Agent-Based Trust and Reputation in the Context of Inaccurate Information Sources by Teacy, W. T. L.
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.ukUNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
Agent-Based Trust and Reputation in
the Context of Inaccurate Information
Sources
by
W. T. Luke Teacy
A thesis submitted in partial fulﬁllment for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Faculty of Engineering, Science and Mathematics
School of Electronics and Computer Science
December 2006UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
ABSTRACT
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by W. T. Luke Teacy
Trust is a prevalent concept in human society that, in essence, concerns our reliance on
the actions of other entities within our environment. For example, we may rely on our
car starting to get to work on time, and on our fellow drivers, so that we may get there
safely. For similar reasons, trust is becoming increasingly important in computing, as
systems, such as the Grid, require integration of computing resources, across organisa-
tional boundaries. In this context, the reliability of resources in one organisation cannot
be assumed from the point of view of another, as certain resources may fail more often
than others. For this reason, we argue that software systems must be able to assess the
reliability of diﬀerent resources, so that they may choose which of them to rely on.
With this in mind, our goal is to develop mechanisms, or models, to aid decision making
by an autonomous agent (the truster), when the consequences of its decisions depend
on the actions of other agents (the trustees). To achieve this, we have developed a
probabilistic framework for assessing trust based on a trustee’s past behaviour, which
we have instantiated through the creation of two novel trust models (TRAVOS and
TRAVOS-C). These facilitate decision making in two diﬀerent contexts with regard to
trustee behaviour. First, using TRAVOS, a truster can make decisions in contexts where
a trustee can only act in one of two ways: either it can cooperate, acting to the truster’s
advantage; or it can defect, thereby acting against the truster’s interests. Second, using
TRAVOS-C, a truster can make decisions about trustees that can act in a continuous
range of ways, for example, taking into account the delivery time of a service.
These models share an ability to account for observations of a trustee’s behaviour, made
either directly by the truster, or by a third party (reputation source). In the latter case,
both models can cope with third party information that is unreliable, either because
the sender is lying, or because it has a diﬀerent world view. In addition, TRAVOS-C
can assess a trustee for which there is little or no direct or reported experience, using
information about other agents that share characteristics with the trustee. This is
achieved using a probabilistic mechanism, which automatically accounts for the amount
of correlation observed between agents’ behaviour, in a truster’s environment.Contents
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Introduction
In human society, the fulﬁlment of even our most basic needs and desires is constantly
at the mercy of other people’s actions. That is, whether we are concerned with having
food on our table or our post delivered on time, someone other than ourselves will play
a critical role in making those events possible. Unfortunately, there is often a great deal
of uncertainty surrounding the behaviour of our fellow beings: as we cannot in general
read minds, so we cannot be certain about other people’s intentions; likewise, we cannot
always tell if the people we rely on have suﬃcient competence and resources to fulﬁll
their obligations.
Managing this uncertainty is something we do almost subconsciously in our daily lives.
For instance, when we need to delegate a task in the workplace, we normally choose
a person who we believe is willing and able to do the job in hand (unless perhaps we
have no better option). Also, we may choose not to disclose information to someone if
we believe they will use that information to our disadvantage. Both of these cases, and
many more, involve assessing the future action of a person or other entity, and deciding
how we personally should act in response to that assessment. In such cases, it is common
to talk about the notion of trust.
The concept of trust is thus prevalent in society and we use it in many contexts. As
with many words in natural language, it is a term that is used frequently, understood
implicitly, but not well deﬁned. For now, we shall defer discussion on a more precise
deﬁnition. However, we observe from this that trust can be associated with scenarios
where action is required on behalf of some person or other entity, when the fulﬁlment
of that action is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. This is particularly true when
cooperation between diﬀerent people is involved.
Increasingly, however, the need to deal with such scenarios is now also widespread in
computer science. For example, in e-commerce, money regularly changes hands between
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individuals and organisations that have no physical involvement; and in computer se-
curity, users must be trusted not to abuse their access rights, and those who are not
trusted to perform certain tasks must be prevented from doing so.
Recent trends in computing, in particular the move towards large-scale open systems,
threatens to make these types of concerns all the more challenging. Visions such as
the semantic web and grid computing aim to enable the integrated use of computer
resources across both geographical and organisational boundaries. It is envisaged that
these systems will have highly dynamic properties, in which decisions regarding what
resources to use, or allow access to, must be made rapidly, and perhaps automatically,
in response to changing circumstances.
Managing the issues of trust that arise in these systems is a challenging problem and
one that, in part, we aim to address in this thesis. To do so, we shall present a number
of mechanisms that can be used to support automated decision making in the context
of trust, but before we can do so, we need to be clear about what it is we mean by trust,
and the precise set of problems that we aim to address.
To this end, the rest of this chapter sets the scene for our work by outlining our aims
and objectives, along with a more precise deﬁnition of the types of problems we wish to
address. Speciﬁcally, we break this discussion into six sections: Section 1.1 discusses the
meaning of trust, and in particular what we mean by the term in this thesis; Section 1.2
outlines some of the general areas in computing for which trust is relevant; Section 1.3
looks at issues of trust in the particular area of service oriented computing, which this
research is targeted at; Sections 1.4 and 1.5 detail the speciﬁc objectives and contri-
butions of the thesis; and ﬁnally, Section 1.6 describes the structure of the rest of the
thesis.
1.1 The Meaning of Trust
In our discussion so far, we have identiﬁed the notion of trust with scenarios that involve
decision making in which the actions of diﬀerent entities are relevant, but by no means
certain. However, trust as an explicit concept is not one that has a single accepted
deﬁnition. For example, deﬁnitions given by the Oxford English dictionary include,
“Conﬁdence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a person or thing, or the
truth of a statement.” which emphasises trust as both a belief and a dependence on
someone or something. From a social science perspective, Misztal (1996) gives an in
depth discussion of many diﬀerent aspects of trust, and surveys a number of deﬁnitions
that emphasize its role as both degree of belief, social relationship or acceptance without
proof or investigation.Chapter 1 Introduction 3
For our purposes, this is not a debate that we need enter into. Nevertheless, we are
interested in a set of problems for which the term trust can meaningfully be applied,
and it is useful to give a precise deﬁnition of the term, as it is used throughout the rest
of this thesis. In doing so, we adopt the following deﬁnition, adapted from Gambetta
(1988), which we believe captures the notion of trust we are interested in.
“Trust is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent
will perform a particular action, both before she can monitor such an action,
and in a context in which it aﬀects her own action.”
There are ﬁve points in this deﬁnition that warrant further elaboration, and which we
describe below:
1. Trust between a pair of entities — Trust is an assessment of one entity, which
we shall refer to as the trustee, from the perspective of another entity, which we
shall refer to as the truster. Although, we may occasionally refer to trust in oneself,
normally these entities are distinct.
2. Trust relates to a particular action — Although sometimes we talk generally
about our trust in an individual, a high level of trust in someone to perform one
type of action does not imply a high level of trust in them to perform another.
For example, just because we can trust a person to pick up a pen does not mean
we trust them to run the country!
3. Trust is a subjective probability — Trust is subjective, because it is assessed
from the unique perspective of the truster. It is dependent both on the individual
set of evidence available to the truster and her relationship with the trustee.
4. Trust is deﬁned to exist before the respective action can be monitored
— Trust is a prior belief about an entity’s actions. It is an assessment made in a
context of uncertainty. Once the truster knows the outcome of an action, she no
longer needs to assess trust in relation to that outcome. Consider the diﬀerence in
the statements, ‘I know you have brushed your teeth’ and ‘I trust that you have
brushed your teeth’.
5. Trust is situated in a context in which it aﬀects the truster’s own action
— By this, we mean that our interest is limited only to those actions of a trustee
that have relevance to the truster. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in trustee ac-
tions that, if their outcomes are known, would usefully inform the truster’s action
decisions.
In our context, this is a strong deﬁnition because it captures both the purpose of trust
that we are interested in, and its nature in a form that can be reasoned about analytically.4 Chapter 1 Introduction
That purpose is to aid an entity to make decisions, with the entity in our case possibly
being an automated computer system. As such, having an explicit concept that can be
reasoned about is a prerequisite, if it is to provide a meaningful label to anything that
can be automated by a computer. Deﬁning trust as a subjective probability fulﬁlls this
requirement, because this is already a term that is well deﬁned and understood within
mathematics.
1.2 The Relevance of Trust in Computing
Having a clear deﬁnition of trust is one step to understanding its relevance to computing.
However, there is a board range of issues in computing for which the term trust has
previously been applied. Not all of these issues can be addressed appropriately in the
same way, and it is beyond the scope of our work to do so. Nevertheless, to understand
our work in context, it is necessary to give an overview of the types of issues encountered.
In general, issues of trust arise in computing when users and software can interact with
information services, computing resources and other users with whom they are unfamiliar
or have no physical contact. For instance, we may ask if we trust an information service
to provide us with accurate information, or a particular website to respect the privacy
of credit card details. The participation of large numbers of entities with conﬂicting
interests in a large open system means that these examples are not isolated. In particular,
we identify three important (possibly overlapping) areas in computing that are concerned
with trust:
Security — Broadly, computer system security can be viewed as an attempt to limit
the actions that individuals or software can perform with a given computer system.
We can view this problem as reverse trust or, equivalently, fear (see Section 2.1):
trust is generally concerned with a wish for an entity to perform an action, whereas
fear is concerned with a wish for an entity not to perform an action. In this respect,
we wish to avoid malicious actions, such as manipulation of important data or
reading of trade secrets, and therefore an attempt to limit the ability to perform
such actions only to those who are unlikely to have incentive to act maliciously.
Traditionally, computer security has been concerned with lower level issues such
as: authentication, whereby the identity of a user is determined; authorisation,
in which access to resources is granted; and data encryption (Gollmann, 1998;
Pﬂeeger, 2002). Recently however, some in this ﬁeld have started to refer ex-
plicitly to issues of trust, though in some cases, the term has been used merely
as a synonym for authorisation or authentication (Grandison and Sloman, 2000).
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authorisation. In this vein, Blaze et al. (1996) introduce the concept of trust man-
agement, which is concerned with specifying and applying security policies that
state precisely what actions can be performed by a given entity.
Service Provision — In contrast to security, service provision concerns actions that a
trustee is obliged to perform. Prime examples of this can be found in the semantic
web (Berners-Lee et al., 2006), pervasive computing (Adelstein et al., 2004) and the
Grid (Foster and Kesselman, 2004), in which certain tasks may be automatically
delegated to systems that are outside the truster’s direct control. In this context,
there may be a number of competing systems that can fulﬁll a particular task,
each providing a diﬀerent quality of service. Obviously, it is in the best interest of
the truster to delegate in a way that maximises the probability of the task being
completed, with the highest possible quality of service.
Human Derived Trust — To assess a trustee, a truster usually gathers evidence
that supports one or more conclusions about the trustee’s likely behaviour. In the
preceding examples, this evidence gathering can, at least in part, be automated.
For instance, automatic intrusion detection indicates that a particular user account
is being used for malicious purposes, or that a service provider may be judged
on the quality of service it has provided in the past. In other cases, such as
online auction houses like e-bay1, trust may depend on intangible qualities, only
discernible from the subjective experience of a human user.
1.3 Service-Oriented Computing
Although there are a number of areas in computing where trust is an issue, our main
motivation is the recent interest in open systems that adopt a service-oriented archi-
tecture (Huhns and Singh, 2005). This type of architecture is central to the idea of
web services (McIlraith et al., 2001; Roy and Ramanujan, 2001), pervasive computing
(Adelstein et al., 2004), and grid computing (Foster and Kesselman, 2004). Each of
these ﬁelds has arisen individually in response to diﬀerent problem domains, but there
is a great deal of overlap in the challenges they face. In particular, they involve loosely
coupled software modules (or services), which are usually distributed over a network,
and can be composed dynamically to solve diﬀerent problems. These services may per-
form a variety of roles from implementing a speciﬁc algorithm, to mediating access to
databases, storage devices or compute clusters.
In this section, we shall focus mostly on grid computing, because part of the work
presented in this thesis is a system that targets this ﬁeld in particular (see Section 4.5).
However, the speciﬁc contributions that we claim in this thesis lay in the intersection
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between grid computing and other service-oriented environments. Thus, we believe our
work has general applicability within service-oriented computing.
From our perspective, what is interesting about all these systems is that resources be-
longing to diﬀerent stakeholders can be brought together in support of a common goal,
and that individual resources may become available, or unavailable, at diﬀerent times.
With regard to grid computing, Foster et al. (2001) state the aim of the Grid as facilitat-
ing, “coordinated resource sharing and problem solving in dynamic, multi-institutional
virtual organisations.” Speciﬁcally, the Grid is concerned with direct access to comput-
ers, software, data and other resources for multiple purposes that involve collaboration
across geographical and institutional boundaries.
In this context, a virtual organisation (VO) is the set of individuals or organisations that
are involved in such a collaboration. It is envisaged that the resources available to a
VO may oﬀer varying degrees of reliability, and may leave and re-join the system at any
time. In addition, the organisations that supply these resources could have diﬀerent, and
possibly conﬂicting, interests. Together, these properties imply an inherent unreliability
in (individual) grid resources, which is ampliﬁed further when we consider that the Grid
is intended to take on a global scale.
Despite the emphasis on dynamic behaviour within the Grid, most existing grid systems
are somewhat inﬂexible in terms of their inter-operation and interactions. Instead,
VOs have usually consisted of research institutes with longstanding relationships, whose
computing resources have been used together in reasonably pre-deﬁned ways. However,
the long term goal is wider than this, and extends to the implementation of ad hoc
solutions that bring together stake holders on-the-ﬂy under short term relationships,
potentially for ﬁnancial gain.
Managing VOs that form and adapt rapidly is not something that has been adequately
addressed by current Grid technology. The emphasis has instead been on developing
protocols and middleware that allow secure, robust and scalable inter-operation between
resources. Therefore, it has been suggested in Foster et al. (2004) that to ﬁll this gap
we should turn to autonomous agents and multi-agent systems (MAS).
As deﬁned by Wooldridge and Jennings (1999), an agent is, “a self-contained problem-
solving system capable of autonomous, reactive, proactive, social behaviour.” A multi-
agent system is a system that comprises a number of such agents, which need to interact
with each other to achieve their goals. Much like in grid computing, agents often need
to organize themselves into collectives (or VOs), despite having potentially conﬂicting
interests. However, the emphasis in agent research as been much less about building
robust and scalable infrastructures, and much more on endowing agents with problem-
solving abilities, so that they may interact and adapt in a changing environment, without
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These types of properties have led many authors to recognise the relevance of agent
technologies to service-oriented computing as a whole. For example, there has been
much research focused on agents that exchange goods in an open marketplace (Pardoe
et al., 2006; He et al., 2006; Sierra, 2004), negotiate and participate in auctions with
sophisticated strategies (Nguyen and Jennings, 2005; Gerding et al., 2006), and form
resource-sharing coalitions of their own accord (Blankenburg et al., 2005; Dang and
Jennings, 2006). As argued by Foster et al. (2004), these types of techniques make
agents a strong candidate for resource management in grid computing, a role which
is quite common in the literature with regard to other service-oriented environments
(Huhns et al., 2005).
1.4 Research Objectives
It is clear from the previous section that multi-agent systems provide an appropriate
tool for managing service-oriented computing environments, like the Grid. It should
also be apparent that such systems may include many diﬀerent stakeholders, who need
to interact despite having potentially diﬀerent incentives and goals. As such, issues of
trust naturally arise from these systems, and decision makers need to be aware of them.
If these decision makers are autonomous agents, then they should be endowed with the
ability to reason about trust, so that they can make eﬀective decisions.
It is this need that forms the motivation of this thesis and the basis of our work. In
particular, we aim to develop trust assessment models, or mechanisms, that can be used to
aid decision making by autonomous agents in a service oriented environment. In doing
so, we can allow agents to manage resources in a service-oriented system eﬀectively,
by identifying which resources are most reliable, and which are best avoided. This
information could then be used along with other factors, to allow an agent to choose the
most suitable resources to fulﬁll its needs, and adapt to circumstances in which resources
fail, or become available.
This raises two issues: (1) we should consider what kind of trust issues agents need to
address, and (2) we should consider what factors an agent should account for, when
making decisions involving trust.
To address the ﬁrst of these issues, we refer back to the categories of trust issues outlined
in Section 1.2. All three of these could potentially arise in problems that an agent
may face, but not all will do so to the same extent. This is due to the nature of
the problem solved by agents in a service-oriented environment. In general, we expect
agents to interact directly with each other, rather than through users. Therefore, it
is possible for agents to learn about each others’ behaviour directly, and so the need
to deal with human derived trust is perhaps of less importance. Similarly, security
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addressed outside the realm of agents, and because security policies are still something
that warrant signiﬁcant human involvement. On the other hand, the key beneﬁt of using
agents in service-oriented environments is to manage the coordination and allocation of
resources from diﬀerent domains. This involves choosing which services to use, and for
what purpose, so it is important to assess the relative reliability of potential service
providers. Thus, the main type of trust that we are interested in is the ability to assess
the willingness and capability of an agent to provide a particular service.
To address the second issue, we need to consider the information that is available to an
agent when making decisions involving trust. This very much depends on the situation,
but examples include using social rules and norms that apply in an environment (Ram-
churn et al., 2003) and the relationships that are known to exist between agents (Ashri
et al., 2005). Although these can play a signiﬁcant role, perhaps the best indicator of
how trustworthy an agent will be is how it has actually behaved in the past. Obser-
vations of past agent behaviour are thus widely recognised as an important and basic
predictor in trust assessment (see Section 2.2 for a detailed review of the literature in
this area).
That said, observations come in diﬀerent guises, and not all are as reliable as each
other. In particular, the source of information is important: a truster may observe
a trustee’s behaviour itself, or it may enquire about a third party’s experiences with
a trustee. Intuitively, direct experience is more reliable than second-hand opinions,
but this may not always be available, especially if a system contains many agents who
interact frequently with strangers.
From human society, we also know that third party experience can be a useful source of
information, the sum of which we refer to as an agent’s reputation (Sabater and Sierra,
2001). For example, we often make assessments about a new business based on word of
mouth, or by reviews written in the press. This form of assessment also has a strong
mediating eﬀect on agent behaviour: if a business provides a poor service and it knows
that this will aﬀect its general reputation, then this will increase its incentive to provide
a good service to continue receiving custom in the future.
On the other hand, those that provide opinions may not always have a truster’s best
intentions at heart, or may not evaluate a service in the way that a truster expects. For
example, if a reputation source is asked to rate a trustee’s performance in an area in
which the reputation source competes, it may provide an unfairly critical report, so as
to increase its own market share. In addition, an agent’s environment may mean that
its performance is perceived diﬀerently depending on which agent it supplies a service
to. In this case, a trustee’s performance, as observed by a reputation source, may not
be a good indicator of its performance toward a particular truster. As such, reputation
cannot be considered as reliable as a truster’s direct experience, and so it must guard
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With this in mind, we can now set out a number of objectives, which we intend to fulﬁll
so that we may meet the aim stated at the start of this section. Speciﬁcally, we believe
the following six objectives are important.
1. Decision Facilitation As our main aim is to facilitate an agent’s decisions, there
should be a clear mechanism by which any system we develop can be used to this
end. Although this seems obvious, it is conceivable to construct a system that
measures some concept of trust, for which the precise role in decision making is
not well deﬁned.
2. Assessment Based on Direct Experience In very many cases, it is safe to
assume that a trustee’s past behaviour is a good indicator of its future behaviour.
Therefore, if a truster has previous direct experience with a trustee, it should
account for this information when deciding how to interact with it in the future.
As such, we should facilitate this in our work.
3. Assessment Based on Reputation In the absence of direct experience, third
party experience can be a useful indicator of a trustee’s behaviour. Thus, our trust
model should make use of a trustee’s reputation, based on third party experiences.
4. Robustness against Inaccurate Reputation Sources Sources of reputation
will not always be reliable. For example, a close colleague of a trustee is likely to
have a strong incentive to exaggerate the trustee’s credentials, and hence provide
unreliable information. Therefore, while making use of reputation, our trust model
should be robust against inaccurate information sources.
5. Eﬃcient Opinion Communication To use reputation, third parties must com-
municate their knowledge to a requesting truster. Hence, we need to support
this communication, ideally such that all relevant information is transmitted with
minimum cost.
6. Assessment with Varying Degrees of Evidence As a group of entities in-
teracts over time, the number and type of interactions that occur between group
members may change. Our trust assessment model should make use of this in-
formation, on average increasing the accuracy of its results as the frequency of
interactions in the system increases. However, the system should not be depen-
dent on such information, but instead its performance should degrade gracefully
as information decreases. In particular, the system should be able to operate when
any one of the following statements is correct:
• The truster has direct experience of the trustee.
• The trustee is not known directly by the truster, but is known by other entities
within the system.
• The trustee is not known to any entity in the system.10 Chapter 1 Introduction
In each case, we should endeavour to make as much use of the information provided
by the environment as possible, but should also be able to provide reasonable
results when certain sources are not available. This is particularly important, for
instance, when a large system has just been initialised and no interactions have
taken place.
Together, these objectives constitute a set of requirements that a trust model must
achieve, if it is to facilitate eﬀective decision making in the types of environments out-
lined in the previous section. As should become clear from Chapter 2, each of these
requirements is fulﬁlled, at least in part, by mechanisms described in the existing lit-
erature. However, these existing systems all suﬀer from certain limitations, which are
addressed in this thesis. Speciﬁcally, we make a number of contributions to the state of
the art, which we outline in the next section.
1.5 Research Contributions
One factor that determines how the objectives deﬁned in the previous section can be
addressed, is how the actions of a trustee can be appropriately represented. This depends
on the needs and preferences of agents within the target domain. For example, suppose
you ask someone to fetch a pint of milk from the shop before 8.00pm. In this case, it
may be that you only care that the milk is delivered by that time, in which case the
relevant aspect of behaviour can be represented as a binary event — either the milk is
delivered, or it is not. On the other hand, you may care about more graded aspects
of this service, for example, the price of the milk, or the number of days left before it
becomes unﬁt for consumption.
With this in mind, the main contribution of our work lies in the creation of two compu-
tational models of trust, which each address our objectives for diﬀerent representations
of trustee behaviour. In particular, the ﬁrst of these, known as TRAVOS (Trust and
Reputation system for Agent Based Virtual OrganisationS), is designed speciﬁcally for
cases in which trustee behaviour can be represented as a binary event. In contrast, the
second model, known as TRAVOS-C, extends the basic concepts employed by TRAVOS,
to address cases in which behaviour is represented as a continuous set of real numbers2.
While together these models do not cover the complete set of possible behaviour repre-
sentations, these two cases do constitute an important subset, which deserve separate
treatment. In addition, the lessons learned from both models provide insight into how
trust could be addressed in other domains. In the rest of the section, we detail the main
contributions that these models share, and exhibit individually.
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What is common to both models is that they both use probability theory to represent
and derive values of trust, regarding the future action of an agent. As such, they
share with other probabilistic models two key advantages over trust models that use
alternative representations. First, the known rules and results of probability theory
can be used to derive a number of important properties of these models. For example,
estimates of unknown quantities about an agent’s behaviour can be shown to be optimal
according to certain criteria and under certain assumptions. Second, probability values
have a natural interpretation in decision theory, so can be used in a well deﬁned and
understood manner to guide rational decision making. However, in addition to these
standard beneﬁts, we provide the following six advances over the state-of-the-art with
respect to other probabilistic models of trust.
1. We specify the ﬁrst set of general requirements for communicating reputation that,
if satisﬁed, guarantee three properties: (1) if a truster requests information about
a trustee from an honest third party, then the truster will receive all relevant
information about that agent’s experiences; (2) this is done such that, under cer-
tain conditions, estimates based on reputation are consistent and as reliable as
estimates based on equivalent direct experience; and (3) this is achieved with min-
imal communication overhead. Moreover, this set of requirements is shown to be
satisﬁed by both of our models, TRAVOS and TRAVOS-C.
2. In TRAVOS, we specify a model of trust for assessing trustees based on a binary
representation of behaviour. This provides a mechanism for ﬁltering out inaccurate
reputation that, of all previous models of its kind, is shown to outperform the
only existing method for achieving this. A description of the TRAVOS model,
along with an explanation of its usage, is given by Patel et al. (2005a, 2004),
while empirical results comparing the model’s ﬁltering mechanism to its existing
competitor is given by Teacy et al. (2005, 2006).
3. Using TRAVOS, we are the ﬁrst to show how a trust model can be used, as
part of a multi-agent system, to manage the formation and reformation of virtual
organisations, within a grid computing environment. To do this, we deployed
TRAVOS as part of a grid resource management system, known as CONOISE-G
(Constraint Oriented Negotiation in Open Information Seeking Environments for
the Grid). Details of this system, including the role of trust within the system,
are given by Shao et al. (2004); Patel et al. (2005b,c, 2006); Nguyen et al. (2006).
4. In TRAVOS-C, we specify the ﬁrst model for assessing trustees based on a contin-
uous representation of behaviour, which satisﬁes the communication requirement,
outlined in Point 1.
5. As part of TRAVOS-C, we have produced the ﬁrst method for dealing with in-
accurate reputation, which is derived completely using probability theory. As a
direct result, this method is known to be optimal under the model’s assumptions.12 Chapter 1 Introduction
6. It has been suggested by some that, when a truster has little or no direct or
indirect experience of a trustee, predictions about the trustee can be improved by
taking into account the known behaviour of similar agents in the system. We have
developed such a mechanism in TRAVOS-C, which is the ﬁrst such method for a
probabilistic trust model with continuous action spaces. Moreover, this is the only
mechanism of its kind which automatically adapts its impact on prediction to best
suit conditions in the truster’s environment.
1.6 Thesis Structure
In the rest of the thesis, we survey the existing literature on trust in multi-agent systems,
and describe in detail the work through which we have made the contributions outlined
in the previous section. This is achieved through the course of the remaining chapters,
which are structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 gives a review of existing mechanisms for managing trust in multi-agent
systems, concentrating in particular on work that goes some way towards fulﬁlling
the objectives described in Section 1.4. The most relevant models with regard to
these objectives are identiﬁed, and their prominent characteristics are described. In
light of these characteristics, we identify several signiﬁcant limitations of existing
trust models, and use these to motivate the work described in the proceeding
chapters.
• Chapter 3 deﬁnes a framework for reasoning about trust, and deﬁnes the basic
notation used throughout the rest of the thesis. Through this framework, we show
how, in general terms, a group of agents can make rational decisions regarding
their peers, based on observations of past behaviour. Moreover, in cases where
these observations are shared between agents, the framework shows how this can
be achieved, while fulﬁlling our objective of eﬃcient communication, outlined in
Section 1.4.
• Chapter 4 introduces the TRAVOS system, describing how it instantiates the
framework from Chapter 3 to reason about trustees whose behaviour is repre-
sented as a binary event. Furthermore, we show how TRAVOS can be used in
practice, by describing how it operates within the CONOISE-G system, and by
giving an empirical evaluation of its performance. In particular, this evaluation
demonstrates how the reputation ﬁltering mechanism in TRAVOS outperforms its
nearest competitor.
• Chapter 5 introduces TRAVOS-C, describing how it too realizes the framework
from Chapter 3 by building on the characteristics of TRAVOS. In particular, we
describe how it can be used to reason about trustees with continuous behaviourChapter 1 Introduction 13
representations, outline its advantages over both TRAVOS and other existing trust
models, and detail its theoretical properties. Finally, we give an empirical evalua-
tion of TRAVOS-C, demonstrating how it performs under the model’s assumptions,
and how it is robust against certain violations of those assumptions.
• Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions drawn throughout the thesis, and in
particular the contributions and limitations of the techniques we have developed.
In addition, we describe and motivate our plans for future work.Chapter 2
Computational Models of Trust
As stated previously, there are a number of areas for which trust is relevant. Generally,
these fall into three major categories: security issues, human derived trust and service
provision. In our work, we are concerned primarily with service provision, and so in this
section we focus our attention only on related work that is relevant to this set of problems.
Speciﬁcally, we divide our discussion into ﬁve main sections. First, Section 2.1 considers
mechanisms for assessing trust by analysing the diﬀerent types of beliefs an agent must
hold to have trust in another. Second, Section 2.2 surveys the major approaches for
forming trust based on information directly available to a truster. Third, Section 2.3
addresses the problems that arise when trust is based on third party opinions. Fourth,
Section 2.4 outlines an alternative approach to trust assessment: it discusses mechanisms
that attempt to enforce trustworthy behaviour by making it in a trustee’s best interest
to be trustworthy. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 2.6, summarising the
related work to date, and identifying key outstanding issues.
2.1 The Cognitive Viewpoint
One way of analysing the trust that one agent should have in another, is to reason about
the beliefs that a truster should hold about a trustee, if it is to believe that the trustee
will behave in a particular way. In this respect, we consider the work of Castelfranchi
and Falcone (2001), who adopt the same basic deﬁnition of trust as us (i.e. a subjective
probability of a trustee’s action). Building upon this, they make two things explicit: (1)
they identify beliefs that a truster must hold before it can rationally believe a trustee
will carry out a given action; and (2) they identify a three-way relationship that exists
between the concepts of trust, fear and authority. The core beliefs that are prerequisite
to a belief of trust are as follows:
• The truster must believe that the trustee is willing to carry out the action.
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Figure 2.1: The three way relationship between trust, fear and authority.
• The truster must believe that the trustee is capable of carrying out the action.
In turn, these beliefs may be conditioned on a number of other beliefs that, for the
most part, are domain dependent. In general, however, we can distinguish between two
diﬀerent sets of beliefs: internal beliefs, which relate to the trustee’s mental state, and
external beliefs, which concern environmental conditions. To illustrate the impact of the
latter, consider an entity, Captain Joe, who is capable of sailing a particular boat, the
Jolly Roger. If something was to happen to the Jolly Roger so as to cause it to sink,
then Captain Joe will no longer be able to sail the boat, despite his skills as a sailor.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between trust, fear and authority mentioned ear-
lier. Fear can be said to be negative trust; it is trust in an entity to carry out an action
that has a negative eﬀect on the truster. Like trust, fear in an entity requires the condi-
tions of willingness and capability to be present. When we introduce an authority, which
is capable of punishing unsolicited behaviour, an interesting dynamic is set up between
the authority, truster, and trustee. The fear a potential wrong-doer has in an authority
decreases its likelihood of behaving illegally. On the other hand, if a victim trusts an
authority to protect its rights, and it can assume potential criminals hold similar beliefs
about the authority, then its trust in potential criminals can be increased.
The inﬂuence of authority on trust relationships is also acknowledged by Dasgupta
(1988), who argues that, if a rational agent is put in a position where it can choose to
beneﬁt at the expense of others, it will always choose to beneﬁt unless it has reason to
fear retribution.
With these factors identiﬁed, we need to consider how can we use them to develop an
automated method for reasoning about trust. An attempt to do this is made by Falcone
et al. (2003), in which they use fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1975, 1965) to build a truster’s
beliefs about trust, willingness and capability from other beliefs that are largely domain
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Although identifying the composite beliefs that make up trust gives us a better under-
standing of what we are attempting to measure, one major question remains unanswered:
how can a truster determine its core beliefs based on observations of its environment?
Clearly, factors such as trustee willingness and capability are not directly observable
in general; they must be estimated from observable evidence. Moreover, depending on
evidence that is observable, attempting to estimate separate beliefs about such factors
may not be practical at all. For example, consider a scenario in which all we can observe
is an agent’s external behaviour in the absence of any other environmental data. In this
case, the best we can do is quantify the uncertainty in the trustee’s behaviour directly;
we cannot possibly distinguish between the trustee defaulting on its obligations because
it wants to, or because it cannot do otherwise.
Thus, due to the diﬃculty in obtaining information about an agent’s internal beliefs, in
our work, we choose not to employ techniques for reasoning about such beliefs, but to
rely only on evidence pertaining to an agent’s external behaviour.
2.2 Learning from Direct Observations
In this section we turn our attention to methods of representing trust, and how to ground
such representations in evidence directly observable to a truster. We diﬀerentiate direct
evidence from evidence as reported by other agents, the latter of which raises a separate
group of problems that we address in Section 2.3.
Generally, existing trust models represent trust in one of three ways: (1) they adopt an
improvised representation, based on intuitive assumptions about the meaning of trust;
(2) they apply probability theory; or (3) they apply Dempster-Shafer theory. For the
purposes of clarity, we separate our discussion according to this categorisation, and
discuss each in turn in the subsequent subsections.
2.2.1 Improvised Models of Trust
As mentioned earlier, although the concept of trust is prevalent in society, there is some
disagreement and confusion about its precise deﬁnition. Perhaps partially as a result, a
range of diﬀerent representations have been adopted in existing computational models
of trust. In some cases, trust is modelled as belonging to a ﬁnite set of qualitative
labels, examples of which include the work by Azzedin and Maheswaran (2002c,b,a) and
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes (1997). In the case of the former, the trust of one entity in
another is a value belonging to the set {A,B,C,D,E,F}, and similarly in the latter, a
member of the set {−1,0,1,2,3,4}. Typically, these values are associated with linguistic
labels that describe their intended meaning. For instance, Abdul-Rahman and Hailes
attach labels to trust values as described in Table 2.1.18 Chapter 2 Computational Models of Trust
Value Meaning Description
-1 Distrust Completely untrustworthy
0 Ignorance Cannot make trust-related judgement about entity
1 Minimal Lowest possible trust
2 Average Moderate trustworthiness
3 Good More trustworthy than most entities
4 Complete Completely trust this entity
Table 2.1: Trust value semantics used by Abdul-Rahman et al.
This relatively coarse set of values reﬂects a perceived diﬃculty in choosing continuous
trust values with any meaningful degree of accuracy. In our view, however, this problem
is speciﬁc to cases in which trust is elicited from a user1. As should become clear from
what follows, there are meaningful methods of calculating continuous trust values when
trust assessment becomes a fully automated task. We therefore argue that the diﬃculty
in distinguishing between discrete trust levels compared to continuous levels limits the
former’s applicability to human elicited trust values.
Models that represent trust as a real-valued scalar include those developed by Marsh
(1994) and Zacharia et al. (1999); and more recently by Fan et al. (2005), and Griﬃths
and Chao (2005). Representative of these, and one that makes a good attempt to deal
with the objectives outlined in Section 1.4, is the REGRET system (Sabater and Sierra,
2001, 2002), which includes three dimensions of trust: an individual dimension, a social
dimension, and an ontological dimension. We shall examine each of these in turn below.
First, we consider the ontological dimension that is essentially concerned with the sub-
jectivity of trust with respect to an individual truster. A trust value in REGRET is
represented as a numeric value in the range [−1,1], with a value of 1 interpreted as
absolute trust, and −1 interpreted as complete distrust. These values are attached to
a particular context by a label, examples of which are to overcharge, meaning that a
trustee has a tendency to charge more for a service than the truster believes it is worth,
and quality swindler, meaning that, from the perspective of the truster, the trustee
tends to supply services with unacceptable quality. The intended interpretation is that
they relate to a particular trait of a trustee’s behaviour.
An important element of the ontological dimension is that behavioural traits2 of an agent
can be deﬁned in terms of other, lower level traits. For instance, a service provider could
be assessed according to a trait labelled swindler, which is deﬁned in terms of the traits,
to overcharge and quality swindler, mentioned earlier. From an implementation
perspective, REGRET calculates trust values for such compositional traits as a weighted
average of the trust values calculated for the base traits. The weights used in this
1To illustrate, consider trying to assess the probability of it raining tomorrow; is it possible to decide
whether this probability is more likely to be 2.1 or 2.2?
2In REGRET, these are referred to as ‘reputation types’. We use the term trait, so as not to confuse
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calculation are considered to be dependent on an individual truster; they encode the
agent’s subjective deﬁnitions for these terms. Besides specifying how compositional traits
can have trust values calculated, the ontological dimension can serve a communication
role in that a reputation source can share its deﬁnition of compositional traits with other
agents, so that they can decide how best to interpret reputation information from that
provider.
The individual dimension of trust is based solely on the ﬁrst-hand knowledge that a
truster has about a trustee. In REGRET this is calculated based on past interactions
that have occurred between the truster and trustee. For example, when a truster pur-
chases a service from a trustee, the truster will have expectations about how the trustee
will behave. Some of these expectations will be explicit, based on a contract between
the truster and trustee for what the trustee should provide. Others will be implicit,
based on the trustee’s personal perspective on the world. A truster’s individual trust
level (with respect to a particular trait) is a function of the diﬀerence between the utility
the truster would achieve if the trustee behaved according to these expectations and the
actual utility gained from the interaction.
As well as providing a method for calculating these trust values, REGRET also provides
two separate methods to measure the reliability of these values. Two diﬀerent types of
uncertainty determine the reliability of a trust value:
• Intrinsic uncertainty in trustee behaviour, which is estimated based on the variance
of observed trustee behaviour.
• Uncertainty due to lack of evidence, for which REGRET uses a function that de-
creases logarithmically until a minimum value, in line with the number of observed
interactions with a trustee and the time that has passed since those interactions.
In REGRET, both of these are measured using improvised functions. For example,
REGRET calculates evidential uncertainty using Equation 2.1, adapted from Sabater
and Sierra (2001).
evidential uncertainty =
(
sin
  π
2·itm · noObs

noObs ∈ [0,itm]
1 otherwise
(2.1)
Here, noObs is the number of observations a truster has made of a trustee’s behaviour,
and itm is a threshold number of observations, above which the truster considers its
knowledge of a trustee to be completely reliable. In a similar way, intrinsic uncertainty is
measured by another function, improvised from intuitive conclusions about what factors
should aﬀect its value. An overall reliability factor is then calculated as a weighted
average of these two functions. One problem with this scheme is that it is unclear what
value should be chosen for itm, and what weight should be used to generate the overall
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Often, an agent will need to assess its trust in an entity with which it has little or no
previous experience. In this case, REGRET can draw upon the social dimension of
trust, and there are three sources of information that fall under this heading: witness
reputation, neighbourhood reputation, and system reputation.
Witness reputation is, as the name suggests, based on the opinions of third parties
concerning a trustee. The inﬂuence of particular witness’s opinion on the overall trust
value is partly determined by the truster’s trust in the reputation source to provide reli-
able information. This can be calculated by applying the formulae for individual trust,
eﬀectively treating the ability to give reliable reputation information as just another
trait.
Neighbourhood reputation assumes that the truster maintains a sociogram, which is a
network structure describing the social relationships between agents in the environment.
To calculate neighbourhood reputation, REGRET applies a set of static3 fuzzy rules,
where the antecedent of each rule is a condition on the relationships connecting the
trustee to other agents. To illustrate, we might deﬁne a rule such as
IF coop(trustee,agent b) = high THEN socialTrust = very bad,
where high, and very bad are predeﬁned fuzzy sets.
System reputation is also calculated according to a static set of fuzzy rules. In this case,
the rules are deﬁned according to the role that a trustee plays within an institutional
structure — seller is an example of such a role. As with neighbourhood trust, system
trust assumes that information about social roles is available to the truster.
REGRET combines these diﬀerent sources — individual and social dimensions — based
on reliability functions deﬁned over them. In addition, there is also an intrinsic pref-
erence ordering built in: direct interactions are intrinsically more reliable than wit-
ness reputation, witness reputation is more reliable than neighbourhood reputation, and
neighbourhood reputation is more reliable than system reputation.
From our perspective, REGRET is signiﬁcant because it broadly satisﬁes the objectives
speciﬁed in Section 1.4. However, REGRET suﬀers limitations for at least two reasons.
First, it assumes that certain information (for example, a sociogram) is available. Sec-
ond, there are several parameters in the model, optimal values for which are not known,
and may be domain dependent.
3By static, we mean that REGRET must be preconﬁgured with a set of rules. REGRET cannot
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2.2.2 Probabilistic Models of Trust
Aside from fuzzy logic, the trust models we have looked at so far all make use of,
essentially, hand-crafted representations of trust, and operations deﬁned on these repre-
sentations. This is by no means an invalid approach — ultimately, the goal of assessing
trust is to provide discriminatory information about trustees, and so any technique that
can be shown to do this can be considered reasonable. However, there are existing for-
malisms for reasoning about uncertainty, which have well known beneﬁcial properties,
and are well grounded in mathematical theory. Of these, perhaps the most prominent
is probability theory.
One noteworthy probabilistic trust model is detailed by Barber and Kim (2001). It
provides a well grounded method for assessing the reliability of information sources, and
shows how it can be used to combine conﬂicting information into a consistent knowledge
base. Unfortunately, the model is designed speciﬁcally to deal with such conﬂicts: it uses
the statistical properties of the conﬂicts themselves to perform its task, and so cannot
be applied to a more general setting.
More generally, the majority of probabilistic models that attempt to assess trustees on
a broad range of services (which include those reviewed in the remainder of this section)
have two things in common. First, they represent the outcome of an interaction with a
trustee as a bistable event — either the trustee cooperates and fulﬁlls its obligations to
the truster, or it defects and does not. Second, they estimate the probability distribution
for this binary variable based on direct or indirect (via reputation) observations of the
trustee’s past behaviour. Obviously, this simpliﬁcation leaves clear room for improve-
ment: if a truster’s utility is dependent, not only on whether a trustee performs a task,
but also on how well the task is performed, then a bistable representation will fail to
capture the relevant dynamics of the problem. Nevertheless, situations in which task
performance does not carry much signiﬁcance over and above task completion constitute
an important subcase.
An example of such a system can be found in Wang and Vassileva (2003). Here, a
trust mechanism is presented for use in a peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing environment. Trust
in a particular provider is assessed according to several quality attributes, such as type
of ﬁle requested, download speed and ﬁle quality. The system uses a na¨ ıve Bayesian
network, in which the probability of the provider being trustworthy (modelled as a
binary variable) is dependent on each of the quality attributes considered. Here, na¨ ıve
means that the eﬀect of each attribute on the trustworthiness of a provider is assumed
to be independent. Such assumptions are often made to simplify a problem domain,
with solutions adopting them generally being robust when faced with minor violations.
Whether the assumption is reasonable in the domain targeted by this model depends on
the particular set of quality attributes used in a given instance of the model.22 Chapter 2 Computational Models of Trust
Agent A Agent B
successful 20 2
unsuccessful 20 2
Table 2.2: Frequencies of successful and unsuccessful interactions with diﬀerent
agents.
One factor that Wang and Vassileva fail to account for is evidential uncertainty. Here,
we diﬀerentiate evidential uncertainty from intrinsic uncertainty. We deﬁne intrinsic
uncertainty to be uncertainty that is due to inherent unpredictability of a stochastic
process. On the other hand, we consider evidential uncertainty as uncertainty that is
due to a lack of knowledge. To illustrate, consider observing successful and unsuccessful
interactions with two agents, A and B, the frequencies for which are shown in Table
2.2. Using Wang’s model, we would consider there to be no diﬀerence in the uncertainty
surrounding agent A’s behaviour and agent B’s behaviour. However, intuition tells us
that this is not the case, because we have interacted with A ten times more than B and
can therefore be more certain about A’s true behaviour. This highlights a failing common
to all simple probabilities that is particularly important in domains where the frequency
of observations is relatively low. We believe that trust assessment in large multi-agent
systems is such a domain, because the likelihood of any two agents interacting a large
number of times is fairly low. We therefore argue that accounting for both types of
uncertainty is important and give further justiﬁcation for this in Chapter 3.
Fortunately, to say that probability theory in general cannot account for evidential
uncertainty would be incorrect. This is illustrated by the trust model presented by
Jøsang and Ismail (2002), in which trust is modelled as a probability distribution for
a binary event, a class of distributions commonly referred to as Bernoulli distributions
(Evans et al., 2000). In addition, however, they also model the parameter distribution
of the Bernoulli distribution (DeGroot and Schervish, 2002). Statistical models, such
as Bernoulli distributions, are characterised by a set of parameters that determine their
shape. In the case of a Bernoulli distribution, it is characterised by a single parameter
— the probability of the variable being equal to one. The parameter distribution in this
case is the distribution over the possible values of that probability.
For simplicity, the authors choose to represent the parameter distribution as a beta dis-
tribution. The advantage of this is that there is a special relationship between Bernoulli
and beta distributions. Speciﬁcally, consider a Bernoulli distribution for which the prior
parameter distribution is a beta distribution. If we draw samples from this Bernoulli
distribution under an i.i.d assumption4, then the posterior parameter distribution, given
the samples, will also be a beta distribution. A family of distributions which exhibits
this property for a statistical model is known as the model’s conjugate family.
4This is a standard abbreviation for the assumption that samples are drawn independently from an
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Eﬀectively, the parameter distribution represents the evidential uncertainty surrounding
the true intrinsic probability of a random variable. In this case, the intrinsic probability
that a trustee will cooperate rather than defect. It can be used to reason about how
much evidence is required to make a particular decision, or to compare the conﬁdence
levels diﬀerent agents have in their knowledge about a trustee. Again, we discuss this
further in Chapter 3. Moreover, by choosing a conjugate prior, the authors simplify
the process of calculating, combining, and storing the parameter distribution associated
with a trustee. For this reason, beta distributions are also applied to the ﬁeld of trust
by Klos and Poutr´ e (2004); Mui et al. (2001); Zhang and Cohen (2006) and Buchegger
and Boudec (2003).
2.2.3 Dempster-Shafer Models of Trust
An alternative method for handling uncertainty can be found in Dempster-Shafer theory
(Shafer, 1976). Dempster-Shafer provides a mechanism for forming degrees of belief
about sets of hypotheses, based on available evidence. For example, imagine we have
a set of two competing hypotheses {A,B}, of which only one can be true. Dempster-
Shafer theory divides the total belief in the set between the elements of its superset5,
{{A},{B},{A,B}}. Essentially, belief in the set {A} represents the evidence supporting
A as the true hypothesis (and likewise for set {B}). On the other hand, belief in the
set {A,B} is belief that cannot be divided between A and B. This can be said to
represent the evidential uncertainty surrounding A and B; because of this, Dempster-
Shafer theory is often claimed as a solution to the inability of simple probabilities to
capture this notion.
In particular, this is the rationale given for its use by Yu and Singh (2002). Here, the
authors deﬁne a binary hypothesis set, in which the competing hypotheses are that
an agent is trustworthy, and that it is not trustworthy. They consider scenarios in
which trustees supply services, which are given a quality of service rating between 0
and 1. To gather evidence for the trustworthiness of an agent, they perform the fol-
lowing three steps. First, they break the range of quality values into three intervals,
[0 <= x < a],[a <= x < b],[b <= x <= 1], where a and b are arbitrary
constants. Second, they count the proportion of recent6 trustee interaction outcomes
that fall in each of these three intervals. Finally, they take the proportion of outcomes
in the lower interval as the belief that the trustee is untrustworthy, the proportion in the
higher interval as the belief that the truster is trustworthy, and the proportion in the
middle interval as the belief in the total set, {untrustworthy, trustworthy}. In line with
5By deﬁnition, the superset of a set, S, is the set comprised of all subsets of S.
6In their model, Yu and Singh only use the x most recent observations of a trustee’s behaviour. This
allows for the possibility that a trustee’s behaviour changes over time, in which case old observations
would be poor predictors of behaviour.24 Chapter 2 Computational Models of Trust
Dempster-Shafer theory, belief in the total set is interpreted as the degree of uncertainty
in whether the trustee is trustworthy or not.
The problem with this approach is twofold. First, there is no clear way to choose the
values for the constants a and b. Second, the notion of trust that this representation
captures is somewhat artiﬁcial. Consider as an example a trustee with whom a truster
has (recently) interacted 1000 times. On each of these occasions, the trustee’s quality of
service was precisely 0.5. Here, the truster has chosen a = 0.3 and b = 0.7. According
to Yu and Singh’s model, this means that the truster is completely uncertain whether it
trusts the trustee or not. A more useful conclusion would be that the trustee provides
an average quality of service of 0.5, with very low variance, so that there is a large degree
of certainty regarding its behaviour.
Futhermore, there are three reasons why Yu and Singh’s rationale for using Dempster-
Shafer theory, rather than probability theory, is somewhat unsound. First, despite their
claim to the contrary, probability theory can be used to represent and reason about
evidential uncertainty, through the use of parameter distributions (Section 2.2.2).
Second, it is well known that Dempster-Shafer theory can result in counter-intuitive
conclusions if there is a signiﬁcant degree of conﬂicting evidence surrounding possible
world states (Campos and Cavalcante, 2003). With regard to trust assessment, this is
a signiﬁcant problem because it is highly possible that a truster may receive conﬂicting
opinions about a trustee, particularly if those opinions come from agents with conﬂicting
interests that may provide misleading evidence in support of their own goals.
Finally, Dempster-Shafer theory is best suited to applications in which available evidence
supports sets of hypotheses to an equal degree, rather than individual conclusions. If
this is not the case, then probability theory can provide a more simple and intuitive
method of reasoning. For example, if an agent provides a QoS of 0.7 this supports the
hypothesis that it will provide a QoS of 0.7 in the future, and to a lesser degree QoS
values close to 0.7. Conversely, there is no QoS value that a trustee could provide that
would equally support the hypotheses that a trustee will provide QoS values of both
0.1 and 0.9, which supports the use of probability theory rather than Dempster-Shafer
theory.
An alternative application of Dempster-Shafer, relevant to trust, is given by Jøsang
(2002, 2001). Here, it is used to deﬁne subjective logic, which is an attempt to extend
ﬁrst order logic to reason about propositions that have probabilities attached to their
truth or falsehood. This has grounding in both probability theory and Dempster-Shafer
theory, and has ﬁrst order logic as a special case. Signiﬁcantly, from the perspective
of trust, it deﬁnes two new operators for reasoning about third party opinions: the
consensus operator and the discounting operator. In particular, these operators can be
used to combine opinions from diﬀerent sources, as is required when trust is based on
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from diﬀerent sources when each source is equally and fully trusted to provide accurate
information. The discounting operator plays a supportive role to the consensus operator:
it is applied prior to the consensus operator, to any sources which are not fully trusted
to provided accurate information, and its eﬀect is to increase the evidential uncertainty
surrounding the opinion. As a result it decreases the eﬀect it would otherwise have when
combined with other opinions.
The justiﬁcation for these two operators, is grounded in statistical theory. Speciﬁcally,
a mapping is provided between the Dempster-Shafer notion of evidential uncertainty,
and the beta distribution representation described in Section 2.2.2. The operators are
thus shown to be equivalent to operations on the parameter distribution. In the case of
the consensus operator, the grounding relation ﬁrst assumes that each opinion concerns
a Bernoulli distribution, and that they are each based on disjoint sets of samples from
that distribution, under an i.i.d assumption. The result of the consensus operator is
then shown to be equivalent to the probability that would result, if all the data are
considered together. Although the assumptions behind this grounding are not expected
to hold in general, it is expected to give reasonable results, even when they do not hold.
The discounting operator is given a similar justiﬁcation, which we do not describe in
full here. Brieﬂy, under certain conditions, it is shown to be equivalent to multiplying
an opinion by the probability that it is true.
Overall, subjective logic provides a promising method for reasoning about uncertain
probabilities. In particular, its grounding in probability theory gives a good justiﬁca-
tion for its use. There are, however, two points that must be considered. First, the
discounting operator does not say how the probability that a source is accurate should
be calculated. This is an open question that may depend on the type of information
available. Second, the deﬁnition is subjective, particularly in the case of its consensus
and discounting operators, which make certain assumptions that may not be appropri-
ate in every case. These should be questioned with respect to any application for which
subjective logic is considered.
2.3 Learning from Others
The basic problem of trust assessment is to estimate the behaviour of a trustee based
on the available evidence. When this evidence is gathered indirectly via third party
opinions (reputation), there are four additional factors that we must consider. First,
a third party may deﬁne observed properties in a diﬀerent way from the truster. For
instance, what one agent considers a good service may not be what another considers
good. Second, reports from several diﬀerent reputation sources may be based on the
same evidence, resulting in correlated evidence. Third, the behaviour of a trustee to-
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reputation source may have no incentive to provide reputation or, if it does, it may have
an incentive to misrepresent its knowledge about a trustee. We can subdivide the lat-
ter into positive discrimination (collusion) in which the reputation source overestimates
the beneﬁcial qualities of a trustee, and negative discrimination in which the trustee’s
beneﬁcial qualities are underestimated.
Each of these factors manifests itself as a decrease in the predictive power of reputation
when compared to direct evidence. Thus, many trust models which employ reputation
include bias reduction mechanisms to target one or more of these factors. Essentially,
there are three basic methods for doing this, which we review separately in the sub-
sections that follow. Speciﬁcally, Section 2.3.1 examines models that employ external
factors, which are not directly related to a reputation source’s opinions, to assess the
accuracy of those opinions; Section 2.3.2 considers methods that assume that the ma-
jority of opinions received about a trustee are reliable; and ﬁnally, Section 2.3.3 reviews
methods that assess the perceived accuracy of past reports given subsequent trustee
behaviour.
2.3.1 External Factors
Zacharia et al. (1999) introduce two complementary reputation systems, HISTOS and
SPORAS. Of these, SPORAS is a simple trust model that is not context dependent,
and that a truster can use when there is little information available about other agents.
To account for the unreliability of a reputation source, it simply weights its opinion by
the truster’s trust in the reputation source itself. The implicit assumption here is that
if an agent can be trusted in general — for example, to provide a particular service —
then it can be trusted to provide accurate information about other agents. Clearly, this
assumption does not hold in general.
HISTOS, on the other hand, is a more sophisticated model suited to environments in
which more information about a trustee’s peers are available. It suﬀers from the same
context independence as SPORAS, but takes on board the social relationships that
exist between the truster, its reputations sources, and the trustee. Speciﬁcally, it (like
SPORAS) treats trust as a transitive relationship, in which the trust of a truster in a
trustee is a function of the trust of each reputation source in the trustee, and the trust of
the truster in each reputation source. Unlike SPORAS, HISTOS builds a social network
from the pairwise ratings that have previously been reported between agents. This is
a directed graph, in which agents are represented by nodes, and edges between nodes
represent the direct trust value of the parent node in the child node. The transitive
trust relationship is then applied recursively along the directed paths between truster
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The REGRET system (Section 2.2.1) applies two diﬀerent techniques to reputation noise
reduction. The ﬁrst of these applies the same transitive reasoning to trust as HISTOS
and SPORAS, weighting a reputation source’s opinion by the trust the truster has in that
reputation source. However, REGRET’s notion of trust is more expressive: it takes on
board contextual issues such as the time a rating was given, and through its ontological
dimension, can account for several diﬀerent aspects of trust. For example, the trust of
an agent as a reputation source may be built on its trust as a service provider and the
accuracy of any past opinions it has provided. Unfortunately, REGRET does not give
speciﬁc guidance on the relative importance of such factors, nor how the accuracy of
past opinions should be calculated, the latter of which, in itself, is not a trivial issue.
The second mechanism adopted by REGRET speciﬁcally attempts to deal with the
correlated evidence problem, which the majority of trust models recognise as a potential
problem. The universal solution is to specify that a reputation source should only share
its direct knowledge, and not pass on other agents’ knowledge as its own, but the speciﬁcs
of the solution vary. Most models assume independence, which can be justiﬁed if the
intersection between agents’ world views are small. In contrast, REGRET’s solution is
to carefully select reputation sources based on social network analysis. To do this, it
uses an algorithm that divides a social network into groups of agents and then chooses
reputation sources which are representative of those groups. The intuition is that a
highly connected group of agents are likely to share the same knowledge, whereas loosely
connected individuals are unlikely to share knowledge.
Common to all of these solutions is that they suﬀer from at least one of two problems:
they assume that the information they rely on is readily available, which is not necessarily
the case; or the links made between the factors they use and reputation accuracy do not
hold in many cases. Speciﬁcally, information about the relationships between agents may
not be readily available, or may require signiﬁcant user input; and trust in an agent in one
context (such as service provision) should not imply trust to provide reliable opinions. To
rectify these limitations, the techniques described in the following subsections attempt
to estimate accuracy based on the observed behaviour of both reputation sources and
other agents.
2.3.2 The Majority Opinion
One way to judge opinion accuracy is to assume that the majority of opinions received
about a trustee are reliable, and so discredit reports that deviate signiﬁcantly from
mainstream opinion. Such methods have been described by Jøsang et al. (2005) and
Whitby et al. (2004) as endogenous, because they rely only on the statistical properties
of the opinions themselves, while approaches that do rely on other factors are described
as exogenous. Representative endogenous techniques are given by Whitby et al. (2004),
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Whitby et al extend the Beta Reputation System (Section 2.2.2) by applying an iterative
ﬁltering algorithm. In each cycle, an interquantile range7 is calculated for the set of
opinions received about a trustee. Any opinions lying outside this range — that is,
opinions that deviate signiﬁcantly from the mean — are discarded. In the following
cycle, the interquantile range is recalculated without the discarded opinions, and the
process continues until all remaining opinions are in range. Although this approach is
reasonable, and has been shown to give encouraging results, there is no guarantee that
any opinions will remain after the algorithm has been applied. This can occur when all
opinions diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the mean. Therefore, the approach is only applicable
when there is a clear consensus between a reasonable number of reputation sources.
Dellarocas adopts a slightly diﬀerent approach. First, he attempts to prevent nega-
tive discrimination through controlled anonymity, by which reputation and services are
distributed by a central institution that does not reveal the identity of producers or
consumers to each other. The intuition here is that, because a reputation source does
not know the true identity of the trustee, it cannot determine if it is friend or foe and so
has no reason to discredit it. This approach does not account for positive discrimination,
because if a trustee and a reputation source collude, they could signal their identity to
each other by other means, breaking anonymity.
To deal with this, the authors apply a clustering algorithm to separate a trustee’s repu-
tation into an upper and lower group of opinions. Since positive discrimination should
appear more complimentary of the trustee, such opinions are assumed to be in the up-
per cluster, which is discarded. In most cases discarding the upper cluster introduces
a negative bias. Through empirical study, the author argues that this bias is within
acceptable bounds.
In our view, the main limitations of the Dellarocas approach lie in the applicability
and eﬀectiveness of controlled anonymity. Obviously, there are many cases in which a
provider and consumer must be aware of each other’s identity for a transaction to take
place, which limits the situations in which this can be applied. Where it can be applied,
it cannot account for a reputation source that wishes to discredit all trustees other than
itself, or assumes that any agent that does not signal its true identity is a foe.
More generally, however, the assumption that majority opinion is reliable does not hold
when there is a trustee with whom no agent has signiﬁcant experience. In this case,
all benevolent reputation sources will report no information, while reputation sources
with an incentive to lie, will report information. In light of this, most, if not all, of the
reputation provided will be unreliable.
7The interquantile range of a dataset is a descriptive statistic that speciﬁes a range of values in which
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2.3.3 Past Performance
To alleviate these problems, we can consider the alternative exogenous approach of
assessing a reputation source based on the accuracy of its past opinions. Amongst
others, this is adopted by Yu and Singh (2003), who extend their previous work (Section
2.2.3) by applying a modiﬁed version of the Weighted Majority Algorithm (Littlestone
and Warmuth, 1994). Essentially, their approach consists of three steps. First, the
reputation of a trustee is calculated as a weighted average of reputation source opinions,
with initially equal weights. Second, after the result of an interaction with the trustee
has been observed, the diﬀerences between each opinion and the observed result are
calculated. Third, the weights applied to each reputation source are adjusted relative
to the diﬀerence between their stated opinion and the observed result.
There are two main advantages of this approach: First, under the reasonable assumption
that a reputation source’s past and future accuracy are correlated, the relative weight
placed in inaccurate reputation sources will gradually decrease towards zero. Second,
unlike Dellarocas and Whitby, this approach does not require the majority of reputation
opinions to be accurate, and so does not suﬀer the consequences associated with that
assumption.
However, as we described previously, the method of representing trust employed by
Yu and Singh does not adequately describe the uncertainty that surrounds an agent’s
behaviour. A better attempt at this is made by some probabilistic trust models, of which
a good example is given by Despotovic and Aberer (2005). In their work, Despotovic
and Aberer consider three diﬀerent scenarios, two of which represent trustee behaviour
as a binary event (cooperate or defect), and one which represents a trustee’s performance
during an interaction as a real value. In the latter case, the real value assigned to an
agent’s performance is supposed to represent some measure of its quality, and is assumed
to be drawn from a normal distribution, with known variance, but unknown mean.
In both these scenarios, maximum likelihood estimation (DeGroot and Schervish, 2002)
is used to derive the probability that a trustee will behave in a certain way, based on
third party opinions. In particular, inaccurate opinions are handled by modelling the
likelihood of receiving a certain opinion, given the probability that a reputation source
is lying or telling the truth. In turn, the probability of a report being accurate is learnt
over time, by a truster comparing reports about its own behaviour to its own knowledge
of how it actually behaved.
The strength in this approach is that it shows how a trustee can be assessed in a well
founded way, based on possibly inaccurate opinions. However, the assumption that a
truster can learn about the reliability of reports based on its own reputation is not widely
applicable. For instance, a particular agent might only ever consume a certain resource,
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of the three scenarios tested, the truster can only judge the average reliability of all
reputation sources, as opposed to the accuracy of one individual. In this case, a truster
is limited in how much it can improve its assessments, because it cannot distinguish
between reliable and unreliable sources.
2.4 Mechanism Design
The techniques described so far have all addressed trust by attempting its assessment
based on available knowledge. An alternative approach, mechanism design (Dash et al.,
2003), aims to design a system in such a way that it is in the best interest of the agents
to behave favourably towards each other. An established research area in its own right,
this is not always explicitly tied to issues of trust, but from a trust perspective, it reduces
the uncertainty surrounding a trustee’s willingness to behave well. However, uncertainty
in trustee behaviour cannot be removed completely. Generally, to manipulate a trustee’s
interests, we must assume that it is rational, which may not be the case for a variety
of reasons, not least that an agent may have contracted a virus. Also, aﬀecting an
agent’s willingness does not aﬀect the uncertainty surrounding its capabilities. In light
of this, we view mechanism design as complementary to trust assessment, rather than a
replacement for it. Here, we illustrate how it can be used to simplify trust assessment
problems, by reviewing some of the methods that lie in the intersection between trust
and mechanism design.
Many of the trust models considered above include recommendations that can be con-
sidered as mechanism design. For instance, in HISTOS and SPORAS, it is not possible
for an agent to have a reputation value lower than that of a new unknown agent enter-
ing the system for the ﬁrst time. If this were possible, and agents were able to change
identity at no cost, then agents with low reputation would simply create a new identity
to improve their standing. Unfortunately, this approach may lead agents never to trust
new agents if measures are not taken to ensure otherwise.
An important problem not addressed above is the incentive that an agent has to act as
a reputation source. Clearly, if agents share information about trustee behaviour, they
can increase their combined expected utility. However, this is not suﬃcient to persuade
individual agents not to freeload, taking advantage of any available information, while
not sharing any of their own. Jurca and Faltings attempt to alleviate this problem by
introducing side payments for reputation (Jurca and Faltings, 2003). This obviously
provides an incentive for an agent to supply reputation information, but it does not
distinguish between accurate and inaccurate reputation. To rectify this, Jurca and
Faltings suggest the following conditions should be guaranteed:
• Agents that report truthfully the result of every interaction with another agent,
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• Agents that report reputation incorrectly should gradually lose utility.
To ensure these conditions, Jurca and Faltings suggest that agents should only be paid
for their opinion if it matches the next opinion received about the same trustee from
a diﬀerent source. Unfortunately, this approach fails if most agents provide false infor-
mation, if agents collude to provide matching false reports, or if agents hold multiple
identities to outwit the truster.
A more robust solution is provided by Dash et al. (2004), who introduce the concept
of trust-based mechanism design, which attempts to explicitly handle issues of trust
through mechanism design. In their approach, suppliers are allocated to consumers
by a central institution (henceforth referred to as the centre). To aid the centre in
making a good allocation, the consumer informs the centre of its preferences with regard
to the allocation and all the information it currently knows about potential suppliers.
Furthermore, the consumer either receives or makes a payment to the centre based on
the eﬀect its information has on the overall utility of the system. Based on these two
components, it can be shown that it is in the best interest of a consumer to provide its
reputation information fully and accurately.
One notable exception, however, is the possibility of agents colluding under certain
conditions. A key premise is that agents will truthfully reveal their utility functions
for an allocation, because to do otherwise risks decreasing the agent’s utility in the
allocation. This does not preclude the agent from omitting preferences it may hold that
do not aﬀect its allocation. For instance, suppose an agent wishes to decrease or increase
the chances of another agent receiving a good allocation, and that it may further this
goal by reporting inaccurate reputation. Provided the eﬀect of this inaccuracy does not
aﬀect its own allocation, then it may do so without penalty, and for this reason, the
approach only works when all of an agent’s preferences concern its own allocation.
2.5 Assessing Unknown Agents
So far, we have seen three main approaches by which a truster can assess a trustee’s
behaviour:
1. It can draw upon its own personal experience or knowledge of a trustee.
2. It can seek the experience of other agents through reputation.
3. It can assume that a trustee will behave in a certain way, by making it in the
trustee’s best interest to do so.
However, there are cases where each of these approaches may fail. For instance, there
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of behaviour may not be assured by manipulating incentives. These types of issues are
particularly apparent when we consider the problem of whitewashing (Zacharia et al.,
1999), whereby agents avoid punishment or bad reputation by assuming a new identity.
Nevertheless, even in these situations, a truster may need to make reasonable decisions
about how to interact with such agents. One suggestion, made by Zacharia et al, is
that previously unknown agents entering a system should always be assigned the lowest
possible level of trust. The main reason given for this is to discourage whitewashing,
because it makes it impossible for an agent to improve its standing by assuming a new
identity. The problem with this approach is that it unfairly discriminates against new
members, who as a consequence may never establish themselves as useful members of
the system.
As an alternative, we could assess unknown agents based on the behaviour of other
similar agents for which some information is available. For whitewashing in particular,
this oﬀers a more pragmatic approach, by adapting a truster’s decisions to best suit
the general behaviour perceived in the environment. This type of solution is oﬀered by
REGRET and by Sun et al. (2005). However, in both of these cases, it is unclear precisely
how much weight should be placed in this type of information over knowledge that is
speciﬁc to a trustee itself. Determining how much predictive value group behaviour has
in a given environment is thus an open question.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have addressed three key points. First, we considered methods
for representing and assessing trust based on evidence directly available to the truster.
Second, we reviewed mechanisms for taking account of third party opinions, bearing
in mind the extra challenges this source of trust imposes. Finally, we described the
complementary role of mechanism design with regard to trust assessment; that is, how
it can simplify the trust assessment problem, by reducing the uncertainty in a trustee’s
behaviour a priori. In this section, we summarise the main points made throughout the
chapter, and identify key challenges for future research into trust assessment.
In Section 2.1 we considered work that concentrates on the cognitive aspects of trust
— the core beliefs that a truster must hold to rationally be in a state of trust with a
trustee. The main contribution of this work is that is helps to better understand the
nature of trust, and the factors that contribute to it. However, it is not always clear
how these core beliefs can be elicited from a truster’s environment.
In contrast to this, the REGRET system demonstrates how a wide range of evidence
can be brought together and used to assess trust in a given context. These sources
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other agents in the same group as the trustee, the relationship between the truster and
the trustee, and general assumptions about trustee behaviour. REGRET thus gives a
reasonable assessment of a trustee, both when there is a signiﬁcant amount of information
available, and when information is scarce. The main disadvantage of REGRET is that
it is based on ad hoc formulae, which require many parameter settings with no obvious
optimal values.
The two main alternatives to ad hoc formulae, as found in REGRET, include Dempster
Shafer theory, and probability theory. An example application of Dempster Shafer theory
to trust is given by Yu and Singh who show how Dempster Shafer theory can be used to
assess trust, based on previously observed interactions with a trustee. Although their
method is sound in general, the way in which they ground trust in observed interactions
is somewhat arbitrary.
Of the probabilistic trust models, the majority represent trust as the probability of
a binary event; that is, the probability that a trustee will cooperate or defect. These
models generally provide a sound statistical basis for calculating trust based on available
evidence, and oﬀer an attractive alternative to ad hoc formulae for trust assessment.
However, by modelling a trustee’s possible actions simply as cooperation or defection,
they ignore the eﬀect that the quality of service provided by a trustee may have on a
truster. In addition, they remain dependent on (direct or indirect) observations of the
trustee’s own behaviour, and do not consider other sources of information, such as those
explored by REGRET.
The vast majority of these trust models rely on third party opinions. Using such opinions,
however, imposes several additional concerns that do not arise from knowledge directly
available to the truster, because a third party’s own preferences and world view inﬂict
a bias on its opinions. To deal with this, there are three main approaches:
1. We can assess the reliability of opinions based on factors not pertaining to the
opinions themselves.
2. We can assume that the majority of opinions are correct, and discredit opinions
that deviate signiﬁcantly from mainstream opinion.
3. We can assess the reliability of reputation, based on the perceived accuracy of
reports received in the past.
Of these, we believe the third approach shows the most promise and potential for wide
applicability, as it does not rely on external factors, nor assume that the majority opin-
ion is correct. However, existing models that take this approach do not oﬀer a perfect
solution, either because they are founded on representations of trust that do not ad-
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assume a truster can determine a reputation source’s accuracy based on information
that is unlikely to be adequate for this task.
When a truster has neither reputation nor direct experience to draw upon, it has two
other techniques that it can draw upon: either it can attempt to manipulate a trustee’s
incentives to make it in its best interest to behave in a certain way, or it can judge the
trustee based on the behaviour of other similar agents in the system.
Of these, the former is realised through mechanism design, but does not oﬀer a complete
solution because not all types of behaviour can be ensured by manipulating incentives.
On the other hand, the latter can provide useful information when no experience speciﬁc
to the trustee is available. However, existing models that enable this approach do
not adequately suggest the relative weight that such information should have against
whatever little knowledge is available and speciﬁc to the trustee.
Against this background, we draw three main conclusions that motivate the work pre-
sented in the proceeding chapters. First, of all the existing methods for assessing trust,
those that employ probability theory oﬀer the strongest solution. This is because proba-
bility theory is well suited for representing and reasoning about the uncertainty surround-
ing events (such as agent behaviour), and is based on a sound theoretical foundation.
For this reason, in Chapter 3 we present a general framework for reasoning about trust
based on probability theory, which forms the basis of two trust modes, TRAVOS and
TRAVOS-C, detailed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. As discussed in Section 1.5, we
have developed these models independently because diﬀerent approaches are appropri-
ate, depending on how trustee behaviour is represented. As a consequence, TRAVOS is
designed for cases in which a trustee can only act in one of two ways during an inter-
action, while TRAVOS-C deals with cases in which trustees have a continuous range of
possible behaviours.
Second, of the existing approaches for dealing with inaccurate reputation, those that
assess the reliability of a reputation source based on past performance are the most
widely applicable for the reasons stated above. However, as all of the models that
adopt this technique leave room for improvement, we have developed methods in both
TRAVOS and TRAVOS-C, which assess a reputation source based on past performance,
while addressing some of the limitations of existing approaches. Speciﬁcally, TRAVOS
includes a heuristic ﬁltering mechanism that is shown empirically to outperform the
method presented by Whitby et al (Section 2.3.2) in a number of important cases.
Building on this, TRAVOS-C includes a more reﬁned ﬁltering method, which has a more
solid theoretical foundation based on probability theory, without the need for heuristics.
Finally, a promising approach for making decisions when there is little speciﬁc infor-
mation available about a trustee is to assess a trustee based on the behaviour of other
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have on a truster’s decisions remains an open question. To address this, in Chapter 5
we describe a probabilistic approach to this issue, as part of TRAVOS-C. Unlike the
existing methods discussed in Section 2.5, this approach chooses the most appropriate
estimate of a trustee’s behaviour based on the behaviour of its peers, taking into account
the amount of correlation observed between agents’ behaviour in the environment.Chapter 3
A Probabilistic Framework for
Modelling Trust & Reputation
According to the objectives we laid down in Chapter 1, we wish to develop models of trust
that draw upon both a truster’s own experiences of a trustee, and the experiences of third
parties. In the case of third party experience, however, we have three extra concerns:
(1) that a benevolent third party should be able to convey all relevant information
about its experiences to a truster; (2) that this should be achieved with minimum
communication overhead; and (3) that where inaccuracies in reputation can occur, the
truster’s inferences should be robust against them.
With this in mind, the purpose of the current chapter is to provide a general framework
for building trust models that fulﬁll these objectives. This not only acts as a foundation
for the trust models we describe in later chapters, but also provides a set of notation
that we shall use throughout the remainder of the thesis.
That said, questions of accuracy and communication are intimately tied to the semantics
of the concepts we are trying to communicate. That is, if we wish to convey a concept
or test its correctness, this can only be done with reference to its precise meaning. As
such, our framework must be tied to a particular representation of trust, and given the
conclusions of the previous chapters, this is a probabilistic one.
This chapter consists of eight parts: Sections 3.1 and ?? outline some basic concepts
from decision theory and statistics, which we apply within the framework; Sections 3.2
and 3.3 deﬁne the basic problem we wish to tackle, along with notation, and show how
this can be addressed using a truster’s personal experience of a trustee; Sections 3.4
and 3.5 give guidelines for communication reputation between agents, in a way that
meets our objectives in Chapter 1; ﬁnally, Section 3.6 categorises sources of inaccuracies
in reputation, which must be dealt with by our trust models, and Section 3.7 summarises.
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3.1 Background
In many situations, an agent must decide how best to act so as to achieve its goals. For
example, in the context of this thesis, we want to determine if a truster should put its
faith in a trustee to perform a given task. Moreover, if there are a number of competing
trustees, we wish to determine which (if any) of these a truster should choose to interact
with. As we have seen in the previous chapter, answering these sorts of questions does
not require a complete reinvention of the wheel. Instead, we can turn to decision theory
(Russell and Norvig, 2003), which deﬁnes a well established set of rules for solving these
types of problems.
The key idea in decision theory is quite simple. Essentially, an agent should always
choose actions that move it toward situations, or states, that it prefers. For example,
suppose that an agent wants to build a house, and to do so it must choose between two
builders, Dodgy Bill and Reliable Rod. The agent knows that if Dodgy Bill is awarded
the building contract, he will take the money and run, whereas if Rod gets the contract,
he will build the house ﬁt for purpose. Clearly, the agent would prefer the state of owning
a reliable house, to a state in which it has no house and no money. Thus, the best action
is to award the contract to Rod, since this moves the agent toward the preferred state
of owning the house.
To capture this intuition, an agent’s preferences about the world are encoded in a utility
function, which maps the set of situations the agent may ﬁnd itself in to a set of real
numbers representing the utility, or value, of each state to that agent. This is done such
that, if one state is preferred to another, then the utility value returned for the preferred
state will be higher than that of the other. Similarly, if two states are equally preferred,
then they should have equal utility. Thus, to move to states that it most prefers, an
agent should always choose actions that maximise its utility. Put formally, if S is the set
of all states the agent can reach through its own actions, and the utility of each s ∈ S
is given by the utility function U(s), then the agent should choose to act so as to arrive
in a state s0, such that:
∀s ∈ S, U(s) ≤ U(s0) (3.1)
Unfortunately, knowing how to act to arrive in s0 is not always feasible, and problems of
trust are no exception. Typically, if a truster has to choose between competing trustees
(such as Dodgy Bill and Reliable Rod) it will not know for certain which trustee will act
most in its favour. To deal with this uncertainty, decision theory draws upon probability.
Here, rather than maximise utility directly, an agent should act to maximise expected
utility, deﬁned as:
E[U(s)] =
Z
S
U(s)p(s|a) ds (3.2)Chapter 3 A Probabilistic Framework for Modelling Trust & Reputation 39
where p(s|a) is the probability density of s, given that the agent chooses action a. If
this is adhered to, then an agent is not guaranteed to arrive in the best state every time.
However, if the same situation were to be encountered n times, then the agent’s average
utility would approach its maximum as n becomes arbitrarily large. Essentially, this
means that, although success is not always guaranteed, over many problems, the agent
will perform to the best of its ability.
The presence of probability in the deﬁnition of expected utility means that decision
theory in the face of uncertainty enters the realm of statistics. That is, to determine
the expected utility of an action, we must determine the probability distribution of the
possible states an action will result in. How we determine this distribution depends
on our point of view, and the nature of the problem at hand. In particular, there are
two main schools of thought in statistics, known as Bayesian and Frequentist statistics
(DeGroot and Schervish, 2002), which diﬀer over how a problem should be approached.
Generally speaking, Frequentists only consider probability with reference to the relative
frequency of the diﬀerent possible outcomes of an experiment which (at least concep-
tually) can be repeated a large number of times. On the other hand, Bayesians view
probability as a subjective measure of the uncertainty surrounding a state, and are will-
ing to assign probability to any statement, even if it does not depend on a random
process. Moreover, in calculating a probability, a Bayesian routinely accounts for the
subjective prior beliefs of the statistician in the calculation, whereas a Frequentist refuses
to rely on anything but objective observations.
Many pros and cons have been argued for both stances, but this is not a debate that we
need enter in detail here. Instead, for our purposes it is suﬃcient to adopt an eclectic
stance, and draw on techniques from either side of the debate depending on what is
convenient and appropriate. As we shall discuss in future sections, the problem of
choosing trustees is one in which a truster may have little more than its own subjective
beliefs to rely upon, or it may need to draw upon diﬀerent sources of information with
varying degrees of reliability. These factors can be much more conveniently handled
using Bayesian rather than Frequentist methods, since these provide mechanisms for
reasoning about subjective beliefs and also the uncertainty surrounding estimates of
probabilities themselves. Therefore, for the rest of this section we focus on Bayesian
estimate techniques that will be referred to later in the text.
Returning to the issue of expected utility, it is unusual for the state probability distribu-
tion to be of a known indisputable form. Instead, under both Frequentist and Bayesian
philosophies, it is normally estimated given the assumptions and evidence available to
the statistician. Typically, we assume that the shape of the distribution takes on one of
a restricted set of forms, which is fully determined by an unknown parameter vector, θ.
For example, suppose we wanted to determine the probability of obtaining heads from
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coin. Here, the probability distribution of obtaining heads or tails would be a binary (or
Bernoulli) distribution, for which θ could be the probability of obtaining heads1. The
distribution is then estimated either by estimating θ and substituting into Equation 3.2,
or under the Bayesian framework, by marginalising over all possible values of θ.
In the case of estimating θ, this can by achieved by calculating its expected value using
Equation 3.3, in which p(θ|X) is the probability density function (p.d.f.) of θ given the
evidence. This approach has the desirable property of minimising the mean squared
estimation error of θ, but it does not account for the amount of uncertainty surrounding
its value. An alternative, although sometimes less tractable approach, is to marginalise
over the space of possible values of θ, denoted Θ (Equation 3.4). Essentially, this averages
the expected utility for all plausible values of θ. Thus, if there is little uncertainty about
θ, the result will be similar to that of the true θ. On the other hand, if there is much
uncertainty about θ, then there will be a larger number of plausible values for θ having
a signiﬁcant impact. This has the eﬀect of making the result less susceptible to error
than accounting only for an estimated θ that may deviate signiﬁcantly from the true
value:
E[θ] =
Z
Θ
θp(θ|X) dθ (3.3)
E[U(s)] =
Z
S
U(s)
Z
Θ
p(s|a,θ)p(θ|X) dθ ds (3.4)
In either case, we are left with the need to determine the posterior density of θ given
the evidence, which (assuming each xi ∈ X is independent) is achieved by applying
Bayes rule as shown in Equation 3.6. Here, p(X|θ) is known as the data likelihood
function, which usually follows directly from the model assumptions. For example, in
the case of our biased coin tosses, the likelihood of each xi is p(xi|θ) = θ if xi is heads,
or p(xi|θ) = (1 − θ) otherwise.
With regard to the other factors, p(θ) is the prior density of θ, which is chosen in line with
the prior beliefs or assumptions of the statistician. For example, if prior to observing
any coin tosses all values of θ are believed equally likely, then p(θ) can be chosen to be
a uniform distribution. Such a prior is appropriate if the statistician has no information
about θ a priori, and often has little impact on the posterior distribution given even a
small amount of data.
On the other hand, existing information from other sources may be incorporated into the
prior, to bias estimates towards values of θ believed to be more likely. For example, if θ
is a parameter relating to the quality of service provided by a grid computing resource,
then a prior distribution could be used that is based on some prior modelling of factors
pertaining to the application domain. However, such modelling is beyond the scope of
1This fully speciﬁes the distribution since the probability of obtain heads is then θ, while the proba-
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our work.
p(θ|X) =
p(X|θ)p(θ)
p(X)
(3.5)
=
p(θ)
Qn
i=1 p(xi|θ)
p(X)
(assuming all xi are independent) (3.6)
Finally, p(X) is the marginal distribution of the data. Essentially, this can be viewed
as a normalising constant that ensures that
R
Θ p(θ|X) dX = 1, as should be the case
for any p.d.f. As such, the value of p(X) is determined by integrating the enumerator
in Equation 3.6 over the domain of θ, which along with the integrals in Equations 3.3
and 3.4 often does not result in a closed form analytical solution. This leaves us with
two choices: either we constrain our model to cases that do have analytical solutions,
or we turn to numerical integration techniques (Appendix A). Constraining the model
may not always be appropriate, but in some cases, this can be achieved by choosing a
particular form for the prior, which in many cases may not be too restrictive. To give
a concrete example, suppose that we have the following prior p.d.f. for the bias of our
coin:
p(θ) =
θα−1(1 − θ)β−1
Beta(α,β)
where, (3.7)
Beta(α,β) =
Z 1
0
tα−1(1 − t)β−1 dt (3.8)
Distributions with this density are known as beta distributions, in which α and β are
shape parameters, and Beta(α,β) is the beta function, which is deﬁned in Equation 3.8.
Now, if we toss the coin a number times and observe a total of N heads and M tails
then, from Bayes rule, the posterior distribution is proportional to:
p(θ|X) ∝ p(θ)
l Y
i=1
p(xi|θ) (3.9)
∝ θα+N−1(1 − θ)β+M−1 (3.10)
∴ p(θ|X) =
θα+N−1(1 − θ)β+M−1
Beta(α + N,β + M)
(3.11)
Thus, by substituting the original shape parameters for α + N and β + M respectively,
we see that, like the prior, the posterior distribution is also a beta distribution. Prior
distributions that exhibit this property of ensuring the posterior shares its form are
known as conjugate priors (see Section 2.2.2). They are particularly signiﬁcant if we
know existing properties, such as how to calculate the density, because this means the
same results apply to the posterior as apply to the prior. In this case of the beta
distribution, we do know how to eﬃciently calculate its p.d.f. and expected value, which
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Another example that we will refer to in later chapters is Bayesian inference concerning
Gaussian (or normal) distributions. For this, if we have l i.i.d. samples X = {x1,...,xl},
which are drawn from a Gaussian with unknown mean (µ) and variance (σ2), then from
the Gaussian p.d.f. we have the following likelihood functions:
p(xi|µ,σ) =
1
√
2πσ2exp

−
(xi − µ)2
2σ2

(3.12)
p(X|µ,σ) =
l Y
i=1
1
√
2πσ2exp

−
(x − µ)2
2σ2

(3.13)
For this, the conjugate prior can be expressed in terms of p(µ|σ) and p(σ) as:
p(µ,σ2) = p(µ|σ2)p(σ2) (3.14)
p(µ|σ2) =
1
p
2πσ2/λ
exp

−
(µ − m)2
2σ2/λ

(3.15)
p(σ2|α,β) =
βα
Γ(α)
(σ2)−α−1exp

−
β
σ2

(3.16)
where p(µ|σ) is a Gaussian density with mean m and variance σ2/λ, and p(σ) is an
inverse-gamma distribution with shape parameters α and β. From this, it can be shown
that the posterior parameter distribution has the same form, but with corresponding
hyperparameters, µ0, λ0, α0 and β0, derived as follows (see DeGroot and Schervish (2002)
for details).
µ0 =
λµ + l¯ x
λ + l
(3.17)
λ0 = λ + l (3.18)
α0 = α +
l
2
(3.19)
β0 = β +
s2
2
+
lλ(¯ x − µ)2
2(λ + l)
where, (3.20)
¯ x =
1
l
l X
i=1
xi (3.21)
s2 =
l X
i=1
(xi − ¯ x)2 (3.22)
3.2 Basic Notation and Problem Deﬁnition
So far, we have described how decision theory can be used in conjunction with probability
theory to enable an agent to choose between possible actions. We now wish to show
how this general theory can be applied to our speciﬁc problem, where trusters need
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approach this problem, we must ﬁrst introduce some basic notation, which we shall reuse
throughout the rest of the thesis.
To this end, in a MAS consisting of n agents, we denote the set of all agents as
{a1,a2,...,an} = A. Over time, interactions take place between distinct pairs of agents
from A, during which one of these agents is obliged to provide a service to the other.
In each case, the agent receiving the service is the truster, denoted atr, and the agent
providing the service is the trustee, denoted ate.
With an aim to assess trustee performance, a truster records the outcome of each inter-
action as it perceives it, which is denoted as Oatr,ate — the outcome of interacting with
ate from the perspective of atr. From this interpretation, bilateral interactions in which
both parties have obligations to each other can be seen as two separate interactions in
which each agent plays the role of truster and trustee in turn. If such an event occurs
between agents a1 and a2, then this will result in two recorded outcomes, denoted Oa1,a2
and Oa2,a1. However, it is important to note that Oa1,a2 and Oa2,a1 are not necessarily
equal, as each agent may represent the outcome only in terms that are relevant to it.
For example, if a1 sells high quality apples to a2, for which a2 does not pay, then from
a2’s perspective the interaction results in the possession of some high quality apples,
while from a1’s perspective, goods are lost without payment.
With this in mind, it is useful to deﬁne a number of outcome instances, and sets involving
them. First, we deﬁne the set of all possible outcomes in a particular context, C, as OC.
Here, a context speciﬁes both the type of interaction from which outcomes are derived
and the way it is recorded. For instance, in the example given above, we could have
Oa2,a1 ∈ Oapples and Oa1,a2 ∈ Omoney, where each context is deﬁned in terms of the
services received by the respective truster.
In general, the rest of our discussion in this and following chapters applies independent
of context. Nevertheless, when assessing a trustee’s behaviour in a given context, we
only base our predictions based on outcomes in that context, as a trustee’s behaviour in
one context does not necessarily provide information about its behaviour in another.2
Therefore, when we do discuss sets of outcomes and functions deﬁned on them, we
assume that all such outcomes belong to the same context, regardless of what that
context actually is. The context superscript for outcome spaces acts as a reminder of
this.
Building on this, we divide time into discrete steps starting from time 0, and denote the
outcome of an interaction that occurred between atr and ate at time t as Ot
atr,ate. In
general we wish to allow any number of interactions to occur between any agents at any
time. However, to simplify our discussion we will assume that at most one interaction can
2Although a trustee’s behaviour in one context may provide information about its behaviour in
another, using such information would require modelling the dependences that exist between contexts,
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occur between a given truster and trustee in a given time step, and that each interaction
is complete by the end of the time step it is said to occur in. Furthermore, we denote
the current time as t0, and the set of all outcomes between atr and ate from time t to
t + n as Ot:t+n
atr,ate. Thus, the history of all interactions between atr and ate is given by
O0:t0
atr,ate.
3.3 Trust Assessment Based on Direct Observations
Now that we have a formal language for discussing interactions between agents, the key
question is how can we apply decision theory to the assessment of potential trustees
in this context. The answer to this comes in two parts. First, we assume that the
utility received by a truster for interacting with a trustee is completely determined by
the outcome of that interaction. This means that the preferences of any atr with regard
to interacting with ate can be encoded by a utility function U : OC → R, such that if
O
(1)
atr,ate is preferred over O
(2)
atr,ate, then U(O
(1)
atr,ate) > U(O
(2)
atr,ate); and if O
(1)
atr,ate is equally
preferred to O
(2)
atr,ate, then U(O
(1)
atr,ate) = U(O
(2)
atr,ate). Second, we assess the value of
atr interacting with ate by calculating the expected utility according to Equation 3.23
(assuming OC is continuous) or Equation 3.24 (assuming OC is discrete).
EU =
Z
OC
U(Oatr,ate)p(Oatr,ate) dOatr,ate (3.23)
EU =
X
Oatr,ate∈OC
U(Oatr,ate)p(Oatr,ate) (3.24)
The precise deﬁnition of U(Oatr,ate) in this equation is something that depends on the
particular application at hand, and so is not something that we address here. Calculating
p(Oatr,ate) is, however, something that can be discussed in more general terms, and is
what we wish to address through our models of trust. How this is achieved depends on
the evidence used, but here we shall concentrate on the history of trustee observations
O0:t0
atr,ate, and ate’s reputation.
Of these, trust based on direct experience is the most straightforward, following directly
from standard practice as described in Section ??. Speciﬁcally, we assume that all
outcomes of interactions between atr and ate are independently drawn from a single
distribution, which is fully determined by a parameter vector θatr,ate with domain ΘC.
In essence, this distribution summarises the uncertainty that is intrinsic to the behaviour
of ate toward atr, and as such will be referred to as the trustee’s behaviour distribution.
For example, if this distribution has relatively high variance, then this means that the
behaviour of the trustee is relatively unpredictable. On the other hand, if the distribution
is highly peaked around a single value with low variance, then this means that the
behaviour of the trustee is consistent and highly predictable.Chapter 3 A Probabilistic Framework for Modelling Trust & Reputation 45
Agent atr
Agent a1
Agent a2
Figure 3.1: Venn diagram of overlapping reputation datasets.
Nevertheless, this is not the whole story because there is likely to be an amount of
uncertainty surrounding the value of θatr,ate depending on the amount of evidence or
knowledge available. This we characterise in the manner described previously, by mod-
elling the parameter distribution of θatr,ate. Accounting for a truster’s experience of a
trustee is then just a matter of obtaining the posterior distribution of θatr,ate by applying
Bayes rule as follows:
p(θatr,ate|O0:t0
atr,ate) =
p(O0:t0
atr,ate|θatr,ate)p(θatr,ate)
p(O0:t0
atr,ate)
(3.25)
=
p(θatr,ate)
P
o∈O0:t0
atr,ate
p(o|θatr,ate)
p(O0:t0
atr,ate)
(3.26)
In calculating this posterior, we may use any one of a number of techniques, but where
we use conjugate priors, some extra notation applies. Speciﬁcally, the parameter distri-
bution belonging to a trustee’s behaviour is characterised by a hyperparameter vector
φatr,ate with domain ΦC. In this case, the posterior update is realised by the particular
update rule that is associated with the parameter model being applied, and is deﬁned
in general by:
p(θatr,ate|φpost
atr,ate) =
p(θatr,ate|φ
prior
atr,ate)
P
o∈O0:t0
atr,ate
p(o|θatr,ate)
p(O0:t0
atr,ate|φ
prior
atr,ate)
(3.27)
where φ
prior
atr,ate and φ
post
atr,ate are the prior and posterior hyperparameters respectively.
3.4 Reputation Framework
The next problem we wish to tackle is how to perform trust assessment based on both a
truster’s direct experiences, and the trustee’s reputation. In particular, we are interested46 Chapter 3 A Probabilistic Framework for Modelling Trust & Reputation
in reputation based on third party observations of a trustee’s behaviour that, in the
simplest of cases, can be achieved by generalising the technique applied in the previous
section. For instance, suppose that atr has three (possibly overlapping) datasets on
which to base its assessment of ate: its own dataset O0:t0
atr,ate, and the dataset of two
other agents, a1 and a2 (Figure 3.1). If the truster had all relevant details about these
datasets available, then it could account for all the evidence simply by substituting the
union O0:t0
atr,ate
S2
i=1 O0:t0
ai,ate for O0:t0
atr,ate in Equation 3.26.
However, in many cases we do not expect this to be a viable solution for two reasons.
First, there may be an overhead associated with communicating reputation between
agents. Hence, transmitting an agent’s observations in their entirety may prove to be a
costly enterprise. Second, the observations in O0:t0
ai,ate may not be drawn from the intended
behaviour distribution, at least as they are reported. This may be because the trustee’s
behaviour diﬀers depending on its interaction partner, resulting in θatr,ate 6= θai,ate, or
because ai intentionally manipulates its reports to mislead the truster.
Although both of these points are associated with the objectives we outlined in Chap-
ter 1, we begin by focusing our attention on the ﬁrst. This we frame by assuming each
reputation source, arep ∈ A, has a function r, such that Rarep,ate = r(O0:t
arep,ate), where
Rarep,ate is the opinion of arep about ate, and r is the opinion function. Also, in the
interest of simplicity, we assume there is one shared deﬁnition of r for all agents, and
that the datasets on which each agent bases its reported opinion do not intersect.3
Intuition then tells us that, rather than encode an agent’s entire observation set verbatim,
the opinion function should somehow capture all relevant information about O0:t0
arep,ate,
yet as concisely as possible. Of course, what information is relevant, depends on what it
is that the information is supposed to be relevant to. In our case, we are trying to locate
the true value of θatr,ate, so are only interested in properties of an agent’s experiences
that tell us something about that parameter.
With this in mind, we turn to the concept of suﬃcient statistics, which captures this
intuition by deﬁnition. For example, suppose that we have a set of i.i.d. variables
X = {x1,...,xn} that are drawn from a distribution with p.d.f. f(x|θ), where θ is a
parameter which we wish to estimate. Any real-valued function r = s(X) deﬁned on
such a set of observations is called a statistic (Deﬁnition 3.1). Moreover, if r = s(X)
is a suﬃcient statistic, with respect to θ, then the distribution of X given r does not
depend on θ (Deﬁnition 3.2).
Suﬃcient statistics have many applications regarding parameter estimation, and can
be found in a number of ways, most notably by applying the factorisation criterion as
deﬁned in Theorem 3.3. Our interest, however, stems from the relationship between
3It may be possible to loosen these assumptions if agents communicate (or estimate) intersections
between their observations, and diﬀerences between their opinion functions. However, dealing with such
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suﬃcient statistics and the distribution of a parameter. Speciﬁcally, it follows from
Theorem 3.4 that the distribution of θ given r does not depend on X.
Thus, if we have a suﬃcient statistic for a parameter, then no extra knowledge about
a sample will ever aﬀect the parameter’s distribution, and so it will never aﬀect our
inferences about that parameter. Conversely, if we don’t have a suﬃcient statistic for a
parameter, then there will be some extra information about a sample that will improve
our estimates about a parameter, if that information were made available.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Statistic). Assume that X is a set of random variables, with domain
X, that corresponds to a set of observations. Then, a statistic of X is any function s(X)
that is deﬁned for X (adapted from Upton and Cook (2002)).
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Suﬃcient Statistic). If r = s(X) is a statistic of a sample X, then s(X)
is said to be suﬃcient for a parameter θ, if and only if the probability distribution of
X, given r, does not depend on θ. Equivalently, T(X) is a suﬃcient statistic for θ if
Theorem 3.3 holds (adapted from DeGroot and Schervish (2002)).
Theorem 3.3 (The factorisation criterion). Let X1,...,Xn form a random sample from
either a continuous distribution or a discrete distribution for which the probability density
function (p.d.f.) or the probability function4 (p.f.) is f(x|θ), and where the value of θ is
unknown and belongs to a given parameter space Θ. A statistic T = r(X1,...,Xn) is a
suﬃcient statistic for θ if and only if the joint p.d.f. or joint p.f., fn(x|θ) of X1,...,Xn,
can be factored as follows for all values of x = (x1,...,xn) ∈ Rn and all values of θ ∈ Θ:
fn(x|θ) = u(x)v[r(x),θ]. (3.28)
Here, the functions u and v are nonnegative; the function u may depend on x but does
not depend on θ; and the function v depends on θ, but depends on the observed value of
x only through the value of the statistic r(x).
Theorem 3.4 (Parameter Distributions from Suﬃcient Statistics). Suppose that X =
{x1,...,xl} is a set of l samples independently drawn from a distribution with param-
eter θ. Then, if r = s(X) is a suﬃcient statistic of X, the distribution of θ will be
conditionally independent of X, given r; put another way, the following equality is true.
p(θ|X,r) = p(θ|r) (3.29)
4A probability function fulﬁlls the same role for discrete probability distributions, as a probability
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Proof: Using Bayes rule, along with Deﬁnition 3.2, we can derive the conditional den-
sity of θ given X and r as follows.
p(θ|X,r) =
p(X,r,θ)
p(X,r)
(Bayes rule) (3.30)
=
p(X|r,θ)p(r,θ)
p(X|r)p(r)
(3.31)
=
p(X|r)p(r,θ)
p(X|r)p(r)
(from Deﬁnition 3.2) (3.32)
=
p(r,θ)
p(r)
(3.33)
= p(θ|r) (Bayes rule) (3.34)
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Minimal Suﬃcient Statistic). A statistic r = s(X) is a minimal suf-
ﬁcient statistic of a sample X if r is a suﬃcient statistic X and is a function of every
other suﬃcient statistic of X (DeGroot and Schervish, 2002).
In this light, we can conclude that the opinion function, r, should ideally be deﬁned
as a suﬃcient statistic, but this, on its own, does not guarantee that the opinion will
be as concise as possible. We thus further strive to make the opinion function a mini-
mal suﬃcient statistic (Deﬁnition 3.5), which ensures that only information that aﬀects
the parameter distribution is retained. This is not a hard constraint, as any suﬃcient
statistic will still retain all relevant information about a sample. However, if a suﬃcient
statistic is minimal, it will express the relevant information using the smallest space of
possible values, making it easier to communicate the information eﬃciently.
To see why this works, suppose that Alice tosses a coin and wants to inform Bob of the
result. To do so, she can choose between two possible codes: either she can transmit
1 for heads or 0 for tails, or she can transmit a number between 1 and 8, with the
numbers 1 to 4 indicating heads, and 5 to 8 indicating tails. The diﬀerence between
these codes is that there is a one-to-one relationship between the toss outcome and the
binary code, but a one-to-many relationship between the outcome and the alternative
code. Both codes distinguish between the states we wish to communicate, but the one-
to-many relationship includes many redundant states that take more bits to represent
and transmit.
Similarly, when we transmit a statistic about a data set, we are interested in what the
posterior parameter distribution should be. If the statistic is suﬃcient, then the number
of possible parameter distributions that may result is as large as can be. However, only
if the statistic is minimally suﬃcient, will it have a one-to-one relationship with the
space of parameter distributions, and so have the potential to enjoy the most concise
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3.5 A Word of Warning on Suﬃciency
Although the discussion in the previous section realises all of our objectives with regard
to communicating reputation, there are three important points about these recommen-
dations that must be kept in mind.
First, we emphasize that these are only guidelines for getting the most value out of
reputation as possible. Even if an opinion function is not suﬃcient, this does not nec-
essarily mean that it provides no useful information. In addition, choosing a minimally
suﬃcient statistic does not guarantee concise enough communication in every case, so it
may be appropriate to choose a non-suﬃcient statistic to further reduce communication
overhead.
Instead, minimal suﬃciency should be seen as an optimal point in the trade-oﬀ between
communication overhead and maintaining information: on one hand, anything that has
a larger representation than a minimally suﬃcient statistic is wasting space somewhere,
whether it is suﬃcient or not, while on the other hand, if we require a representation
smaller than that of a minimal suﬃcient statistic, then we should be aware of how much
information we are losing in the process.
Second, the deﬁnition of suﬃciency is intimately tied up with the particular parameter
model being used, so suﬃciency for one model does not imply suﬃciency for another. For
example, suppose that we draw samples from a Gaussian distribution that we assume
has a variance of 1. In this case, provided we know the size of the sample, the sample
mean is suﬃcient for the model. However, once we remove this assumption, the extra
free parameter means that a statistic requires more information to be suﬃcient than the
sample mean can provide.
Finally, we do not expect the number of observations that a reputation source has of a
trustee to be directly observable by the truster. This means that, in order to be suﬃ-
cient, the sample size must be included, or be derivable from, the opinion function. We
highlight this because there are instances when it is implicitly assumed in the literature
that the sample size is observable.
For instance, in DeGroot and Schervish (2002) the sample mean is quoted in an example
as being suﬃcient for estimating the mean of a Gaussian distribution. However, we know
from the discussion in Section ?? that, when we use conjugate priors, the posterior
distribution of a Gaussian mean, given the variance, does depend on the size of the
sample. In addition, the same can be said for any model for which larger samples
provide more information about the model parameters. As this is generally the case, the
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3.6 Coping with Inaccurate Reputation
From the previous section, we have a fully speciﬁed framework for assessing trust based
on reputation. However, for this framework to provide reasonable results for a given
truster-trustee pair, then the following conditions must hold:
Condition 1. If atr ∈ A is a truster and R ⊆ A is the set of all reputation sources that
atr consults about a trustee ate ∈ A, then the behaviour of ate towards all members of
{atr}
S
R must be equal.
Condition 2. If atr ∈ A is a truster and R ⊆ A is the set of all reputation sources that atr
consults about a trustee ate ∈ A, then all members of R must report their information
about ate truthfully and accurately.
Essentially, Conditions 1 and 2 ensure that observations made by a truster’s reputation
sources are representative of the actual behaviour a trustee is likely to have towards
the truster. Unfortunately, we cannot expect these conditions to hold in general, so we
must develop methods for coping with cases in which they are violated. Many of the
trust models we reviewed in Chapter 2 include methods for coping with some of these
conditions. However, as we stated in Section 2.6, each has its own set of problems.
To address these limitations, each of the trust models described in the following chapters
include their own unique mechanisms for coping with the problems that arise when
Conditions 1 or 2 are violated. Although we defer discussing possible solutions to these
problems until then, it is useful to be aware of the types of issues that any such solution
must account for.
To this end, the subsections that follow categorise the possible causes of inaccuracies
in reputation, and deﬁne the impact that each category may have, with respect to the
communication guidelines set forth in the previous section. In particular, we identify
three groups of causes:
1. statistical noise, due to a trustee’s own behaviour;
2. the opinion view of an agent, which deﬁnes how it perceives a trustee’s behaviour;
and
3. the incentives of an agent, which may lead it to manipulate a trustee’s reputation.
3.6.1 Statistical Noise
Statistical noise is noise which we normally associate with learning about a distribution
by sampling from it under an i.i.d. assumption, and it is entirely due to the properties
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the error variance in that the error variance will decrease as the amount of information
the sample conveys about the distribution increases. In particular, under reasonable
assumptions, the error variance decreases as the sample size increases.
3.6.2 Opinion View
We deﬁne a reputation source’s opinion view as its view of a trustee’s behaviour; that
is, how a trustee behaves towards the reputation source, and how that reputation source
observes and records the trustee’s behaviour. The opinion view of a reputation source,
arep, is a source of noise in observations sent to a atr if it causes those observations to
be drawn from a distribution other than p(Oatr,ate|θatr,ate). For example, this can be the
case if observing a trustee’s behaviour involves taking readings from physical sensors,
and the sensors used by arep are uncalibrated with those used by atr. On the other hand,
the behaviour of the trustee may diﬀer depending on whether it is interacting with atr
or arep. This could be for environmental reasons, for example diﬀerences in network
bandwidth used by atr and arep, or simply because the trustee has incentives to behave
diﬀerently towards diﬀerent agents.
As opinion views can cause observations to be drawn from diﬀerent unknown distribu-
tions, they can aﬀect both the bias and error variance of a truster’s estimate. However,
this is not to say that if the distributions diﬀer, a third party’s observations carry no
information about θatr,ate because the distributions may still be correlated. For exam-
ple, suppose that ate provides video streaming to both arep and atr, but the networks
connecting ate to arep and ate to atr oﬀer diﬀerent levels of service. Although in this
case the network may cause diﬀerent behaviour to be observed by arep and ate, if the
servers hosting ate’s video content continually go oﬀ-line, this eﬀect will be observed by
both parties.
3.6.3 Opinion Incentives
When a truster assesses a trustee based on observations reported from third parties, the
truster must consider the possibility that the reputation source may not reveal those
observations truthfully. To deal with this possibility, the truster should consider any
knowledge it has about the incentives the reputation source may have for, or against,
truthtelling, and the ways in which the observations may be manipulated to meet such
goals. Although a reputation source may have conﬂicting incentives, the net eﬀect will
fall into one of three categories:
Truthtelling Incentive In this case, the truster knows that it is in the best interest
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trustee truthfully. Thus, the incentive of the opinion provider does not add any
extra noise over and above that described in the previous sections.
Competitive Incentive Here, the truster believes that an opinion provider may wish
to bias the truster’s decisions to the disadvantage of the trustee. Assuming that
the opinion provider knows which types of trustee behaviour the truster dislikes,
the following eﬀects may occur:
• The opinion provider’s reported observations may be biased towards predict-
ing unfavourable trustee behaviour, which we call a negative bias.
• If the opinion source is lying, the sample variance of the observations may
be aﬀected depending on the adopted lying strategy, because the samples
may no longer be drawn from the actual behaviour distribution. Moreover,
the lying strategy will also determine how bad the eﬀect is. For example, the
reputation source could completely discard its knowledge of the trustee’s true
behaviour, in which case its observations may be completely uncorrelated with
p(Oatr,ate|θatr,ate). On the other hand, it could mediate its lies based on its
knowledge to purposely introduce some correlation to disguise its lies. In the
latter case, the correlation still provides useful information (albeit possibly
reduced), even though it is introduced only to diminish the footprint of the
reputation source’s lying behaviour.
• The opinion provider may exaggerate the sample size by reporting an ob-
servation set which has higher cardinality than any true underlying sample.
This is because increasing the proportion of Ou that the provider is responsi-
ble for increases the provider’s inﬂuence over the truster’s ﬁnal estimate. On
the other hand, the opinion provider is unlikely to report the cardinality as
being lower than its true value, because it is unlikely to have an incentive
to decrease its inﬂuence on the truster’s opinion. In any event, even if the
opinion provider does report a lower cardinality, the truster would be unwise
to assume the cardinality to be higher than reported, because it would then
be making estimates based on knowledge that it does not have.
This last eﬀect is perhaps the most damaging consequence of reputation source
incentives conﬂicting with those of a truster. With the noise sources discussed in
Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, we can at least be sure that the number of observations
is correct, since there is known uncertainty surrounding this from the perspective
of the observer. With conﬂicting interests, the truster must also consider the
possibility that a set of reported observations is not even a real random sample,
but a set concocted from the mind of the reputation source.
Collusion Incentive Here, the truster believes that an opinion provider may wish to
bias the truster’s decisions to the advantage of the trustee. The eﬀects of this source
of inaccuracy, and the reasoning behind it, are the same as those of competitiveChapter 3 A Probabilistic Framework for Modelling Trust & Reputation 53
incentives, but in this case we assume that the eﬀect on the bias is positive rather
than negative. That is, assuming that the opinion provider knows which types of
trustee behaviour the truster dislikes, the opinion provider may manufacture its
reported observations so as to bias the truster’s decisions in favour of the trustee.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have considered problems in which an agent must choose whether
or not to interact with a potential trustee, and have made three main points about how
such problems may be solved.
First, solving such problems does not require a completely new solution, but instead
we can draw upon existing techniques in decision theory and statistics. That is, when
deciding whether or not to interact with a trustee, a truster should compare the inter-
action to its alternatives, and choose the course of action that maximises its chance of
obtaining an outcome that it prefers.
To achieve this, the truster must have deﬁned a utility function, which encodes its
preferences about the possible outcomes of each course of action. The truster can then
account for the uncertainty surrounding such outcomes, by using this function, along
with the probability distribution of possible outcomes, to calculate the expected utility
of each course of action, and then act in way that maximises this value. Moreover, to
derive the probability distribution of possible outcomes, the truster can apply Bayesian
analysis to its past experiences of a truster (if any), along with reported third party
experiences, known as reputation.
Second, if we wish to make decisions that account for a trustee’s reputation, we must
decide how best to communicate third party experiences between agents. Ideally, this
should be achieved by communicating all relevant information as concisely as possible,
which can be accomplished by deﬁning an agent’s opinion about a trustee as a minimal
suﬃcient statistic of the agent’s experiences with that trustee. This ensures that, aside
from its reported opinion, a reputation source cannot convey any other information
about its experiences that could improve a truster’s assessment of a trustee. Conversely,
by ensuring the statistic is minimal, we ensure that no eﬀort is wasted transmitting
information that does not have predictive value with regard to a trustee’s behaviour.
Finally, in all but the most restrictive conditions, third party experiences cannot be
assumed to be as reliable as a truster’s own direct observations for two main reasons:
1. A trustee’s behaviour, as it is measured, may be diﬀerent depending on which
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2. A truster’s reputation sources may have incentives to misrepresent their experi-
ences, in pursuit of their own goals.
Together these imply that, while reputation may generally provide useful information
about a trustee, it may be noisy, or contain no useful information about a trustee at all.
In the following chapters, we apply the principles described in this chapter to cases in
which trustee behaviour is represented in one of two ways. Speciﬁcally, Chapter 4 shows
how, within TRAVOS, Bayesian analysis is applied to cases in which trustee behaviour
is represented as a binary event, while Chapter 5 shows how the same is achieved by
TRAVOS-C, when trustee behaviour is given a continuous representation. What is more
signiﬁcant, however, is the way in which each of these models deals with reputation.
In this regard, we shall discuss how each model applies the recommendations of the
current chapter, by ensuring eﬃcient communication of reputation, and by addressing
the possibility of inaccurate reputation.Chapter 4
TRAVOS: A Trust Model for
Boolean Action Spaces
So far we have seen that, when a truster and trustee interact, the worth of the interaction
to the truster is determined by the actions of the trustee. This means that to determine
what a truster stands to gain or lose from an interaction, we need to enumerate the
possible ways in which the trustee may act, be it to the advantage or disadvantage of
the truster. In addition, the granularity with which we represent a trustee’s actions
depends on what matters to the truster.
For instance, if Bob has 50 pence to spend on a phone call to a long lost friend, then the
more time he can spend on the phone for that money, the better it may be for him. On
the other hand, suppose that Bob is just calling to order a pizza, and that, regardless of
how long he takes to place his order, he will not receive any change from his 50 pence.
In this case, perhaps it doesn’t matter if his credit runs out in 5 minutes or 5 hours,
provided he has enough time to place his order.
This shows that sometimes an agent’s preferences may depend on one or more ﬁnely
graded attributes of a trustee’s behaviour, or it may depend only on whether an action
is carried out or not. In the latter case, it is suﬃcient to represent a trustee’s actions as
a binary event: either the trustee cooperates by fulﬁlling its obligations to the truster,
or it defects by breaking its obligations.
With this in mind, we give separate treatments for each of the two types of cases de-
scribed, by concentrating on the binary case in the current chapter, and leaving the
continuous case to Chapter 5. Speciﬁcally, the current chapter introduces a trust model
that we call TRAVOS (Trust and Reputation system for Agent Based Virtual Organisa-
tionS), which instantiates the framework described in the previous chapter, for boolean
action spaces.
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To begin our discussion, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 outline how, by applying the framework,
Bayesian analysis is used in TRAVOS to assess a trustee based on direct experience
and reputation. Using this as a foundation, we then describe the main contributions of
TRAVOS to the state of the art, which comes in three parts. First, Section 4.3 describes
how inaccurate reputation is handled by TRAVOS. To achieve this, a truster learns over
time which of its reputation sources are reliable, by comparing the opinions provided
about a trustee to its subsequent behaviour. Based on this, if a reputation source gen-
erally provides opinions that do not correlate well with actual trustee behaviour, it will
have its impact on the truster’s future assessments reduced. Second, Sections 4.4 and 4.5
describe how TRAVOS can be used as part of the CONOISE-G1 system, for forming
and managing virtual organisations in a service-oriented environment. Third, Section 4.6
demonstrates empirically how TRAVOS outperforms the most similar existing model in
the literature.
4.1 Instantiating the Framework for Boolean Action Spaces
The process of applying the principles of the previous chapter to a particular problem
consists of three main steps: (1) we need to choose an appropriate parameter model
for representing interaction outcomes, along with their distributions; (2) we need to
decide how to communicate reputation between agents, based on the guidelines laid
down previously; and (3) we need to specify a mechanism for dealing with inaccurate
reputation sources.
Thus, we start by describing the parameter model used in TRAVOS to reason about
interaction outcomes that, as we have already stated, can take on one of two values: a
trustee can either cooperate by fulﬁlling its obligations, or it can defect by neglecting
its obligations. As such, this description of behaviour can naturally by represented by a
binary number, which we realise in our notation by setting OC = {0,1}, and attaching
the following semantics to any Oatr,ate ∈ OC.
Oatr,ate =
(
1 if contract is fulﬁlled by ate
0 otherwise
(4.1)
This binary deﬁnition means that a series of observations of trustee behaviour (such as
O0:t0
atr,ate) can be treated in the same way as a series of tosses from a biased coin — that
is, as a set of Bernoulli trials. We have already described an appropriate parameter
model for this in Chapter 3, in which the distribution of outcomes is described by a
single parameter representing the probability of obtaining a 1 or 0. Thus, we deﬁne
the behaviour distribution parameter, θatr,ate, as the probability that ate will fulﬁll its
1The name CONOISE-G stands for Constraint Oriented Negotiation in Open Information Seeking
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obligations during an interaction with atr (Equation 4.2), and specify its domain as
ΘC = [0,1]:
θatr,ate = p(Oatr,ate = 1), where θatr,ate ∈ ΘC = [0,1] (4.2)
In the interest of simplicity, we adopt the standard practice of choosing a conjugate
prior for the parameter distribution (DeGroot and Schervish, 2002) that, in the case
of Bernoulli distributions, is given by the family of beta distributions. In this respect,
TRAVOS is therefore similar to the Beta Reputation System and its related models
(Section 2.2.2), which also represent interaction outcomes as binary events, and model
their parameter distributions as Beta distributions.
Thus, the hyperparameter space, ΦC, now takes on the form of the standard param-
eters of the beta distribution (Equation 4.3). Speciﬁcally, the beta distribution has
two parameters, typically denoted α and β, both of which are positive real numbers.
These parameters determine the shape of the distribution through the probability den-
sity function (Equation 4.4), the expected value of the distribution (Equation 4.5) and
the variance (Equation 4.6).
ΦC = {(α,β)|α > 0 ∧ β > 0} (4.3)
d(θ|α,β) =
θα−1(1 − θ)β−1
R
Uα−1(1 − U)β−1dU
(4.4)
E[θ|α,β] =
α
α + β
(4.5)
σ2 =
α · β
(α + β)2(α + β + 1)
(4.6)
With this in mind, we can now show how the various aspects of the beta distribution can
be applied to the framework. In particular, for a given prior, φ
prior
atr,ate = (αprior,βprior),
the posterior hyperparameter, φ
post
atr,ate = (αpost,βpost), is calculated by counting the num-
ber of successful interactions (Equation 4.7) and the number of unsuccessful interactions
(Equation 4.8) in the interaction history, O0:t0
atr,ate, and then adding these values to the
α and β parameters as shown in Equations 4.9 and 4.10. This is a well known result, a
derivation of which is given by DeGroot and Schervish (2002).
matr,ate = |{o ∈ O0:t0
atr,ate|o = 1}| (4.7)
natr,ate = |{o ∈ O0:t0
atr,ate|o = 0}| (4.8)
αpost = αprior + matr,ate (4.9)
βpost = βprior + natr,ate (4.10)
The eﬀect of updating the parameter distribution in light of observations is illustrated
in Figure 4.1. Here, adding observations, and thus increasing α and β, decreases the
distribution variance, making the distribution more peaked. The proportion of successful
and unsuccessful interactions, along with the prior, determine where in the interval [0,1]58 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
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Figure 4.1: Example beta pdf plots; note that when α = 1,β = 1 (top-left) the
distribution is uniform in the interval [0,1].
the distribution peaks. A high α value compared to β (usually resulting from a high
proportion of successful outcomes) causes the distribution mode to occur close to 1.
Intuitively, this is correct because it supports the conclusion that the intrinsic probability
of Oatr,ate = 1 is also close to 1.
At this stage, it is useful to describe in detail how the parameter model in TRAVOS
can be applied within the framework of Decision Theory. Section 3.3 described this in
more general terms by stipulating that a truster’s preferences should be captured in a
utility function, U : OC → R, and that this should be used, along with the distribution
of Oatr,ate, to calculate the expected utility of atr interacting with ate. Assuming that
p(θatr,ate) is the p.d.f. of θatr,ate given all available direct experience and reputation, then
it follows from the parameter model that this expected utility can be calculated in theChapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces 59
following way:
EU =
X
o∈OC
U(Oatr,ate = o)p(Oatr,ate = o) (4.11)
=
X
o∈OC
U(Oatr,ate = o)
Z
ΘC
p(Oatr,ate = o|θatr,ate)p(θatr,ate) dθatr,ate (4.12)
= U(Oatr,ate = 1)
Z
ΘC
θatr,ate p(θatr,ate) dθatr,ate + (4.13)
U(Oatr,ate = 0)
Z
ΘC
(1 − θatr,ate)p(θatr,ate) dθatr,ate
= E[θatr,ate]U(Oatr,ate = 1) + (1 − E[θatr,ate])U(Oatr,ate = 0) (4.14)
What is interesting about this calculation is its simplicity, and that it depends only on
the expected value of θatr,ate (Equation 4.5), rather than the parameter distribution as a
whole. Choosing between competing trustees thus becomes the simple process of opting
for the agent that maximises Equation 4.14.
4.2 Instantiating the Reputation Mechanism
Accounting for reputation in TRAVOS requires agents to be able to share their experi-
ences of one another’s behaviour. According to our guidelines, this should be achieved
by specifying an opinion function Rarep,ate = r(O0:t0
arep,ate) that has a shared deﬁnition
across all reputation sources arep ∈ A, and is (ideally) a minimal suﬃcient statistic of
O0:t0
arep,ate.
To achieve this in TRAVOS, we deﬁne Rarep,ate to be a two dimensional vector consisting
of the number of successful and unsuccessful interactions that arep has had with ate, or
put another way, we let Rarep,ate be the vector < marep,ate,narep,ate >, in which each
component is deﬁned as follows:
marep,ate = |{o ∈ O0:t0
arep,ate|o = 1}| (4.15)
narep,ate = |{o ∈ O0:t0
arep,ate|o = 0}| (4.16)
Accounting for reputation in our assessments can now be done in the same way as a
truster does for its own direct experiences. That is, we simply sum together the truster’s
own interaction counts with those of its reputation sources, and so calculate the posterior60 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
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Figure 4.2: Example beta distributions for aggregating opinions of 3 agents.
hyperparameters in the following way, given reputation sources {ai,...,ap}.
αpost = Matr,ate + αprior (4.17)
βpost = Natr,ate + βprior where, (4.18)
Matr,ate = matr,ate +
p X
i=1
mai,ate (4.19)
Natr,ate = natr,ate +
p X
i=1
nai,ate (4.20)
From this, it is clear that the opinion function is suﬃcient because the posterior distri-
bution depends only on the interaction counts, and not on any other properties of the
observations. In addition, it is minimal because, with all other factors constant, any
change in a reputation source’s opinion will always result in a change to the posterior
hyperparameters. As such, there is a one-to-one mapping between an opinion and its
eﬀect on the hyperparameters, so any non-invertible function of Rarep,ate would not be
suﬃcient, thus proving that Rarep,ate is minimal.
The eﬀect of combining opinions in this way is illustrated in Figure 4.2. In this ﬁg-
ure, part (a) shows a beta distribution representing one agent’s opinion, along with
the attributes of the distribution that have been discussed so far. In contrast to this,
part (c) illustrates the diﬀerences between the distribution in part (a) and distributions
representing the opinions of two other agents with diﬀerent experiences. The result of
combining all three opinions is illustrated in part (b), of which there are two important
characteristics. First, the distribution with parameters α = 13 and β = 10 is based on
more observations than the remaining two distributions put together, and so has the
greatest impact on the shape and expected value of the combined distribution. This
demonstrates how conﬂicts between diﬀerent opinions are resolved: the combined trust
value is essentially a weighted average of the individual opinions, where opinions with
higher conﬁdence values are given greater weight. Second, the variance of the combined
distribution is strictly less than any one of the component distributions. This reﬂects
the fact that it is based on more observations overall, and so has a greater conﬁdence
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4.3 Filtering Inaccurate Reputation
As described in the previous chapter, opinions provided about a trustee from a third
party may not always be reliable. This may occur for a variety of reasons, for example,
because a trustee behaves diﬀerently toward a third party than it does toward the
truster, or because a reputation source intentionally manipulates its opinions for its
own purposes. In addition, the latter of these possibilities is particularly problematic
because not only do we not know for certain that reported observations are drawn from
the desired distribution, but also because the number of observations may be exaggerated
to increase their impact on a truster’s assessment.
In Chapter 2, we reviewed two basic approaches for addressing this problem, which
Jøsang et al. (2005) refer to as endogenous and exogenous methods. The former attempt
to identify unreliable reputation information by considering the statistical properties of
the reported opinions alone (e.g. Whitby et al. (2004); Dellarocas (2000)), while the
latter rely on other information to make such judgements, such as the reputation of the
source or its relationship with the trustee (e.g. Buchegger and Boudec (2003); Yu and
Singh (2003); Klos and Poutr´ e (2004)).
Many proposals for endogenous techniques assume that inaccurate or unfair raters are
generally in a minority among reputation sources, and thus consider reputation providers
whose opinions deviate in some way from mainstream opinion to be those most likely
to be inaccurate. Our solution is exogenous, in that we judge a reputation provider on
the perceived accuracy of its past opinions, rather than its deviation from mainstream
opinion. Moreover, we deﬁne a two-step method as follows. First, we calculate the
probability that an agent will provide an accurate opinion given its past opinions and
later observed2 interactions with the trustees for which opinions were given. Second,
based on this value, we reduce the distance between a rater’s opinion and the prior
belief that all possible values for an agent’s behaviour are equally probable. Once all
the opinions collected about a trustee have been adjusted in this way, the opinions are
aggregated using the technique described above. In so doing, we reduce the inﬂuence
that an opinion provider has on a truster’s assessment of a trustee, if the provider’s
opinion is consistently biased in one way or another. This can be true either if the
provider is malevolent, or if a signiﬁcant number of trustees behave diﬀerently towards
the truster than towards the opinion provider in question.
We describe this technique in more detail in the remainder of this section: ﬁrst we
detail how the probability of accuracy is calculated, and then we show how opinions are
adjusted and the combined reputation obtained. An example of how these techniques
can be used is also given with the aid of a walk-through scenario in Section 4.5.2.
2These are observations made by the truster after it has obtained an opinion.62 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
4.3.1 Estimating the Probability of Accuracy
The ﬁrst stage in our solution is to estimate the probability that a rater’s stated opinion
of a trustee is accurate, which depends on the value of the current opinion under con-
sideration, denoted ˆ Rarep,ate = (ˆ marep,ate, ˆ narep,ate). Speciﬁcally, if Er is the expected
value of a beta distribution, Dr, such that αr = ˆ marep,ate + 1 and βr = ˆ narep,ate + 1, we
can estimate the probability that Er lies within some margin of error around θatr,ate,
which we call the accuracy of arep according to atr, denoted as ρatr,arep. To perform this
estimation, we consider the outcomes of all previous interactions for which arep provided
an opinion similar to ˆ Rarep,ate about ate, to atr, for each ate. Using these outcomes, we
construct a beta distribution, Do, for which, if its expected value Eo is close to Er, then
arep’s opinions are generally correlated to what is actually observed, and we can judge
arep’s accuracy to be high. Conversely, if Er deviates signiﬁcantly from Eo, then arep
has low accuracy.
For example, the process of achieving this estimation is illustrated in Figure 4.3, in
which the range of possible values of Er and Eo is divided into ﬁve intervals (or bins),
bin1 = [0,0.2],...,bin5 = [0.8,1]. These bins deﬁne which opinions we consider to be
similar to each other, such that all opinions that lie in the same bin are considered alike.
This is necessary because we may never see enough opinions from the same provider
to assess an opinion based on identical opinions in the past. Instead, the best we can
do is consider the perceived accuracy of past opinions that do not deviate signiﬁcantly
from the opinion under consideration. In the case illustrated in the ﬁgure, the opinion
provider, arep, has provided atr with an opinion with an expected value in bin4. Now,
if we therefore consider all previous interaction outcomes for which arep provided an
opinion to atr in bin4, the portion of successful outcomes, and thus Eo, is also in bin4,
so ρatr,arep is high. If subsequent outcome-opinion pairs were also to follow this trend,
then Do would be highly peaked inside this interval, and ρatr,arep would converge to 1.
Conversely, if subsequent outcomes disagreed with their corresponding opinions, then
ρatr,arep would approach 0.
More speciﬁcally, we divide the range of possible values of Er into N disjoint intervals
bin1,...,binn, then calculate Er, and ﬁnd the interval, bino, that contains the value of Er.
Then, if Hatr,arep is the set of all pairs of the form (Oatr,ax, ˆ Rarep,ax), where ax ∈ A, and
Oatr,ax is the outcome of an interaction for which, prior to being observed by atr, arep
gave the opinion ˆ Rarep,ax, we can ﬁnd the subset Hr
atr,arep ⊆ Hatr,arep, which comprises
all pairs for which the opinion’s expected value falls in bino. We then count the total
number of pairs in Hr
atr,arep for which the interaction outcome was successful (denoted
Csuccess) and those for which it was not (denoted Cfail). Based on these frequencies, the
parameters for Do can be deﬁned as αo = Csuccess + 1 and βo = Cfail + 1. Using Do,
we now calculate ρatr,arep as the portion of the total mass of Do that lies in the intervalChapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces 63
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of ρatr,arep estimation process.
bino (see Equation 4.21).
ρatr,arep =
R max(bino)
min(bino) Xαo−1(1 − X)βo−1dX
R 1
0 Uαo−1(1 − U)βo−1dU
(4.21)
Each truster performs these operations to determine the probability of accuracy of re-
ported opinions. However, one implication of this technique is that the number (and
size) of bins eﬀectively determines an acceptable margin of error in opinion provider
accuracy: the estimated accuracy of a larger set of opinion providers converges to 1 with
large bin sizes, as opposed to small sizes.
4.3.2 Adjusting Reputation Source Opinions
To describe how we adjust reputation opinions, we must introduce some new notation.
First, let Dc be the beta distribution that results from combining all of a trustee’s
reputation information (using Equations 4.17 to 4.20). Second, let Dc−r be a distribution
constructed using the same equations, except that the opinion under consideration,
ˆ Rarep,ate, is omitted. Third, let ¯ D be the result of adjusting the opinion distribution Dr,
according to the process described below. Finally, we refer to the standard deviation
(denoted σ), expected value and parameters of each distribution by using the respective
superscript; for instance, Dc has parameters αc and βc, with standard deviation σc and
expected value Ec.
Now, our goal is to reduce the eﬀect of unreliable opinions on Dc. In essence, by adding
ˆ Rarep,ate to a trustee’s reputation, we move Ec in the direction of Er. The standard
deviation of Dr contributes to the conﬁdence value for the combined reputation value
but, more importantly, its value relative to σc−r determines how far Ec will move towards
Er. This eﬀect has important implications: consider as an example three distributions
d1, d2 and d3, with shape parameters, expected value and standard deviation as shown
in Table 4.1; the results of combining d1 with each of the other two distributions are64 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
Distribution α β E σ
d1 540 280 0.6585 0.0165
d2 200 200 0.5000 0.0250
d3 5000 5000 0.5000 0.0050
d1 + d2 740 480 0.6066 0.0140
d1 + d3 5540 5280 0.5120 0.0048
Table 4.1: Combination of beta distributions.
shown in the last two rows. As can be seen, distributions d2 and d3 have identical
expected values with standard deviations of 0.025 and 0.005 respectively. Although the
diﬀerence between these values is small (0.02), the result of combining d1 with d2 is quite
diﬀerent from combining d1 and d3. Whereas the expected value in the ﬁrst case falls
approximately between the expected values for d1 and d2, the relatively small parameter
values of d1 compared to d3 in the latter case means that d1 has virtually no impact on
the combined result. Obviously, this is due to our method of reputation combination in
which the parameter values are summed. This is important because it shows how, if left
unchecked, an unfair rater could deliberately increase the weight an agent places on its
opinion by providing very large values for m and n which, in turn, determine α and β.
In light of this, we adopt an approach that signiﬁcantly reduces very high parameter
values unless the probability of the rater’s opinion being accurate is very close to 1.
Speciﬁcally, we reduce the distance between, respectively, the expected value and stan-
dard deviation of Dr, and the expected value and standard deviation of the uniform
distribution, α = β = 1, which represents a state of no information (see Equations
4.22 and 4.23). Here, we denote the standard deviation of the uniform distribution as
σuniform and its expected value as Euniform. By adjusting the standard deviation in
this way, rather than changing the α and β parameters directly, we ensure that large
parameter values are decreased more than smaller values. We adjust the expected value
to guard against cases where we do not have enough reliable opinions to mediate the
eﬀect of unreliable opinions; if we did not adjust the expected value then, in the absence
of any other information, we would take an opinion source’s word as true, even if we did
not consider its opinion reliable.
¯ E = Euniform + ρatr,arep · (Er − Euniform) (4.22)
¯ σ = σuniform + ρatr,arep · (σr − σuniform) (4.23)
Once we have determined the values of ¯ E and ¯ σ, we use Equations 4.24 and 4.25 to
ﬁnd the parameters ¯ α and ¯ β of the adjusted distribution,3 and from these we calculate
adjusted values for ˆ marep,ate and ˆ narep,ate, denoted as ¯ marep,ate and ¯ narep,ate respectively
(see Equation 4.26). These scaled versions of ˆ marep,ate and ˆ narep,ate are then used in
their place to calculate the combined trust value, as in Equations 4.17 to 4.20. Strictly
3A derivation of these equations is provided in Appendix B.Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces 65
speaking, ¯ marep,ate and ¯ narep,ate are not frequencies nor are their unadjusted counter-
parts, but, for these purposes, these have the same eﬀect on the combined trust value
as an equivalent set of observations made by the truster itself. In general, as ρatr,arep
approaches 0, both ¯ marep,ate and ¯ narep,ate will also approach 0. Thus, if ρatr,arep is 0 then
no observation reported by arep will aﬀect atr’s decision making in any way.
¯ α =
¯ E2 − ¯ E3
¯ σ2 − ¯ E (4.24)
¯ β =
(1 − ¯ E)2 − (1 − ¯ E)3
¯ σ2 − (1 − ¯ E) (4.25)
¯ marep,ate = ¯ α − 1 , ¯ narep,ate = ¯ β − 1 (4.26)
4.4 Reputation Gathering for TRAVOS
In the preceding sections, we have shown how, by using the framework, reputation infor-
mation can be used along with a truster’s direct experience to assess the trustworthiness
of an agent. However, apart from assessment, there are two other issues that a practi-
cal trust and reputation system should include: (1) agents require some mechanism to
obtain opinions from reputation sources, and (2) agents must decide when it is neces-
sary to obtain reputation information. The latter is important, because if a truster has
suﬃcient direct evidence with which to judge a trustee, the cost of obtaining reputation
information may outweigh its beneﬁts. We now consider each of these issues in turn.
4.4.1 Reputation Brokering
The problem with obtaining opinions in large systems is that directly querying many
agents may entail a signiﬁcant communication overhead. Therefore, agents must do one
or more of the following:
1. choose a subset of agents to query; and
2. employ some method of streamlining reputation.
Our solution to this problem is illustrated in Figure 4.4. We assume that each agent
in a system belongs to exactly one primary domain. Here, a domain may correspond
to an organisation or department in the real world, to which the agent is responsible.
This view is in line with the vision of systems, such as the Grid, in which computing
resources belonging to diﬀerent organisations may be used together (recall our discus-
sion in Section 1.3). Within each domain, there is a reputation broker agent, which is
responsible for aggregating the opinions of all other agents within its domain; that is,
the opinion of a reputation broker about a trustee is an aggregation of the opinions of66 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
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Figure 4.4: Reputation brokering system.
all other agents within its domain. In addition, domains can be arranged in a hierarchy
such that brokers in sub-domains report to a broker in an overall domain. It this way,
a top level broker aggregates all the opinions of agents in each of its sub-domains.
Reputation brokers provide a point of contact for external agents looking to receive rep-
utation information. When a truster requires reputation, it ﬁrst uses a service discovery
system (such as described in Section 4.5) to identify domains that advertise information
about trustees in some general context4. For example, companies which make use of
grid-based storage space may advertise knowledge about vendors of such storage space.
Once a truster has received a list of appropriate domains, it can choose to request an
opinion from either the main reputation broker for that domain, or other brokers or
individual agents within that domain. Although we do not specify how a truster should
make this choice, there is an obvious trade-oﬀ in granularity. By requesting information
from a top-level broker, the truster can receive all the information known by the domain
in a single message. However, in this case, a truster can only judge the accuracy of the
broker’s domain as a whole (using the techniques described in Section 4.2). On the other
hand, if a truster contacted several agents within a domain, it could judge their accuracy
individually, thus identifying the most reliable contacts within an organisation. Here,
it is important that a truster should avoid using a reputation source at the same time
as any reputation broker that the source reports to. The reason for this is the problem
of correlated evidence: since the broker’s opinion is based on those agents which report
to it, using a reputation source along with its broker would amount to counting the
reputation source’s opinion twice!
4Here, we do not address the issue of the level at which domains should advertise information. For
example, if a department within a company is mainly responsible for certain information, it is not clear
whether the department should be the advertised point of contact, or the organisation it belongs to.Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces 67
Algorithm 1 Reputation broker update algorithm, performed by reputation sources.
{Each time an interaction outcome is observed do the following}
if interaction successful then
m[trustee id] ← m + 1
else
n[trustee id] ← n + 1
end if
{Periodically do the following}
for all i = trustee id do
if m[i] 6= 0 OR N[I] 6= 0 then
add m[i] and n[i] to update message
end if
m[i] ← 0
n[i] ← 0
end for
SEND update message to reputation broker
We now describe how a reputation broker’s opinion is formed. Each broker periodically
receives updates regarding any newly observed interaction outcomes from the agents
within its own domain of responsibility. These updates take the same form as normal
reputation opinions in TRAVOS (Equations 4.17 to 4.20) except that they are only
based on observations that have occurred since the last update the observer sent to its
broker. This process is summarised in Algorithm 1. When a reputation broker receives
an opinion from within its domain about a trustee ate, it updates its own opinion about
ate using Equations 4.27 and 4.28. In this way, the broker’s opinion can be compared
to that of a single agent that has observed all the interaction outcomes recorded by the
agents within the broker’s domain.
mabroker,ate = mabroker,ate +
X
ai∈D
m∗
ai,ate (4.27)
nabroker,ate = nabroker,ate +
X
ai∈D
n∗
ai,ate (4.28)
where (m∗
ai,ate,n∗
ai,ate) is the update message from ai about ate,
and D is the set of agents in abroker’s domain.
4.4.2 When to Seek Reputation
In some cases, an agent may decide that it is suﬃciently conﬁdent in its own knowledge
about a trustee to avoid acquiring reputation information to improve its estimate. This
is valuable because of the communication cost of reputation acquisition, and the inherent
unreliability of reputation compared to direct observations. One simple method of doing
this is to calculate the posterior probability that the true value for θatr,ate lies within
an acceptable margin of error around its estimate, ϑatr,ate. We can calculate this using
the parameter distribution as follows. First, we decide on an acceptable error margin,68 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
ϑatrate ± , where  is the acceptable distance from ϑatrate. Second, we integrate the
parameter distribution over the area deﬁned by the error margin. To do this, we use the
beta probability density function as shown in Equation 4.29. We refer to the resulting
value as the conﬁdence value of ϑatrate, which we denote as γatr,ate. Finally, we choose
a threshold for this probability, above which we consider the accuracy of the estimate
as acceptable; we denote this threshold as τ.
γatr,ate =
R ϑatr,ate−
ϑatr,ate+ Bα−1(1 − B)β−1dB
R 1
0 Uα−1(1 − U)β−1dU
, where (α,β) = φatr,ate (4.29)
4.5 An Application to Agent-Based Virtual Organisations
In this section, we describe the role of TRAVOS in the CONOISE-G system (Patel
et al., 2005b; Shao et al., 2004), which seeks to “support robust and resilient virtual
organisation formation and operation. It aims to provide mechanisms to assure eﬀective
operation of VOs in the face of disruptive and potentially malicious entities in dynamic,
open and competitive environments.”5 More speciﬁcally, CONOISE-G provides methods
by which agents operating in a grid environment can form dynamic resource coalitions
(VOs) in order to fulﬁll their goals. Here, by dynamic we mean that the member-
ship of a VO may change over its lifetime. This can happen for various reasons; for
instance, a particular member’s resources may fail, requiring a new member to make
up the shortfall. In the following subsections we give an overview of the CONOISE-G
system (Section 4.5.1), followed by a trust-oriented scenario of how TRAVOS is used
in CONOISE-G (Section 4.5.2). All of the work described in these sections has been
implemented, and applied to a number of real world scenarios.
4.5.1 System Overview
In essence, the CONOISE-G architecture comprises several diﬀerent agents, including
system agents and service providers (SPs), as shown in Figure 4.5. SPs are agents
which may belong to a VO, and are responsible for overseeing its formation, operation
and dissolution. On the other hand, system agents are those needed to achieve core
system functionality for VO formation and operation, and include ﬁve diﬀerent types of
agent:
1. the Yellow Pages Agent (YP);
2. the Quality of Service Consultant (QoSC);
3. the Quality of Service Accessor (QA);
5This quote is taken from http://www.conoise.org/Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces 69
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4. the Clearing Agent (CA); and
5. Reputation Brokers.
Using these agents, the formation of a VO consists of three steps:
1. Resource Discovery — A particular SP, acting either on its own behalf, or
on behalf of a user, identiﬁes a need for a number of resources, which it cannot
supply (eﬃciently) by itself. To fulﬁll this need, the SP instigates VO formation,
by requesting a list of other SPs that can supply the required resources; it obtains
this list from the Yellow Pages Agent (YP), which performs a service discovery
role (Deora et al., 2004). At this point, the SP that places the request for the
service takes on the VO Manager (VOM) role for the potential VO, as illustrated
in Figure 4.5.
2. Resource Assessment – After receiving a response from the YP, the VOM
invites the identiﬁed providers to bid for the requested services. Once all such
bids are received, the VOM generates an expected utility function for each bid,
based on the price oﬀered per resource unit, trust and the advice given by the
Quality of Service Assessor (QoSA). The QoSA, based on Deora et al. (2003), is
an external service which rates how well a given SP is likely to perform. Its role
can be viewed as similar to that of a reputation provider in TRAVOS, in that
it provides extra information about a trustee’s likely behaviour. However, the
nature of its assessment and its underlying assumptions are diﬀerent from that of
reputation sharing in TRAVOS, and therefore it must be treated diﬀerently.
In our approach, we ﬁrst estimate the SP’s behaviour distribution (as described in
the previous sections) thereby estimating the probability that the SP will fulﬁll its
obligations to the VOM. Then, we use the QoSA’s assessment of an SP to provide
an alternative estimate of this probability, and combine these two estimates using
a suprabayesian approach (Keeney and Raiﬀa, 1976). In general, the combined
probability should be more accurate than either of the individual estimates, since
it incorporates the knowledge of the QoSA, the VOM (in its role as a truster) and
the VOM’s reputation sources. The combined probability is then used to calculate
the expected utility for the VOM, for each possible number of resource units it can
purchase from the bidding SP.
3. Resource Allocation – Once we have an expected utility function for each bid-
der, we employ the Clearing Agent (CA), which ﬁnds the optimal resource al-
location6 for the set of bidding SPs (Dang and Jennings, 2002). The resulting
allocations are reported back to the VOM, which then sends ‘hired’ messages to
6Alternatively, if there are signiﬁcant time constraints, the CA can ﬁnd an allocation which is within
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each of the successful bidders, informing them of the quantity of each resource
they are asked to provide.
Once the VO is formed, the operational phase begins. During this stage, the VOM may
request the QoS Consultant (QoSC) to monitor any services provided by any members of
the VO. The QoSC informs the VOM if and when an SP diverges from its agreed service
level. When the QoS provision of a service in the VO falls below an acceptable level of
service, or some breach of contract is observed, the QoSC alerts the VOM, which initiates
a VO re-formation process. During this stage, the Contract Management component of
the VOM decides whether a breach of contract has actually occurred, and if so, which
SP is to blame. Based on this result, the VOM updates its trust component, recording
either a successful or unsuccessful outcome for any terminated contracts.
Meanwhile, the VOM issues another message to the YP, requesting a list of SPs that
can replace the resources of the failed SP. As before, the YP identiﬁes possible SPs, bids
are received and evaluated, resulting in the CA determining the best SP to replace the
failed provider. At this point, the VOM re-forms the VO with the new SP replacing
the old one, and instructs the QoSC to stop monitoring the old SP and to monitor the
new one instead. A similar process may also take place if another SP, not currently in
the VO, sends the VOM a competitive oﬀer on resources it receives from current VO
members. This process is facilitated by a publish and subscribe service oﬀered by the
YP: the VOM may register interest in SPs that provide particular resources, in response
to which the YP will inform the VOM any time a new SP oﬀering such services appears
in the system.
4.5.2 Walk-through Scenario
This section provides an agent-based VO scenario in which we demonstrate the use of
TRAVOS. We begin by stating that there is a need to create a VO to meet a speciﬁc
requirement to provide a composite multimedia communication service to an end user.
This consists of the following basic services: text messaging, multimedia streaming,
HTML content provision, and phone calls (this example is adapted from one given by
Norman et al. (2003)). Now, assume agent a1 has identiﬁed this need and wishes to
capitalise on the market niche. However, a1 only has the capability to provide a text
messaging service, and can only achieve its goal by forming a VO with an agent that can
supply a service for phone calls and one for HTML content. For simplicity, we assume
that each agent in the system has the ability to provide only one service. Agent a1 is
aware of three agents that can provide a phone call service, and its interaction history
with these is shown in Table 4.2. Similarly, it is aware of three agents that are capable
of providing HTML content, and its past interactions with these entities are given in
Table 4.3. We also assume that a truster’s prior parameter distribution for all agents is72 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
Agent Past interactions
Successful Unsuccessful
a2 17 5
a3 2 15
a4 18 5
Table 4.2: Agent a1’s interaction history with phone call service provider agents.
Agent Past interactions
Successful Unsuccessful
a5 9 14
a6 3 0
a7 18 11
Table 4.3: Agent a1’s interaction history with HTML content service provider agents.
uniform:
αprior = 1, βprior = 1
Agent a1 would like to choose the most trustworthy phone call and HTML content
service provider from the selection. The following describes how this is achieved using
TRAVOS.
4.5.2.1 Calculating Trust
Using the information from Tables 4.2 and 4.3, a1 can determine the number of successful
interactions, m, and the number of unsuccessful interactions, n, for each agent it has
interacted with. Feeding these into Equations 4.9 and 4.10, a1 can obtain a parameter
distribution which summarises each agent’s likely behaviour in future interactions; for
example, the shape parameters α and β, for a2, are calculated as follows:
Using Table 4.2: ma1,a2 = 17, na1,a2 = 5.
Using Equations 4.9 & 4.10: α = 17 + 1 = 18 and β = 5 + 1 = 6.
The hyperparameter for each agent is then used to estimate the probability that each
agent will cooperate in any future interaction. In line with Section 4.1, we calculate
this estimate as the expected value of the parameter distribution (Equation 4.5); for
example, the estimate, ϑa1,a2, for a2 is calculated as follows:
Using Equation 4.5: ϑa1,a2 = α
α+β = 18
18+6 = 0.75.
The above estimate gives a1 an assessment of a2’s likely behaviour based on direct inter-
actions. However, as discussed in Section 4.4, a1 may wish to determine if the accuracy
of this estimate is suﬃcient to avoid the need to gather reputation. To do this, we
calculate the posterior probability that the true value for θa1,a2 lies within an acceptableChapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces 73
Agent α β ϑa1,ax γa1,ax
a2 18 6 0.75 0.9806
a3 3 16 0.1579 0.9798
a4 19 6 0.76 0.9835
a5 10 15 0.4 0.9657
a6 4 1 0.8 0.8704
a7 19 12 0.6129 0.9822
Table 4.4: Agent a1’s calculated trust and associated conﬁdence level for HTML
content and phone call service provider agents.
margin of error around the estimate. We can calculate this using the parameter distri-
bution as follows. First, we decide on an acceptable error margin, ϑa1a2±, where  is a
suitable value, such as 0.2. Second, we integrate the parameter distribution over the area
deﬁned by the error margin. Finally, we determine some threshold for this probability,
above which the estimate gives an acceptable level of accuracy; for example, we could
deﬁne a threshold τ as 0.95. The proceeding example illustrates this calculation for a1’s
estimate for a2, using  = 0.2; we denote the resulting conﬁdence value as γa1,a2:
γa1,a2 =
R ϑa1,a2−
ϑa1,a2+ Bα−1(1 − B)β−1dB
R 1
0 Uα−1(1 − U)β−1dU
=
R 0.55
0.95 Bα−1(1 − B)β−1dB
R 1
0 Uα−1(1 − U)β−1dU
= 0.98
The hyperparameters, estimate and associated conﬁdence for each agent, a2 to a7, which
a1 computes using TRAVOS, are shown in Table 4.4. From this, it is clear that the trust
values for agents a2, a3 and a4, all have a conﬁdence above τ (=0.95). This means that
a1 does not need to consider the opinions of others for these three agents. Agent a1 is
able to decide that a4 is the most trustworthy out of the three phone call service provider
agents and chooses it to provide the phone call service for the VO.
4.5.2.2 Calculating Reputation
The process of selecting the most trustworthy HTML content service provider is not
as straightforward. Agent a1 has calculated that out of the possible HTML service
providers, a6 has the highest trust value. However, it has determined that the conﬁdence
it is willing to place in this value is 0.8704, which is below that of τ and means that a1
has not yet interacted with a6 enough times to calculate a suﬃciently conﬁdent trust
value. In this case, a1 has to use the opinions from other agents that have interacted
with a6, and form a reputation value for a6 that it can compare to the trust values it
has calculated for other HTML providers (a5 and a7).
Suppose that a1 is aware of three agents that have interacted with a6, denoted by a8,
a9 and a10, whose opinions about a6 are (15,46), (4,1) and (3,0) respectively. Agent a1
can then obtain hyperparameters based solely on the opinions provided as follows:74 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
Opinions from providers: a8 = (15,46),a9 = (4,1) and a10 = (3,0)
Using Equations 4.19 & 4.20: M = 15 + 4 + 3 = 22, N = 46 + 1 + 0 = 47
Using Equations 4.17 & 4.18: α = 22 + 1 = 23, β = 47 + 1 = 48
Having obtained the shape parameters, a1 can obtain an estimate for a6 using Equation
4.5, as follows:
Using Equation 4.5: ϑa1,a6 = α
α+β = 23
23+48 = 0.3239
Now, a1 is able to compare the trust in agents a5, a6 and a7. Before calculating the
trustworthiness of a6, agent a1 considered a6 to be the most trustworthy (see Table
4.4). Having calculated a new trust value for agent a6 (which is lower than the ﬁrst
assessment), agent a1 now regards a7 as the most trustworthy. Therefore a1 chooses a7
as the service provider for the HTML content service.
4.5.2.3 Handling Inaccurate Opinions
The method a1 uses to assess the trustworthiness of a6, as described in Section 4.5.2.2,
is susceptible to errors caused by reputation providers giving inaccurate information.
In our scenario, suppose a8 provides the HTML content service too, and is in direct
competition with a6. Agent a1 is not aware of this fact, which makes a1 unaware that a8
may provide inaccurate information about a6 to inﬂuence its decision on which HTML
content provider agent to incorporate into the VO. If we examine the opinions provided
by agents a8, a9 and a10, which are (15,46), (4,1) and (3,0) respectively, we can see
that the opinion provided by a8 does not correlate with the other two. Agents a9 and
a10 provide a positive opinion of a6, whereas agent a8 provides a very negative opinion.
Suppose that a8 is providing an inaccurate account of its experiences with a6. We can
use the mechanism discussed in Section 4.3 to allow a1 to cope with this inaccurate
information, and arrive at a better decision that is not inﬂuenced by self-interested
reputation providing agents (such as a8).
Before we show how TRAVOS can be used to handle such inaccurate information, we
must assume the following. Agent a1 obtained reputation information from a8, a9 and
a10 on several occasions, and each time a1 recorded the opinion provided by a reputation
provider and the actual observed outcome (from the interaction with an agent to which
the opinion is applied). Each time an opinion is provided, the outcome observed is
recorded by updating a frequency bin corresponding to the interval, ΘC
r, which the
received opinion belongs to. Agent a1 maintains information of like opinions in bins as
shown in Table 4.6. For example, if a8 provides an opinion that is used to obtain a trust
value of 0.254, then the actual observed outcome (successful or unsuccessful) is stored
in the 0.2 < E[θatr,ate|φr] ≤ 0.4 bin.Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces 75
Agent Weighting Adjusted Values
µ σ α β
a8 0.0049 0.4988 0.2875 1.0095 1.0144
a9 0.7802 0.6672 0.1881 3.5215 1.7567
a10 0.7424 0.7227 0.1956 3.0629 1.1751
Table 4.5: Agent a1’s adjusted values for opinions provided by a8, a9 and a10.
[0,0.2] [0.2,0.4] [0.4,0.6] [0.6,0.8] [0.8,1] Total
m n m n m n m n m n
a8 2 0 11 4 0 0 0 0 2 3 22
a9 0 2 1 3 0 0 22 10 6 4 48
a10 1 3 0 2 0 0 18 8 5 3 40
Table 4.6: Observations made by a1 given opinions from reputation sources. m rep-
resents that the interaction (to which the opinion applied) was successful, and likewise
n means unsuccessful.
Using the information shown in Table 4.6, agent a1 can calculate the weighting to
be applied to the opinions from the three reputation sources by applying the tech-
nique described in Section 4.3. In so doing, agent a1 uses the information from the
bin that contains the opinion provided, and integrates the beta distribution between
the limits deﬁned by the bin’s boundary. For example, a8’s opinion falls under the
0.2 < E[θatr,ate|φr] ≤ 0.4 bin. In this bin, agent a1 has recorded that m = 11 and n = 4.
These m and n values are used to obtain a beta distribution, d(θatr,ate|φo), which is then
integrated between 0.2 and 0.4 to give a probability of accuracy ρa1,a8 = 0.0049 for a6’s
opinion. Then, by using Equations 4.22 and 4.23, agent a1 can calculate the adjusted
mean and standard deviation of the opinion, which in turn gives the adjusted α and β
parameters for that opinion. The results from these calculations are shown in Table 4.5.
Summing the adjusted values for α and β from Table 4.5, a1 can obtain a more reliable
value for the trustworthiness of a6. Using Equation 4.5, a1 calculates an estimate ϑa1,a6 =
0.7419 for a6. This means that from the possible HTML content providers, a1 now sees
a6 as the most trustworthy and selects it to be a partner in the VO. Unlike a1’s decision
in Section 4.5.2.2 (when a7 was chosen as the VO partner), here we have shown how a
reputation provider cannot inﬂuence the decision made by a1 by providing inaccurate
information.
4.6 Empirical Study
In this section, we demonstrate the advantages that TRAVOS oﬀers to the state of the
art, through empirical evaluation. We divide our discussion into three parts. First,
Section 4.6.1 describes the simulation environment and overall methodology used to
perform our experiments. Second, Section 4.6.2 compares the reputation component of76 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
TRAVOS to the Beta Reputation System (BRS) (see Sections 2.2.2 & 2.3.2 for more
detail). We have chosen this model as a benchmark because it shares the same basic
representation of trust as TRAVOS. Any diﬀerence in performance can therefore be
attributed to the novel properties of TRAVOS rather than those it shares with BRS.
Finally, Section 4.6.3 investigates the component performance of TRAVOS; that is,
how TRAVOS performs when a truster uses both its direct experience of a trustee and
reputation, and when it uses either source of evidence in isolation. This allows us to show
how TRAVOS behaves when diﬀerent types of information are available, and that using
both types of information is in general better than using one or the other independently.
4.6.1 Experiment Methodology
Evaluation of TRAVOS took place using a simulated marketplace environment, consist-
ing of three distinct sets of agents: provider agents P ⊂ A, consumer agents C ⊂ A,
and reputation source agents S ⊂ A. For our purposes, the role of any c ∈ C is to
evaluate ϑc,p for all p ∈ P. The behaviour of each provider and reputation source agent
was set before each experiment. Speciﬁcally, the behaviour of a provider p1 ∈ P is
determined by the parameter θc,p1 as described in Section 3.3. Here, reputation sources
are divided into three types that deﬁne their behaviour: accurate sources report the
number of successful and unsuccessful interactions they have had with a given consumer
without modiﬁcation; noisy sources add Gaussian noise to the beta distribution deter-
mined from their interaction history, rounding the resulting expected value if necessary
to ensure that it remains in the interval [0,1]; and lying sources attempt to maximally
mislead the consumer by setting the expected value Er to 1 − Er.
Against this background, all experiments consisted of a series of episodes in which a
consumer was asked to assess its trust in all providers P. Based on these assessments,
we calculate the consumer’s mean estimation error for the episode (Equation 4.30). This
gives us a measure of the consumer’s performance on assessing the provider population
as a whole. The value of this metric will vary depending on the distribution of values
of θc,p over the provider population. For simplicity, all the results described in the next
sections have been acquired for a population of 101 providers, {p1,...,pn}, with values
of θc,p chosen uniformly between 0 and 1 at intervals of 0.01.
avg estimate err =
1
n
n X
i=1
abs(ϑc,pi − θc,pi) (4.30)
In each episode, the consumer may draw upon both the opinions of reputation sources
in S and its own interaction history with both the providers and reputation sources.
However, to ensure that the results of each episode are independent, the interaction
history between all agents is cleared before every episode, and re-populated according toChapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces 77
experiment no. lying no. noisy no. accurate
1 0 0 20
2 0 10 10
3 0 20 0
4 10 0 10
5 20 0 0
Table 4.7: Reputation source populations.
set parameters. All the results that we discuss have been tested for statistical signiﬁcance
using Analysis of Variance techniques and Scheﬀ´ e tests (Cohen, 1995).
4.6.2 TRAVOS Against the Beta Reputation System
Like TRAVOS, BRS uses the beta family of probability functions to calculate the pos-
terior probability of an agent ate’s behaviour holding a certain value, given past inter-
actions with ate. However, the models diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their approach to handling
inaccurate reputation. TRAVOS assesses each reputation source individually, based on
the perceived accuracy of past opinions. In contrast, BRS assumes that the majority of
reputation sources provide an accurate opinion, and it ignores any opinions that deviate
signiﬁcantly from the average. Since BRS does not diﬀerentiate between reputation and
direct observations, we have focused our evaluation on scenarios were consumers have
no personal experience, and must therefore rely on reputation only.
To show variation in performance depending on reputation source behaviour, we ran
experiments with populations containing accurate and lying reputation sources, and
populations containing accurate and noisy sources. In each case, we kept the total
number of sources equal to 20, but ran separate experiments in which the percentage
of accurate sources was set to 0%, 50% and 100% (see Table 4.7). Figure 4.6 shows
the mean estimation error of TRAVOS and BRS with these diﬀerent reputation source
populations averaged over 50 independent episodes in each experiment. To provide a
benchmark, the ﬁgure also shows the mean estimation error of a consumer, c0.5, which
keeps ϑc0.5,p = 0.5 for all p ∈ P. Results are plotted against the number of previous
interactions between the consumer and each reputation source.
As can be seen, in populations containing lying agents, the mean estimation error of
TRAVOS is consistently equal to or less than that of BRS. Moreover, estimation errors
decrease signiﬁcantly for TRAVOS as the number of consumer to reputation source
interactions increases. In contrast, BRS’s performance remains constant, since it does
not learn from past experience. Both models perform consistently better than c0.5 in
populations containing 50% or 0% liars. However, in populations containing only lying
sources, both models are suﬃciently misled to perform worse than c0.5, but TRAVOS
suﬀers less from this eﬀect than BRS. Speciﬁcally, when the number of past consumer78 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
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to reputation interactions is low, TRAVOS beneﬁts from its initially conservative belief
in reputation source opinions. The beneﬁt is enhanced further as the consumer becomes
more skeptical with experience.
Similar results can be seen in populations containing noisy sources. In general, per-
formance is better because noisy source opinions are not as misleading as lying source
opinions on average. TRAVOS still outperforms BRS in most cases, except when the
population contains only noisy sources. In this case, BRS has a small but statistically
signiﬁcant advantage when the number of consumer to reputation source interactions
are less than 10.
4.6.3 TRAVOS Component Performance
To evaluate the overall performance of TRAVOS, we compared three versions of the
system that used the following information respectively: direct interactions between
the consumer and providers; direct provider experience and reputation; and reputation
information only. In these experiments, we varied the number of interactions between
the consumers and providers, and kept the number of consumer to reputation source
interactions constant at 10. We used the same reputation source populations as described
in Section 4.6.2. The mean estimation errors for a subset of these experiments are shown
in Figure 4.7. Using only direct consumer to provider experience, the mean estimation
error decreases as the number of consumer to provider interactions increases. As would
be expected, using both information sources when the number of consumer to provider
interactions is low results in similar performance to using reputation information only.
However, in some cases, the combined model may provide marginally worse performance
than using reputation only.7 This can be attributed to the fact that TRAVOS always
puts more faith in direct experience than reputation.
With a population of 50% lying reputation sources, the combined model is misled enough
to temporarily increase its error rate above that of the direct only model. This is a
symptom of the relatively small number of consumer to reputation source interactions
(10), which is insuﬃcient for the consumer to completely discount all the reputation
information as unreliable. The eﬀect disappears when the number of such interactions
is increased to 20. However, these results are not illustrated graphically here.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce the TRAVOS trust model, which instantiates the frame-
work introduced in the previous chapter, for cases in which a trustee’s behaviour can
7This eﬀect was not considered signiﬁcant under a Scheﬀ´ e test, but was considered signiﬁcant by
Least Signiﬁcant Diﬀerence Testing. The latter technique is, in general, less conservative at concluding
that a diﬀerence between groups does exist.80 Chapter 4 TRAVOS: A Trust Model for Boolean Action Spaces
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be described as a binary event. That is, TRAVOS deals with situations in which a
truster only cares about whether or not a trustee cooperates by fulﬁlling its obligations,
or defects by breaking those obligations.
In particular, we showed how, by using TRAVOS, a truster could decide if and when
to interact with a trustee based on its direct observations and reputation. Signiﬁcantly,
as part of this solution, we introduced a reputation ﬁltering mechanism that allows a
truster to account for the reliability of its reputation sources in making its assessment. To
achieve this, the truster ﬁrst estimates the probability with which a source’s prediction
is within a margin of error around a trustee’s true behaviour. This is then used as part of
a heuristic method, to reduce the impact of unreliable sources on the truster’s decisions.
Following on from this, we then demonstrated how TRAVOS works in practice in two
ways. First, we showed how it can be used as part of the CONOISE-G system to guide
automatic formation and management of agent-based virtual organisations. This was
followed by a walk-through scenario, showing how the model parameters respond to
observations made in the environment. Second, we demonstrated the performance of
TRAVOS through empirical analysis. In particular, this showed how it out-performs
the most similar model in the literature, under most of the conditions tested.Chapter 5
TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for
Continuous Action Spaces
In the previous chapter, we introduced the TRAVOS system, and showed how it could
be used to fulﬁll our aim of facilitating decision making in a multi-agent system. As
discussed, however, TRAVOS relies on a heuristic method for ﬁltering out inaccurate
opinions, and is only applicable when trustees have binary action spaces.
In this chapter, we improve upon this situation by introducing a reﬁnement, TRAVOS-
C1, which not only addresses continuous action spaces, but has four other key advantages
over its predecessor. First, reputation source accuracy is no longer assessed by a heuris-
tic, but follows directly from Bayesian theory along with the model’s assumptions. This
gives the model a more solid theoretical foundation that is optimal under the model’s
assumptions.
Second, in addition to assessing the accuracy of a reputation source based on its past
performance, the Bayesian model can account for observed correlations between opinions
from diﬀerent sources. This means that, if a group of agents generally provide similar
opinions, then evidence for the reliability of one of the group can count against the group
as a whole.
Third, if a reputation source always provides biased opinions, TRAVOS-C can still make
use of the source, provided that a correlation with trustee behaviour still exists. For
example, if each time Alice gives Bob an apple, Bob says that she gave him an orange,
then knowing that Bob reports receiving an orange is evidence that he actually received
an apple. Under TRAVOS, such reports would be ignored, even if there was an obvious
correlation.
Finally, the model can further improve the accuracy of its estimates, by observing cor-
relations between the behaviour of groups of agents. For example, if it is observed that
1The C in the name refers to the applicability of the new model to continuous action spaces.
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agents belonging to a particular organisation generally provide a certain quality of ser-
vice, the truster can use this information to better estimate a trustee’s behaviour when
both direct observations and reputation are in short supply.
In the following sections, we elaborate on these claims and detail the theoretical basis for
TRAVOS-C. We begin in Section 5.1 by deﬁning the basic model and outlining how it can
be used to assess trustee behaviour based on direct experience and reputation. Building
on this, Section 5.2 shows how the model can be extended to account for correlations in
group behaviour, and Section 5.3 instantiates the model for continuous outcome spaces.
Finally, Sections 5.4 and 5.5 detail how the model can be applied in practice, Section 5.6
gives an empirical evaluation of the model, and Section 5.7 summarises.
5.1 The TRAVOS-C Model
As in previous chapters, our main goal is to estimate the future behaviour distribution
for a trustee, given direct and third party observations of agent behaviour. In the
case of third party information, diﬀerent reputation sources may be more reliable than
others, so a truster must decide how much inﬂuence each reputation source should have
on trustee assessment. While making this decision, the important thing to consider is
the relative predictive value of opinions from diﬀerent sources. However, provided we
can assess their relative worth, the reasons why one reputation source provides better
opinions than another are only of secondary importance. For instance, if opinions from
a particular agent generally have low correlation with trustee behaviour, this may be
due to the reputation source purposely misleading the truster, or because the reputation
source has an inaccurate world view. In both cases, the eﬀect is the same: the reputation
source’s opinions provide little information about trustee behaviour, and so should not
have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on trustee assessment.
This gives the intuition behind TRAVOS-C, in which any source of inaccuracy in
third party opinions is modelled as independent random noise added to each reputa-
tion source’s observations of a trustee, before an opinion is conveyed to the truster.
Thus, an unreliable reputation source is modelled as having signiﬁcant noise associated
with its opinions, which, as result, provide little information to the truster. In contrast,
a reliable reputation source is modelled with little or no added noise. Thus, its opinions
will be judged to have value similar to direct experience. In either case, Bayesian in-
ference is applied to determine the probable amount of noise contained in a reputation
source’s opinion. This replaces the ﬁltering mechanism used in TRAVOS (Section 4.3),
whereby the weight of an opinion is reduced heuristically, if evidence suggests that it
deviates signiﬁcantly from trustee behaviour.
The formal aspects of this approach are illustrated by the Bayesian network in Fig-
ure 5.1, in which the dashed ovals indicate which variables are assumed to be visibleChapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 85
Truster's Sphere of Visibility
Oatr,ate Rarep,ate
Reputation Source's Sphere of Visibility
Oarep,ate Narep
 atr,ate  arep
  Oarep,ate
Figure 5.1: The TRAVOS-C model.
to the truster and each of its reputation sources respectively. As before, the behaviour
distribution of a trustee toward a truster is determined by a parameter vector denoted
θatr,ate; the interaction history between the trustee and truster is denoted O0:t0
atr,ate; and
the interaction history between the trustee and reputation source is denoted O0:t0
arep,ate.
As indicated in the ﬁgure, the truster can only observe its own direct observations and
the reported opinions of reputation sources. If any third party opinion is to be useful,
then it should depend on the observation history between trustee and reputation source.
However, TRAVOS-C introduces two modiﬁcations to the basic framework. First, we
assume that the behaviour distribution of the trustee toward the reputation source is
always identical to its behaviour distribution toward the truster. This implies that
O0:t0
arep,ate is a private set of observations drawn from ate’s behaviour distribution toward
atr that, in a perfect world, will always be returned unmolested to the truster. Second,
we introduce a new random variable Narep, which has a probability distribution speciﬁed
by a parameter vector arep, and a domain denoted N C. In the model, Narep plays the
role of noise added to each Oarep,ate to form noisy observations, denoted e Oarep,ate. To
ensure that both noisy and direct observations can be treated in the same way, we deﬁne
N C such that:
∀Narep ∈ N C, ∀Oarep,ate ∈ OC, e Oarep,ate = (Narep + Oarep,ate) ∈ OC (5.1)
With this in mind, we deﬁne e O0:t0
arep,ate as the set of all noisy observations obtained by
arep up to time t0, and it is on this set that we make Rarep,ate a statistic.
Using this model, practical Bayesian inference can be performed by considering the
posterior distribution of θatr,ate given O0:t0
atr,ate and Rarep,ate for a number of reputation86 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
 G1  G2
 atr,a1  atr,an  atr,an+1  atr,am ... ...
Figure 5.2: Bayesian network for inferring group priors.
sources arep. Although details of how this can be done are deferred to the following
sections, there are essentially two mechanisms by which this model can provide eﬀective
predictions of behaviour. The ﬁrst and simplest of these is direct interaction, whereby
the truster builds up a picture of the trustee’s behaviour by interacting with it repeatedly
over time.
The second is similar to how reputation is used in TRAVOS, in which the reliability
of a reputation source is assessed by receiving opinions about diﬀerent trustees over
time. This works by identifying plausible levels of noise that explain the amount of
correlation observed between opinions and later observed direct observations; the direct
observations provide reliable information about trustee behaviour, and any discrepancy
between this and reported opinions points to high levels of noise. In turn, if higher levels
of noise seem plausible, then the reputation source in question will have little eﬀect on
the posterior distributions of trustee behaviour.
5.2 Learning Group Behaviour
So far we have discussed models for assessing trustee behaviour when either the truster
or some third party has experience of the trustee. However, there are situations where
this may not be the case, for example when a new service provider enters a system for
the ﬁrst time with no previous provision history. One way to deal with such cases is
to draw comparisons between agents with certain attributes in common. For instance,
if we ﬁnd that agents that belong to a particular organisation generally behave in a
particular way then, a priori, we could assume that an unknown agent from that group
will behave similarly to its peers.
To take advantage of such correlations, TRAVOS-C includes an additional component
that can be invoked when correlations between groups of agents are likely to exist.
For instance, using the multimedia scenario from Section 4.5.2, suppose that a number
of agents provide multimedia content using the same type of streaming technology.
Presumably, the quality of this technology will be a major factor in the capabilities ofChapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 87
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Figure 5.3: Examples of group parameter distributions with behaviour samples.
these agents to provide their service. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to speculate that
the ability of one such agent to deliver multimedia will be similar to that of another. If
such correlations do exist, then we can use the behaviour of known agents to predict the
behaviour of other agents that use the same technology.
The idea, then, is to divide agents into groups containing members that we suspect will
have similar behaviours; for example, this could be based on organisation membership,
or geographical location. Then, we associate with each group a parameter distribution,
which characterises the distribution of behaviours belonging to agents in that group. We
can use this to determine things such as the average behaviour of agents belonging to
a particular group and how similar agent behaviours are within a group, and to predict
the behaviour of an anonymous agent within a group. Put formally, we separate the set
of agents A into distinct subsets, G1,...,Gg, such that
Sg
i=1 Gi = A. Then we associate
a hyperparameter vector, φGi, with each group Gi, which determines the parameter
distribution of trustee behaviours belonging to Gi.
The way this model works is demonstrated in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. Speciﬁcally, Fig-
ure 5.2 shows a Bayesian network for two distinct sets of trustees, G1 = {a1,...,an}
and G2 = {an+1,...,am}. Here, the parameter vectors for all the members of each group
are shown to be dependent on their respective hyperparameter vector. This is exempli-
ﬁed in Figure 5.3, in which the parameter distributions for each group are depicted along
with trustee behaviour distributions sampled from them. Here, we assume that trustees
have binary action spaces for illustration purposes. In this case, each parameter vector,
θatr,ate, speciﬁes the probability of the trustee supplying a successful service, as is as-
sumed in TRAVOS. The group parameter distributions become beta distributions, with
α and β parameters speciﬁed by each hyperparameter φGi. For G1, the hyperparameter88 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
φG1 speciﬁes α = 80, β = 20. This is an example of a highly informative group, in which
member behaviours do not deviate signiﬁcantly from a mean of 0.8. On the other hand,
φG2 gives α = 1 and β = 1, which gives a non-informative uniform distribution. In this
case, knowing that an agent belongs to G2 tells us relatively little, other than that a
member of G2 is equally likely to assume any behaviour distribution.
The application of this model is highly ﬂexible. For instance, we could potentially as-
sign agents to groups based on organisation membership, social relationships, or the
length of time an agent has been in the system. Obviously, it is best to pick predictive
attributes based on some investigation of the target application. However, choosing rela-
tively unpredictive attributes will not reduce the eﬀectiveness of the system because the
model will automatically account for how informative a group is. Even if no predictive
attributes can be identiﬁed, the group model may still provide some value by assigning
all agents in an environment to a single group. In this case, TRAVOS-C could learn
the most appropriate prior to use for the environment as a whole. In this way, if most
agents in a system behave in a certain way, TRAVOS-C will use this information to give
a head start in behaviour prediction, and so will generally need fewer interactions with
a trustee to accurately predict its behaviour.
In addition, the method by which group parameter distributions are determined is highly
ﬂexible. For example, we could statically assign group parameter distributions, or more
signiﬁcantly, apply standard Bayesian techniques to learn appropriate hyperparameters
dynamically, by observing correlations in trustee behaviour within groups. In fact,
committing to a ﬁxed hyperparameter vector per group is not even strictly necessary.
Instead, we can consider the joint distribution of both the hyperparameters and the
behaviour parameters alike, and marginalise over all possible hyperparameters. This
accounts for any uncertainty surrounding the hyperparameters themselves.
For example, if a truster interacts ten times with two distinct members of a group and
ﬁnds that, over those interactions, the trustees appear to behave in a similar way, this
may suggest a highly informative group parameter distribution. On the other hand, per-
haps ten interactions are not enough to pin down the individual behaviour distributions,
and perhaps two trustees are not a representative sample of group members. However,
by marginalising over the hyperparameters, we need not worry about such concerns,
because the Bayesian machinery will always give the most appropriate distribution for
trustee behaviour. That is, the marginal distribution will account for both the uncer-
tainty inherent in the trustee’s behaviour, and the uncertainty due to lack of evidence.
By using this distribution, we can then make choices using Decision Theory, to account
appropriately for the risk due to both sources of uncertainty. In the following sections
we shall see how this is achieved for a particular representation of trustee behaviour.Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 89
5.3 Instantiating TRAVOS-C for Continuous Action Spaces
At this level of detail, the model could potentially be applied to any domain of trustee
behaviour2, including continuous and binary action spaces. However, to fully assess the
merits of this approach requires a fully instantiated working model, and this necessitates
the choice of some set of assumptions to allow learning to take place. For this reason,
and since we wish to demonstrate applicability to continuous action spaces, we assume
that both trustee behaviour and reputation noise are normally distributed.
This is not an unreasonable assumption, because there are many instances where real life
phenomena have distributions that are approximately normal. For example, according
to the central limit theorem, many random variables that can be seen as the sum of
several other random variables will have an approximately normal distribution. Despite
this choice, however, we stress that the general methods discussed here could by applied
to any reasonable choice of distribution.
With this mind, we must instantiate three aspects of the model: (1) the domains of
each model parameter, (2) the reputation function for forming opinions, and (3) the
prior distributions for each parameter to enable Bayesian inference and group behaviour
analysis. We consider each of these in turn in the subsections that follow.
5.3.1 The Parameter Domains
Starting with the model parameters, the support3 of a normal distribution is the entire
real line, so we let OC = N C = R. This clearly satisﬁes Equation 5.1, since R is closed
under addition. Furthermore, as normal distributions are fully deﬁned by their mean,
µ, and variance, σ2, we let θatr,ate =< µatr,ate,σ2
atr,ate > and arep =< µarep,σ2
arep >,
where in each case, the subscripts identify which distribution the parameter belongs to.
Accordingly, the domain of θatr,ate becomes ΘC = R × R+, since µ is real and σ2 is
positive real.
5.3.2 The Reputation Function
From Chapter 3 we know that a reputation function should ideally be concise, but still
capture all the information conveyed by the noisy observations on which an opinion is
supposedly based. In more formal terms, we want to ensure that the model parameters,
comprising θatr,ate and each arep, are conditionally independent of all noisy observations,
2In some cases, this may require introducing a dependency between Narep and Oarep,ate so that
Equation 5.1 can be satisﬁed. However, we do not concern ourselves with such cases here.
3The support of a probability distribution is the smallest closed set whose complement has probability
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given the third party opinions. Symbolically, this means that, for reputation sources
a1,...,an:
p(θatr,ate,arep(1),...,arep(n)|Ra1,ate,...,Ran,ate, e O0:t0
a1,ate,..., e O0:t0
an,ate) =
p(θatr,ate,arep(1),...,arep(n)|Ra1,ate,...,Ran,ate) (5.2)
which, assuming an opinion is derived only from the noisy observations, is equivalent to:
p(θatr,ate,arep(1),...,arep(n)| e O0:t0
a1,ate,..., e O0:t0
an,ate) =
p(θatr,ate,arep(1),...,arep(n)|Ra1,ate,...,Ran,ate) (5.3)
From Bayes rule, and assuming that noise added by diﬀerent sources is independent4,
we know that
p(θatr,ate,arep(1),...,arep(n)| e O0:t0
a1,ate,..., e O0:t0
an,ate) ∝
p(θatr,ate,arep(1),...,arep(n))
n Y
i=1
p( e O0:t0
ai,ate|θatr,ate,arep(i)) (5.4)
and that
p(θatr,ate,arep(1),...,arep(n)|Ra1,ate,...,Ran,ate) ∝
p(θatr,ate,arep(1),...,arep(n))
n Y
i=1
p(Rai,ate|θatr,ate,arep(i)) (5.5)
Since these equations only diﬀer by their likelihood terms, p( e O0:t0
ai,ate|θatr,ate,arep(i)) and
p(Rai,ate|θatr,ate,arep(i)), we can prove that Equation 5.3 holds if we can prove that:
∀i ∈ [1,n], p( e O0:t0
ai,ate|θatr,ate,arep(i)) = p(Rai,ate|θatr,ate,arep(i)) (5.6)
To achieve this, we suggest deﬁning the reputation function such that Rarep,ate comprises
three values: (1) the number of observations in e O0:t0
arep,ate (denoted n), (2) the sample mean
of e O0:t0
arep,ate (denoted m), and (3) its sample variance (denoted v). Thus, for each arep
and ate, we deﬁne Rarep,ate as the vector < n,m,v >, where:
n = | e O0:t0
arep,ate| (5.7)
m =
1
n
n X
i=1
e Oi
arep,ate (5.8)
v =
1
n
n X
i=1
( e Oi
arep,ate − m)2 (5.9)
(5.10)
4This can safely be assumed, provided reputation sources do not share information during opinion
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To prove that this satisﬁes our conditions, we ﬁrst note that each noisy observation,
e Oarep,ate, is a sum of two normally distributed random variables, so is itself normally
distributed, with mean µatr,ate + µarep and variance σ2
atr,ate + σ2
arep. This means that
e O0:t0
arep,ate is a set of independent normally distributed random variables with shared mean
and variance, and we want to show that its likelihood, p( e O0:t0
arep,ate|θatr,ate,arep), depends
only on the size of the set, its mean and its variance. In the following sections, we shall
encounter this problem on a number of occasions, as well as more general cases where
samples have a shared mean, but possibly diﬀerent variances. Therefore, we state the
more general proof in Theorem 5.1 for future reference, and address the speciﬁc case of
shared variance in Corollary 5.2. By applying these general results to the model, we can
state that
p( e O0:t0
arep,ate|θatr,ate,arep)
= p(Rarep,ate|θatr,ate,arep) (5.11)
=
h
2π(σ2
atr,ate + σ2
arep)
i−n/2
· exp
"
−
n
 
(m − µatr,ate − µarep) + v
2
2(σ2
atr,ate + σ2
arep)
#
(5.12)
Theorem 5.1 (Gaussian Likelihood). Suppose that X = {x1,...,xn} is a set of n
independent samples drawn from gaussian distributions with the same mean, µ, but
possibly diﬀerent variances, {σ2
1,...,σ2
n}. The full data likelihood function is then:
L(X) = (2π)−n/2 · exp
h
−
τtot
2
 
(x − µ)2 + s2i n Y
i=1
1
q
σ2
i
(5.13)
where
τtot =
n X
i=1
1
σ2
i
(5.14)
x =
1
Pn
j=1
1
σ2
j
n X
i=1
xi
σ2
i
(5.15)
s2 =

 1
Pn
j=1
1
σ2
j
n X
i=1
x2
i
σ2
i

 − x2 (5.16)
Proof:
It follows directly from the deﬁnition of the gaussian distribution that:
L(X) =
n Y
i=1
1
q
2πσ2
i
exp

−
(xi − µ)2
2σ2
i

(5.17)
= (2π)−n/2 · exp
"
−
1
2
n X
i=1
(xi − µ)2
σ2
i
#
n Y
i=1
1
q
σ2
i
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Now, if we expand the summation in Equation 5.18 we get:
n X
i=1
(xi − µ)2
σ2
i
=
n X
i=1
x2
i − 2µxi + µ2
σ2
i
(5.19)
=
 
n X
i=1
x2
i
σ2
i
!
− 2µ
 
n X
i=1
xi
σ2
i
!
+ µ2
 
n X
i=1
1
σ2
i
!
(5.20)
= τtot
" 
1
τtot
n X
i=1
x2
i
σ2
i
!
− 2µx + µ2
#
(5.21)
and by completing the square we have:
n X
i=1
(xi − µ)2
σ2
i
= τtot
" 
1
τtot
n X
i=1
x2
i
σ2
i
!
− x2 + (x − µ)2
#
(5.22)
= τtot

s2 + (x − µ)2
(5.23)
Finally, by substituting Equation 5.23 into Equation 5.18 we obtain Equation 5.13, thus
proving the theorem.
Corollary 5.2 (Shared Variance Gaussian Likelihood). If X = x1,...,xn is a set of n
independent samples drawn from a gaussian distribution with ﬁxed mean, µ and variance,
σ2, then it follows from Theorem 5.1 that the full data likelihood is:
L(X) = (2πσ2)−n/2 · exp
h
−
τtot
2
 
(x − µ)2 + s2i
(5.24)
where
τtot =
n
σ2 (5.25)
x =
1
n
n X
i=1
xi (5.26)
s2 =
 
1
n
n X
i=1
x2
i
!
− x2 (5.27)
5.3.3 Parameter Distributions for Group Behaviour
The ﬁnal part of TRAVOS-C that we must instantiate is the group behaviour model.
That is, for a given trustee ate ∈ Gi, we must specify the distribution of θatr,ate given
φGi, which we can then use to derive the full posterior distribution of θatr,ate given all
available evidence. Since we postulate that trustee behaviour is normally distributed,
it seems reasonable that we should deﬁne φGi in line with the conjugate family for the
Gaussian distribution. This generally keeps the form of equations as simple as possible,
particularly when we ignore reputation and use only direct observations, in which case
the posterior distribution of θatr,ate inherits the same form as the prior (see Chapter 3).Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 93
Consequently, we model the group parameter distribution as a normal inverse-gamma
distribution (Denison et al., 2002), which is well known to be the conjugate family for
Gaussian distributions. In general, this has four hyperparameters, denoted m, v, α and
β, which specify the p.d.f. of Gaussian parameters µ and σ2 as follows:
p(µ,σ2|m,v,α,β) = p(µ|σ2,m,v)p(σ2|α,β) (5.28)
p(µ|σ2,m,v) =
1
√
2πvσ2exp

−
(µ − m)2
2vσ2

(5.29)
p(σ2|α,β) =
βα
Γ(α)
(σ2)−α−1exp

−
β
σ2

(5.30)
Here, the distribution is deﬁned in terms of the conditional probability of µ given σ2, and
the marginal distribution of σ2. Speciﬁcally, µ has a normal distribution with mean m
and variance vσ2, and σ2 has an inverse-gamma distribution with shape parameter α and
scale parameter β. With this in mind, for each group Gi we deﬁne the hyperparameter
vector φGi as < mGi,vGi,αGi,βGi >, where each element assumes the corresponding
meaning from above. In the next section, we show how this, along with the other parts
of the model instantiation, can be used to guide decision making in a multi-agent system.
5.4 Applying the Model
The type of problems we foresee TRAVOS-C being useful for are those which involve
an agent choosing rationally which of its peers to interact with. In decision theory,
this is generally done by calculating the expected utility of interacting with a particular
trustee (see Section 3.1), which can then be compared to other options, such as choosing a
diﬀerent interaction partner or none at all. According to standard theory, and assuming
for the moment that we know the value of θatr,ate, the expected utility of atr interacting
with ate would be:
E[U(Oatr,ate)|θatr,ate] =
Z ∞
−∞
U(Oatr,ate)p(Oatr,ate|θatr,ate) dOatr,ate (5.31)
where U(·) is some function that speciﬁes the utility of an interaction outcome Oatr,ate,
from the perspective of atr. Without knowledge of θatr,ate, the best thing to do is
marginalise over its value (Equation 5.33), so that the uncertainty surrounding it is
fully accounted for. However, this can be a non-trivial problem if p(θatr,ate) is hard to
evaluate. Alternatively, we can simply estimate θatr,ate, either by the mode or the mean
of its distribution given the evidence, and then use this to apply Equation 5.31. If the
estimation is straightforward, then this is a tractable proposition because, even if there is
no analytical solution to E[U(Oatr,ate)|θatr,ate], it only requires integration over a scalar,
which can readily be done by numerical integration (Appendix A). However, this only
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θatr,ate distribution is high.
E[U(Oatr,ate)] = E[E[U(Oatr,ate)|θatr,ate]] (5.32)
=
Z
ΘC
E[U(Oatr,ate)|θatr,ate] · p(θatr,ate) dθatr,ate (5.33)
As it stands, in all but the simplest cases, there does not appear to be a closed analytical
solution to Equation 5.33, but then neither are there any known closed analytical solu-
tions to estimate θatr,ate by its mean or mode. Furthermore, although solutions using
inﬁnite series could be sought, it is not obvious that one could be found that would pro-
vide an eﬃciency advantage over numerical integration techniques. For these reasons,
we suggest approximating E[U(Oatr,ate)] directly by calculating Equation 5.33 using nu-
merical integration. For this, we suggest using Monte Carlo techniques (Appendix A)
for two reasons:
1. They allow us to estimate any function of Oatr,ate (including E[U(Oatr,ate)]) to
arbitrary precision, even if the number of unknown parameters is reasonably large.
2. Using them to estimate E[U(Oatr,ate)] directly does not require signiﬁcantly more
eﬀort than using them to estimate θatr,ate.
To apply Monte Carlo techniques to this problem, we use them to draw a set of n
samples, {x1,...,xn}, such that for any function f(θatr,ate) (e.g. Equation 5.31):
lim
n→∞E[f(θatr,ate)] =
1
n
n X
i=1
f(xi) (5.34)
Normally, we could achieve this by sampling from the marginal distribution of θatr,ate,
but this would require the ability to evaluate the density of this distribution, or at
least some function proportional to it. Unfortunately, there is no simple way of doing
this, but we can achieve the same goal by sampling from the joint distribution for all
the parameters in the given instance of the model. This is a more tractable problem
because it is relatively easy to ﬁnd a function proportional to the full joint density. The
disadvantage is that this distribution is highly dimensional, depending on the number
of agents, which has its own practical issues (Appendix A). On the other hand, one
Markov chain will produce estimates for each parameter in the model, so unless we are
only interested in a small subset of parameters at a time, we gain some eﬃciency in this
way.
To see how this works in detail, consider a truster atr who is interested in the behaviour of
n trustees, ate(1),...,ate(n) and consults m reputation sources arep(1),...,arep(m). Given
our assumptions that both noise and behaviour distributions are normal, this gives the
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1. the means and variances of all trustee behaviour distributions; and
2. the means and variances of all reputation noise distributions.
Thus, each sample drawn from the joint distribution is a l = 2n+2m dimensional vector,
of the form:
x = < µatr,ate(1), ..., µatr,ate(n),
σ2
atr,ate(1), ..., σ2
atr,ate(n),
µarep(1), ..., µarep(m),
σ2
arep(1), ..., σ2
arep(m) >
(5.35)
By drawing p such samples, x1,...,xp, we can approximate the expectation of any
arbitrary function f(x) as:
E[f(x)] ≈
1
p
p X
j=1
f(xj) (5.36)
provided p is suﬃciently large. This includes any function that is dependent on only
a subset of parameters, for example the expectation of any particular element of the
parameter vector. For instance, if for each i, xi =< xi,1,...,xi,l > and xi,j ∈ Dj, then
from probability theory:
E[xi,j] =
Z
Dj
xi,jp(xi,j) dxi,j (5.37)
E[xi,j] =
Z
D1
···
Z
Dl
xi,jp(xi,1,...,xi,l) dx1 ···dxl (5.38)
E[xi,j] ≈
1
p
p X
i=1
xi,j (5.39)
which illustrates why approximating expectations using samples from the joint distribu-
tion is equally valid as sampling from the marginal distributions. That is, we essentially
marginalise over the unused parameters.
To account for group behaviour under this regime is also straightforward, and can be
achieved by including the group hyperparameters in the joint distribution. For example,
if ate(1),...,ate(n) are divided between g groups labelled G1,...,Gg, then samples from
the joint distribution now take the form:
x = < µatr,ate(1), ..., µatr,ate(n),
σ2
atr,ate(1), ..., σ2
atr,ate(n),
µarep(1), ..., µarep(m),
σ2
arep(1), ..., σ2
arep(m),
mG1, ..., mGg,
vG1, ..., vGg,
αG1, ..., αGg,
βG1, ..., βGg >
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set deﬁnition set deﬁnition set deﬁnition
Sbeh {σ2
atr,ate|ate ∈ T } Snoise {σ2
arep|arep ∈ R} SGi {σ2
atr,ate|ate ∈ Gi}
Mbeh {µatr,ate|ate ∈ T } Mnoise {µarep|arep ∈ R} MGi {µatr,ate|ate ∈ Gi}
Pbeh Sbeh ∪ Mbeh Pnoise Snoise ∪ Mnoise PGi SGi ∪ MGi
Pall Pbeh ∪ Pnoise Y {φGi|Gi ∈ G} Q Pall ∪ Y
Table 5.1: Parameter set deﬁnitions.
The main beneﬁt of this method is that it enables marginalisation over possible group
behaviour models (as mentioned in Section 5.2), which will account for any extra infor-
mation that group behaviour conveys about the likely behaviours of individual agents.
A possible secondary advantage is that, if a truster has direct preferences about group
behaviour, it can calculate expected utilities that take on board these preferences. For
example, an agent may wish to punish groups for erratic behaviour by not interact-
ing with its members. However, we suspect that, in most applications, it would be
hard to identify such preferences that cannot be reduced to preferences about individual
behaviour.
5.5 A Monte-Carlo Method for TRAVOS-C
Now that we have described the purpose of Monte Carlo methods in TRAVOS-C, we
shall describe a particular Monte Carlo process adapted for its application. For this, we
use Gibbs sampling (Appendix A) which, while not the most eﬃcient method available,
does allow us to get a working model reasonably quickly5. Consequently, we do not
suggest this mechanism is the best realisation of TRAVOS-C, but only that it shows one
possible realisation, which we have used for the empirical evaluation in Section 5.6.
Before detailing this method, however, it is useful to introduce new notation for some
commonly used sets. In particular, we introduce ﬁve new sets of parameters:
1. the set of noise variances Snoise;
2. the set of noise means Mnoise;
3. the set of behaviour variances Sbeh;
4. the set of behaviour means Mbeh; and
5. the set of hyperparameters Y.
Formal deﬁnitions for each of these are given in Table 5.1, along with a number of other
sets deﬁned in terms of these basic ﬁve.
5A review of all the techniques used in this section, including alternative techniques that may oﬀer
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Algorithm 2 The TRAVOS-C Gibbs sampler.
Require: ∀θ ∈ Q, θ(0) ← initial state for θ
n ← number of required samples
Q(0) = {θ(0)|θ ∈ Q}
for s = 1 to n do
for θ ∈ Q do
θ(s) ← sample from p(θ|Q(s−1) − {θ(s−1)})
end for
Q(s) = {θ(s)|θ ∈ Q}
end for
We can now outline the process in detail. As described in Appendix A, Gibbs sampling
produces samples from a high-dimensional distribution, such as the joint parameter
distribution in TRAVOS-C, by sampling from a suitable set of conditional distributions
that together cover all the dimensions of the target distribution. In our case, this is
achieved by drawing independent samples from the conditional distributions of each
of the component vectors, θatr,ate, φGi and arep for all ate, arep and i. The complete
sampling mechanism thus follows Algorithm 2.
The independent samples used in this algorithm are generated by a mixture of standard
techniques and rejection sampling, depending on the distribution in question. How this
is achieved depends on the density of the distribution so, in the following subsections, we
outline the sampling mechanisms in each case, by ﬁrst deriving the conditional densities.
Speciﬁcally, we split our discussion into three subsections: Section 5.5.1 derives the
equations needed to sample from the hyperparameter distributions required for group
behaviour analysis, Section 5.5.2 derives the equations required for sampling from the
parameter distributions for individual behaviour, and Section 5.5.3 shows how these can
be used to implement the required sampling methods.
5.5.1 Hyperparameter Sampling
Suppose that we wish to draw samples from a distribution with density p(x). To do this,
we don’t necessarily need the ability to evaluate p(x), as long as we can evaluate some
other function, p∗(x), such that p∗(x) = c·p(x), for some (possibly unknown) constant c.
When this is the case, we say that p∗(x) is proportional to p(x), and write p(x) ∝ p∗(x).
We can now consider the problem of sampling from p(Q − {φGi}|φGi), and so need a
function that is proportional to it, and can be easily evaluated. To this end, we ﬁrst
note from the model deﬁnition that φGi only directly aﬀects the behaviour distributions
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their group. As a result, we know that the likelihood p(Q − {φGi}|φGi) is equal to:
p(Q − {φGi}|φGi) = p(Q − {φGi,PGi}|PGi,φGi)p(PGi|φGi) (5.41)
= p(Q − {φGi,PGi}|PGi)p(PGi|φGi) (5.42)
which (w.r.t. φGi) is proportional to:
p(Q − {φGi}|φGi) ∝ p(PGi|φGi) (5.43)
∝
Y
ate∈Gi
p(θatr,ate|φGi) (5.44)
Thus, if we assume a uniform prior for φGi, then from Bayes rule we have:
p(φGi|PGi) =
p(φGi)
Q
ate∈Gi p(θatr,ate|φGi)
p(PGi)
(5.45)
(w.r.t. φGi) p(φGi|PGi) ∝
Y
ate∈Gi
p(θatr,ate|φGi) (5.46)
which means that to derive each conditional hyperparameter parameter distribution, we
need only consider the likelihoods for trustee behaviour distributions belonging to the
group in question. Speciﬁcally, if we suppose that: {µ1,...,µn} = MGi, {σ2
1,...,σ2
n} =
SGi and < α,β,m,v >= φGi then from Equations 5.28 to 5.30 we have:
p(φGi|PGi) ∝
n Y
i=n
βα(σ2
i )−α−1
Γ(α)
q
2πvσ2
i
exp

−
β
σ2
i
−
(µi − m)2
2vσ2
i

(5.47)
∝ exp
"
−
n X
i=1
(µi − m)2
2vσ2
i
+
β
σ2
i
#
βnα(
Qn
i=1 σ2
i )−α−1.5
Γ(α)n(2πv)n/2 (5.48)
Given this, we can consider each component of φGi individually. To sample from
p(φGi|PGi}), we shall prove that:
p(φGi) = p(β|α)p(α)p(m|v)p(v) (5.49)
where p(m|v) is a Gaussian distribution, p(v) is an inverse-gamma distribution, p(β|α) is
a gamma distribution, and p(α) is a gamcon type II distribution, as deﬁned by Damsleth
(1975). There are well known techniques for sampling from each of these types of
distribution, apart from the gamcon distribution. So, provided we can specify a sampling
method for latter, we can sample from p(φGi) by ﬁrst generating samples from p(v)
and p(α), and then using these as known values to sample from p(β|α) and p(m|v)
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5.5.1.1 Conditional distribution for β
From probability theory, we know that for any variables x, y and z, p(x|y,z) is propor-
tional (w.r.t. x) to p(x,y|z). Applying this principle to the hyperparameter β, we ﬁnd
from Equation 5.48 that:
(w.r.t β) p(β|α,m,v,PGi) ∝ p(β,α,m,v,|PGi) (5.50)
∝ p(φGi|PGi) (5.51)
∝ βnα · exp
"
−β
n X
i=1
1
σ2
i
#
(5.52)
Since every p.d.f. must integrate to 1, it follows directly that this is a gamma distribu-
tion, and so has the following density with scale parameter ζ and shape parameter k.
Furthermore, since this does not depend on m or v, we know that p(β|α,m,v) = p(β|α).
p(β|α,PGi) =
ζk
Γ(k)
βk−1 · exp[−βζ] (5.53)
where k = nα + 1 > 0 (5.54)
ζ =
n X
i=1
1
σ2
i
> 0 (5.55)
5.5.1.2 Conditional distribution for α
At this point we are interested in ﬁnding p(α|m,v,PGi) which, from probability theory,
we know is:
p(α|m,v,PGi) =
p(α,β|m,v,PGi)
p(β|α,m,v,PGi)
(5.56)
We already know p(β|α,m,v,PGi), so all that remains is to ﬁnd the form of p(β,α|m,v,PGi)
and divide by the former. From Equation 5.48 this is:
p(β,α|m,v,PGi) ∝ exp
"
−β
n X
i=1
1
σ2
i
#
βnα(
Qn
i=1 σ2
i )−α−1.5
Γ(α)n (5.57)
from which dividing by p(β|α,m,v,PGi) we get:
p(α|m,v,PGi) ∝
Γ(k)(
Qn
i=1 σ2
i )−α−1.5
ζkΓ(α)n (5.58)
∝
 
n Y
i=1
σ2
i
!−α  
n X
i=1
1
σ2
i
!−nα
Γ(nα + 1)Γ(α)−n (5.59)
∝


 
1
n
n X
i=1
1
σ2
i
! 
n Y
i=1
σ2
i
!1/n

−nα
Γ(nα + 1)Γ(α)−nn−nα (5.60)
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where C2 is a normalising constant, and:
δ =
 
1
n
n X
i=1
1
σ2
i
! 
n Y
i=1
σ2
i
!1/n
(5.62)
for δ > 1, α > 0 and n > 0. Here, Equation 5.61 is the p.d.f. for the gamcon type II
distribution, as speciﬁed by Damsleth (1975). Although the normalising constant, C2,
is not known to have a closed form, it is clear that the distribution does not depend on
m or v, so deﬁnes p(α|PGi).6 The constant C2 does not always exist when δ < e.
5.5.1.3 Conditional distribution of m
In the same vein as β, we ﬁnd p(m|α,β,v,PGi) by ignoring all constant terms in the
joint distribution not depending on m. Thus we have:
(w.r.t. m) p(m|α,β,v,PGi) ∝ exp
"
−
n X
i=1
(µi − m)2
2vσ2
i
#
(5.63)
which from Theorem 5.1 is:
p(m|α,β,v,PGi) =
1
p
2πσ2
mv
exp

−
(µm − m)2
2σ2
mv

(5.64)
where
µm =
n X
i=1
µi/vσ2
i Pn
j=1 1/vσ2
j
=
n X
i=1
µi/σ2
i Pn
j=1 1/σ2
j
(5.65)
σ2
mv =
1
Pn
i=1 1/vσ2
i
=
v
Pn
i=1 1/σ2
i
(5.66)
Thus, p(m|v,α,β,θ1:n) is a Gaussian distribution, with mean µm and variance σ2
mv, and
is equivalent to p(m|v,PGi) since the density does not depend on α or β.
5.5.1.4 Conditional distribution of v
Finally, we ﬁnd p(v|α,β,PGi) in a similar way to the conditional distribution of α, by
ﬁrst ﬁnding the joint distribution of m and v and then dividing by p(m|α,β,v,PGi). So,
with respect to v and m we have:
p(v,m|α,β,PGi) ∝ v−n/2exp
"
−
n X
i=1
(µi − m)2
2vσ2
i
#
(5.67)
6Since δ is the arithmetic mean of 1/σ
2
1:n divided by its geometric mean, it will always be that case
that δ ≥ 1. It will only be equal to 1, if all σ
2
i hold the same value. Nevertheless we may need to legislate
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which from Theorem 5.1 is:
p(v,m|α,β,PGi) ∝ v−n/2 · exp

−
(µm − m)2 + s2
2σ2
mv

where, (5.68)
where
s2 =
 
σ2
m
n X
i=1
µ2
i
σ2
i
!
− µ2
m (5.69)
Now, by dividing Equation 5.68 by p(m|v,α,β,PGi) we ﬁnd that:
p(v|α,β,PGi) ∝ v−(n−1)/2 · exp

−
s2
2σ2
mv

(5.70)
Then, since Equation 5.70 has the same form as:
v−αv−1 · exp

−
βv
v

(5.71)
where αv > 0 and βv > 0, we ﬁnd that p(v|α,β,θ1:n) is an inverse gamma distribution,
with parameters deﬁned as follows:
αv =
n − 1
2
− 1 (5.72)
βv =
s2
2σ2
m
(5.73)
Moreover, since the density does not depend on α or β, we know that: p(v|α,β,PGi) =
p(v|PGi).
5.5.2 Parameter Sampling
From the previous section, we have the conditional distributions necessary to draw
samples for the group behaviour model. In this section, we turn our attention to the
conditional distributions of the parameters for an individual agent’s behaviour, which
depend on the direct and third party observations available to the truster. Here, our
task is simpliﬁed by the symmetry that exists between these groups of parameters in
the model, in the way they aﬀect the evidence available to the truster. To see why
this is the case, let us consider a scenario where a truster is interested in the behaviour
distributions of trustees ate(1),...,ate(q), and has evidence from l reputation sources
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uniform priors for all model parameters, the conditional distributions have the form:
p(θatr,ate(j)|Pall − {θatr,ate(j)},Ra1,ate,...,Ral,ate)
∝
m Y
i=1
p(Rai,ate|θatr,ate(j),arep(i)) (5.74)
p(arep(j)|Pall − {arep(j)},Ra1,ate,...,Ral,ate)
∝
m Y
i=1
p(Rai,ate|θatr,ate(i),arep(j)) (5.75)
where from Equation 5.12, the likelihood of any particular opinion is given by:
p(Rai,ate|θatr,ate(i),arep(j)) ∝
exp
"
−
ni
 
(¯ ri − µatr,ate(j) − µarep(i))2 + s2
i

2(σ2
atr,ate(j) + σ2
arep(i))
#
(σ2
atr,ate(j) + σ2
arep(i))−
ni
2 (5.76)
where ¯ rr is the sample mean, s2
i is the sample variance and ni is the sample size speciﬁed
by the opinion Rai,ate. From this, it is clear that both the noise and behaviour parameter
distributions have precisely the same form, since substituting the noise parameters for
behaviour parameters and vice versa does not change the equations. This is also true if
we introduce direct observations or conjugate priors. In the case of direct observations,
these can either be incorporated into the conjugate hyperparameters in the standard
way (see Section ??), or be considered a special case of third-party opinions, in which
the noise is known to be zero. Likewise, the information given by conjugate priors can
also be expressed in the same form as reputation.
To see how this is done, suppose that ˆ µ and ˆ σ2 are the mean and variance of interest,
and that µ1,...,µl and σ2
1,...,σ2
l are the additional means and variances present in
the likelihood. So, for example, if we are concerned with the conditional distribution of
θatr,ate, then ˆ µ = µatr,ate, ˆ σ2 = σ2
atr,ate, µi = µarep(i) and σ2
i = σ2
arep(i). Likewise, if we
are concerned with a particular noise parameter distribution, then the noise parameters
are the parameters of interest, and each pair (µi,σ2
i ) denotes the behaviour parameters
of a trustee, about which the relevant reputation source has previously expressed an
opinion. This gives us the following general form for both noise and behaviour parameter
distributions:
p(ˆ µ, ˆ σ2|µ1,...,µl,σ2
1,...,σ2
l )
∝ exp
"
−
l X
i=1
ni
 
(¯ ri − ˆ µ − µi)2 + s2
i

2(ˆ σ2 + σ2
i )
#
·
l Y
i=1
 
ˆ σ2 + σ2
i
ni/2 (5.77)
For convenience, it will be useful to talk in terms of the precision of interest, which is
the reciprocal of ˆ σ2 and is denoted τ. This avoids division by zero when (ˆ σ2 + σ2
i ) = 0,
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term wi initially set to ni/2, this gives us the following alternative form:
p(ˆ µ,τ|µ1,...,µl,σ2
1,...,σ2
l )
∝ exp
"
−
l X
i=1
niτ
 
(¯ ri − ˆ µ − µi)2 + s2
i

2(1 + τσ2
i )
#
·
l Y
i=1

τ
1 + τσ2
i
wi
(5.78)
From this, it is straightforward to see how to incorporate direct observations into this
equation, by substituting 0 for µi and σ2
i , which results in the standard Gaussian like-
lihood as given by Corollary 5.2. With regard to conjugate priors, such as the group
based priors described earlier (Equations 5.28 to 5.30), we know that these have the
form:
p(ˆ µ,τ|α,β,m,v) ∝ τα−1/2exp

−τβ −
τ(m − ˆ µ)2
2v

(5.79)
So, if we make the following substitutions:
¯ r0 = m, µ0 = σ2
0 = 0, s2
0 = 2βv, n0 =
1
v
, w0 = α − 1/2 (5.80)
we have that Equation 5.79 is equivalent to:
p(ˆ µ,τ|α,β,m,v) ∝ exp
"
−
n0τ
 
(¯ r0 − ˆ µ − µ0)2 + s2
0

2(1 + τσ2
0)
#
τ
1 + τσ2
0
w0
(5.81)
which can easily be incorporated in Equation 5.78 without modiﬁcation. Armed with
this information, we can now proceed to derive the conditional behaviour and noise
parameter distributions, in terms of ˆ µ and ˆ σ2. Speciﬁcally, we will derive equations
for p(ˆ µ|ˆ σ2) and p(ˆ σ2). These can then be used to draw independent samples from the
joint distribution of ˆ µ and ˆ σ2 by ﬁrst sampling from p(ˆ σ2) and then using the result to
sample from p(ˆ µ|ˆ σ2). In terms of the overall problem, this enables us to sample from the
distributions p(θatr,ate|Q − {θatr,ate}) and p(arep|Q = {arep}) as required by the Gibbs
Sampler outlined earlier.
5.5.2.1 Conditional distribution of µ
To derive p(ˆ µ|ˆ σ2), we ﬁrst note that this is proportional to Equation 5.78, so with respect
to ˆ µ we have:
p(ˆ µ|ˆ σ2,µ1,...,µl,σ2
1,...,σ2
l ) ∝ exp
"
−
l X
i=0
niτ(ˆ µ − ¯ ri − µi)2
2(1 + τσ2
i )
#
(5.82)
which from Theorem 5.1 is equivalent to:
p(ˆ µ|ˆ σ2,µ1,...,µl,σ2
1,...,σ2
l ) ∝ exp

−
τr(ˆ µ − µr)2
2

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where
τr =
l X
i=0
τni
(1 + τσ2
i )
(5.84)
µr =
l X
i=0
niτ/(1 + τσ2
i )
Pl
j=0 njτ/(1 + τσ2
j)
· (¯ ri − µi) (5.85)
=
l X
i=0
ni/(1 + τσ2
i )
Pl
j=0 nj/(1 + τσ2
j)
· (¯ ri − µi) (5.86)
=
l X
i=0
niτ(¯ ri − µi)
τr(1 + τσ2
i )
(5.87)
(5.88)
Therefore, the conditional distribution of the mean is a Gaussian distribution, with mean
µr and precision τr. Its p.d.f. is thus given as follows:
p(ˆ µ|ˆ σ2,µ1,...,µl,σ2
1,...,σ2
l ) =
√
τr √
2π
· exp

−
τr(ˆ µ − µr)2
2

(5.89)
5.5.2.2 Conditional distribution of τ
To ﬁnd the marginal distribution of ˆ σ2, we ﬁrst divide the joint distribution of ˆ µ and ˆ σ2
by the conditional distribution of ˆ µ, and then remove any superﬂuous constant terms.
From Theorem 5.1 and Equation 5.78, we know that the joint distribution of ˆ µ and ˆ σ2
has the form:
p(ˆ µ,τ|µ1,...,µl,σ2
1,...,σ2
l )
∝ exp
"
−
τr
 
(ˆ µ − µr)2 + s2
r

2
−
l X
i=1
niτs2
i
2(1 + τσ2
i )
#
·
l Y
i=1

τ
1 + τσ2
i
wi
(5.90)
where s2
r is deﬁned as:
s2
r =
l X
i=0
niτ(¯ ri − µi − µr)2
τr(1 + τσ2
i )
(5.91)
Now, by dividing by Equation 5.89 we get (w.r.t. τ):
p(τ|µ1,...,µl,σ2
1,...,σ2
l )
∝
1
√
τr
· exp
"
−
τrs2
r
2
−
l X
i=1
niτs2
i
2(1 + τσ2
i )
#
·
l Y
i=1

τ
1 + τσ2
i
wi
(5.92)
∝
1
√
τr
· exp
"
−
l X
i=1
niτ
 
s2
i + (¯ ri − µi − µr)2
2(1 + τσ2
i )
#
·
l Y
i=1

τ
1 + τσ2
i
wi
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Note that if for all i, σ2
i = 0 then this simpliﬁes as follows:
τr = τ
l X
i=0
ni ∴ (5.94)
p(τ|µ1,...,µl,σ2
1,...,σ2
l ) =
ωψ
Γ(ψ)
τ−ψ−1exp[−τω] (5.95)
where
ω =
1
2
l X
i=1
ni(s2
i + (¯ ri − µi − µr)2) (5.96)
ψ = 1/2 −
l X
i=1
wi (5.97)
Thus, when all observations are noise free, τ has a gamma distribution with scale pa-
rameter ω and shape parameter ψ.
5.5.3 Sampling Methods for Conditional Parameter Distributions
In the previous sections, we have derived the form of each of the conditional distributions
required for Gibbs Sampling. What remains is how to use this knowledge to produce
samples from these distributions, which for the most part can be achieved by readily
available software libraries.7 In particular, sampling solutions for both normal and
gamma generated random numbers are given by Gentle (1998), while inverse-gamma
samples can be sought by taking the reciprocal of gamma distributed samples.8
This leaves only two sets of model parameters that require a specialised mechanism to be
devised, namely, the alpha hyperparameter distribution (Section 5.5.1.2) and the vari-
ance distributions (Section 5.5.1.4). For both of these, we have two choices: either we can
generate dependent samples with a technique such as the Metropolis-Hastings method,
or independent samples using rejection sampling (Appendix A). Independent samples
are always preferable, since estimates based on them converge more quickly. However,
there may be a larger overhead in ﬁnding a suitable proposal density for rejection sam-
pling, which may outweigh its beneﬁts in certain cases. Therefore, to choose between
the two approaches, we need to compare the relative diﬃculty in ﬁnding proposal densi-
ties in each case, which depends on the characteristics of the target distributions in our
problem.
7Libraries that implement suitable sampling methods for gamma and normal distributed variables
include the Matlab Statistical Toolbox (http://www.mathworks.com) and the NAG Software Libraries
(http://www.nag.co.uk).
8This is the case because the inverse-gamma distribution is deﬁned as the distribution of the reciprocal
of a gamma distributed random variable (Evans et al., 2000).106 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
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Figure 5.4: Examples of gamcon type II, precision and gamma distributions for com-
parison.
To this end, some examples of both gamcon type II and precision distributions are
illustrated in Figure 5.4. As can be seen, both tend to resemble gamma distributions in
form, with skewed tails and a single modality. This general shape suggests that, in both
cases, a suitable proposal density may be acquired using Laplace’s method (Mackay,
2003). This involves ﬁnding the mode,9 and then calculating the second log derivative
of the distribution, in the region of its mode. The distribution is then approximated
with a Gaussian distribution with the same mode, and variance equal to the negative
reciprocal of this derivative. That is, for some density p(x), the variance, σ2
approx, of the
Gaussian approximate is given by Equation 5.98, where m is the distribution mode:
σ2
approx = −

∂
∂x2 ln(p(m))
−1
(5.98)
σ2
approx =
1
n2φ(1)(nm + 1) − nφ(1)(m)
(5.99)
This technique is used in Garrido (2002) to simulate the gamcon type II distribution
using the Metropolis-Hastings method. In this case, the variance of the Gaussian ap-
proximate is as shown in Equation 5.99, where φ(1) is the polygamma function of order 1
(Erd´ elyi et al., 1953). Garrido points out that the short tails of the Gaussian make it
unsuitable to use as a proposal density directly. Instead, a Cauchy distribution is used,10
by scaling it according to standard deviation of the Gaussian approximate, and shifting
it so that it shares the same mode (see Figure 5.5). This gives a similar distribution,
but with longer tails that result in better performance.
9The mode of a distribution corresponds with the maximum of its p.d.f. or p.f. When we talk about
a distribution having multiple modes, we mean that it has multiple local maxima.
10As with normal and gamma distributions, samples from Cauchy distributions are easily generated
using standard libraries and algorithms.Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 107
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Gamcon II Approximate Proposal
Figure 5.5: Example gamcon type II densities with Gaussian and Cauchy approxi-
mates.
The main overhead in ﬁnding this proposal is the estimation of the mode, which can
be achieved using standard hill-climbing algorithms, such as the bisection method, or
Quasi-Newton methods (Burden and Faires, 2001). To aid this task, Garrido proves that
the gamcon type II distribution is always unimodal (thus, the problem does not suﬀer
from local maxima) and provides the following bounds on its location:
1 − 1/n
ln(δ) + ln(n/2)
≤ m ≤
2
ln(δ)
(5.100)
Given that the shape of the precision distribution is generally similar to the gamcon type
II, it seems reasonable that this same technique could also be applied to its simulation.
However, if evidence supplied by a truster and its reputation sources diﬀer signiﬁcantly
in the conclusions they support, then it is possible to introduce some local maxima into
the precision distribution. As such, algorithms such as simulated annealing (Otten and
van Ginneken, 1989), which can deal with local maxima, should be considered as part
of a solution.
For both distributions, this technique can also be adapted to provide proposal distri-
butions for rejection sampling. However, in this case we have two extra constraints to
consider. First, we need to be able to determine the constant, which is used to multi-
ply the unnormalised target density so that it always lies beneath the proposal density.
Second, we need to ensure that the target density ﬁts comfortably within the proposal
density to keep the rejection probability reasonably low.
This requirement is illustrated in Figure 5.6. Here, in both parts (a) and (b), the scale
of the Cauchy distribution is such that the main region of probable values is narrower
than that of the target distribution. This means that the target distribution has to
be scaled down low to ﬁt within the proposal density, resulting in a reasonably large108 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
(a)
target proposal
(b) (c)
Figure 5.6: Cauchy proposal densities for precision distributions.
rejection probability11. Better results are achieved in (c), in which the probable region
of the proposal is wide enough to contain the target density, such that the modes of the
densities meet. Provided the proposal is not too wide, this can result in better rejection
probabilities.
Again, a certain amount of local search may be required to ﬁnd a good match between
the densities. However, we have found that using a scale factor of 2σapprox gives rea-
sonable results for all the gamcon type II and precision distributions we have tested.
Furthermore, in this case the optimal scale factor for the target density tends to be the
ratio of the proposal mode over the target mode. That is, if t(x) is the unnormalised tar-
get density, p(x) is the proposal density and m is their shared mode, then it is generally
the case that:
∀x,
t(x)p(m)
t(m)
<= p(x) (5.101)
which satisﬁes the general requirement of rejection sampling. However, there are no
guarantees that this is always the case, so some local search is still required to check
that the condition is satisﬁed. Despite this, it seems that, by using these suggested scale
factors, a suitable rejection sampling method can be implemented without signiﬁcant
overhead above that of the Metropolis-Hastings method mentioned. Moreover, since
independent samples are preferred to dependent samples, this rejection regime should
always outperform the Metropolis-Hastings method.
11The rejection probability is proportional to the area of the proposal density outside the region
covered by the scaled target density (Appendix A).Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 109
5.6 Empirical Study
So far, we have discussed the theoretical aspects of TRAVOS-C, including the deﬁnition
of the model, and details of how it can be realised and applied using Monte Carlo
methods. As described for TRAVOS in Section 4.6, this section evaluates the behaviour
of TRAVOS-C in a simulated environment, in which a truster interacts with trustees
and reputation sources that behave in certain ways.
More speciﬁcally, we present results from a series of experiments in which a truster must
assess the reliability of the trustees in its environment, based on varying numbers of
direct observations, and reputation with varying degrees of reliability. Together, these
results show that TRAVOS-C can not only learn agent behaviour eﬀectively, but that it
can do so both when all the assumptions of the model are upheld, and in the presence
of certain types of violations of those assumptions.
The rest of this discussion is structured as follows: Section 5.6.1 describes the method-
ology used to evaluate TRAVOS-C, and collect the results detailed in the proceeding
sections; Section 5.6.2 presents a number of results concerning the fundamental learning
behaviour of TRAVOS-C, given diﬀerent degrees of information; Section 5.6.3 shows how
TRAVOS-C can learn about the reliability of a reputation source, and hence improve
its assessment of trustees for which there is little or no direct experience; Section 5.6.4
gives results showing how TRAVOS-C can use information about one reputation source
to predict the reliability of other reputation sources; ﬁnally, Section 5.6.5 considers cases
in which the assumptions made in TRAVOS-C are violated, and shows how TRAVOS-C
is robust against certain types of violation.
5.6.1 Experiment Methodology
To evaluate TRAVOS-C, there are three aspects of our experimental methodology that
must be considered:
1. the metrics used to assess the model’s performance;
2. the simulation process by which the model is tested, and the results recorded; and
3. the methods used to draw conclusions about the model’s behaviour and to test for
statistical signiﬁcance.
One way to measure performance is to compare the expected utility calculated by
TRAVOS-C to the actual utility a truster receives. This approach is attractive, because
it gives an indication of the similarity between decisions made using TRAVOS-C and the
optimal decisions a truster could take, given perfect information about its environment.110 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
Algorithm 3 The TRAVOS-C simulation algorithm.
Require: P ← {ate(1),...,ate(p)} {the set of trustees}
Require: S ← {arep(1),...,arep(q)} {the set of reputation sources}
Require: ∀i ∈ {1,...,p}, ni ← number of direct observations of ate(i)
Require: ∀i ∈ {1,...,p}, ∀j ∈ {1,...,q}, mi,j ← number of observations of ate(i)
reported by arep(j)
{Step 1}
for ate(i) ∈ P do
dirObs(i) ← ni samples generated from ate(i) behaviour distribution {direct obser-
vations of ate(i)}
for arep(j) ∈ P do
repObs(i,j) ← mi,j samples generated from arep(j) noise distribution
if arep(j) is not a liar then
repObs(i,j) ← repObs(i,j) + mi,j samples generated from ate behaviour dis-
tribution {observations of ate(i) reported by arep(j)}
end if
end for
end for
{Step 2}
based on dirObs and repObs, estimate all model parameters using Gibbs sampler
{Step 3}
calculate mean absolute errors for each parameter estimate
Unfortunately, an agent’s utility depends on its preferences in a particular application
domain, which makes it diﬃcult to choose a utility function capable of characterising
performance across a range of applications.
For this reason, we choose to measure performance by using TRAVOS-C to estimate
the parameters associated with each of the agents in a truster’s environment. That
is, for each trustee, ate, we estimate the parameters µatr,ate and σ2
atr,ate, and for each
reputation source, arep, we estimate the parameters µarep and σ2
arep. The accuracy of
these estimates is then measured using the same method employed to evaluate TRAVOS
in Section 4.6; that is, by using their mean absolute error using Equation 5.102, in which
θ is the parameter being estimated, ϑ, is the estimate, and n is the number of independent
simulation episodes used to calculate the mean.
1
n
n X
i=1
|θ − ϑ| (5.102)
Such estimates do not fully determine a truster’s ability to make good decisions because
the utility of interacting with a trustee may depend on more aspects of its behaviour than
the modelling parameters used in TRAVOS-C. However, good estimates of these param-
eters do imply an ability to characterise at least some aspects of an agent’s behaviour,
and so provide some indication of how TRAVOS-C should perform in general. With
this in mind, we measure the performance of TRAVOS-C in a simulated environment,Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 111
in which it is used to estimate trustee behaviour and reputation noise distributions. This
is similar to the way in which we evaluated TRAVOS in Section 4.6, except that, in this
case, only the trustee behaviour distribution parameter was estimated, since TRAVOS
does not explicitly model reputation inaccuracies as added noise. Each experiment con-
sists of a number of independent episodes during which conditions controlled in the
experiment remain constant. In turn, these episodes consist of three steps, outlined in
Algorithm 3.
First, for each reputation source arep and trustee ate, a speciﬁed number of samples are
drawn from ate’s behaviour distribution, to which noise is added, generated from arep’s
noise distribution. In line with the model’s assumptions, the resulting noisy samples
form the basis for arep’s opinion about ate, except for certain cases described in Sec-
tion 5.6.5, in which lying reputation sources are simulated by basing opinions solely on
noise, independent of trustee behaviour. Similarly, a speciﬁed number of direct observa-
tions are generated from each trustee’s behaviour distribution, which are made available
to the truster without added noise.
Second, given all such direct observations and opinions, Gibbs sampling is used to esti-
mate all trustee behaviour and reputation noise parameters, using the methods described
in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. As this is an implementation of Bayesian inference, it requires
a prior distribution to be speciﬁed for the model parameters. In practice, such a prior
could be speciﬁed using the group behaviour model (Section 5.2) or some other source
of information about the application domain. However, for our purposes, the choice of
prior is not signiﬁcant, as we need only assess TRAVOS-C’s performance under diﬀerent
conditions relative to how it performs using only the prior, whatever that prior may
be. Thus, we use a normal inverse-gamma distribution (Section 5.3.3) as a prior for
the mean and variance of each trustee behaviour distribution, and each reputation noise
distribution where, in each case, the hyperparameters used are α = 2, β = 10, m = 0
and v = 100.
Third, once estimates of each model parameter are collected, we use Equation 5.102 to
calculate the mean absolute error for each parameter, over a number of independent
episodes, executed under the same experimental conditions. These are then recorded,
and used, along with the variance in errors among episodes, to establish the statistical
signiﬁcance of each set of results. Speciﬁcally, all claims made in the following sections
with regard to these experiments have been tested for statistical signiﬁcance using anal-
ysis of variance techniques. In addition, where results are illustrated using graphs, error
bars are displayed using 95% conﬁdence intervals, as is standard practice.12
12The methods we use to calculate these conﬁdence intervals, along with analysis of variance, are as
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5.6.2 Basic Learning Behaviour
For TRAVOS-C to perform a useful role in evaluating agent performance there are two
fundamental hypotheses that should be true, as follows:
1. As a truster gains direct experience of a trustee, its estimation accuracy should
improve for both the trustee’s behaviour parameters and the noise parameters of
any reputation source that has provided an opinion about that trustee in the past.
2. As the number of observations a reputation source reports for a given trustee
increases, the truster’s estimation accuracy should improve for both the trustee’s
behaviour parameters and the reputation source’s noise parameters.
To test these hypotheses, we ran a series of experiments during which a truster, atr,
was presented with direct observations of a trustee, ate, along with the opinion of a
reputation source, arep, about ate. During these experiments, no evidence pertaining
to any other trustee or reputation source was made available to atr, and between each
experiment, we varied three control variables:
1. the number of direct observations of ate made by atr;
2. the number of observations of ate that arep claims to have made; and
3. the sum of arep’s noise variance, σ2
arep, and ate’s behaviour variance, σ2
atr,ate.
While the ﬁrst two control variables relate directly to the hypotheses, the third controls
the level of diﬃculty associated with estimation. Standard statistical theory tells us that,
to achieve a given estimation accuracy for the parameters of a Gaussian distribution,
more observations are required as the variance of the distribution increases13 (DeGroot
and Schervish, 2002). As TRAVOS-C estimates agent behaviour using observations
assumed to be drawn from Gaussian distributions, its performance should not be immune
to this eﬀect.
To ensure that the results obtained apply to a general set of agent behaviours, all other
aspects of agent behaviour were varied randomly between each episode. Speciﬁcally,
σ2
atr,ate and σ2
arep were determined by assigning a random proportion of their sum to
σ2
atr,ate, with the remaining proportion assigned to σ2
arep. This was achieved by gener-
ating a random number, P, uniformly distributed on the interval [0.1,0.9], with which
the variances were calculated using Equations 5.103 and 5.104. Given these values,
the mean parameters, µatr,ate and σ2
atr,ate, were generated from their conditional prior
13This is also true for many other useful classes of distribution.Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 113
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Figure 5.7: Parameter estimates with variance sum of 25, varying direct observations.
distributions, as speciﬁed in Section 5.6.1.
σ2
atr,ate = P(σ2
atr,ate + σ2
arep) (5.103)
σ2
arep = (1 − P)(σ2
atr,ate + σ2
arep) (5.104)
Selected results from these experiments are illustrated in Figure 5.7, in which the number
of direct observations is varied along the horizontal axis of each graph, while the number
of reported observations is varied between the top and bottom sets of graphs. In addition,
Figure 5.8 gives a similar set of results, except that, in this case, the reported observations
vary along the horizontal axes, while the direct observations vary between the top and
bottom graphs. In each of these ﬁgures, the mean estimation errors achieved for the
reputation noise mean, µatr,ate, and trustee behaviour mean, µatr,ate, are plotted in the
left of the ﬁgure, while mean estimation errors for the corresponding variance parameters
are plotted to the right. For comparison, the estimation error achieved by the model
prior is plotted in each graph, showing how the model performs when it has no direct
or reported observations.
These results show that, in general, increasing either direct observations or reputation
decreases the mean estimation error for each of the model parameters, which is in agree-
ment with the hypotheses stated above. In addition, however, two other notable aspects
of behaviour can be observed.114 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
−50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Mean Parameters, 0 Dir Obs
no. reputation observations
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
e
r
r
o
r
 
 
prior
reputation noise
trustee behaviour
−50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Variance Parameters, 0 Dir Obs
no. reputation observations
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
e
r
r
o
r
 
 
prior
reputation noise
trustee behaviour
−50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Mean Parameters, 4 Dir Obs
no. reputation observations
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
e
r
r
o
r
 
 
prior
reputation noise
trustee behaviour
−50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Variance Parameters, 4 Dir Obs
no. reputation observations
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
e
r
r
o
r
 
 
prior
reputation noise
trustee behaviour
Figure 5.8: Parameter estimates with variance sum of 9, varying reputation observa-
tions.
First, the number of observations required to signiﬁcantly improve estimates of the mean
parameters is less than required for the variance parameters. This property is intuitive,
when we consider the Fisher information (DeGroot and Schervish, 2002) associated with
a given number of samples from a Gaussian distribution. Essentially, Fisher informa-
tion measures the predictive value that each sample has for a given property of its
distribution, with higher values indicating more information. In the case of a Gaussian
distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, the Fisher information of a single sample from
that distribution is 1/σ2 with respect to µ, and 1/2σ4 with respect to σ2. This tells us
that it takes signiﬁcantly more data to obtain the same level of information about the
distribution variance, compared to its mean, which is reﬂected in our results.
Second, as shown in the top two graphs in Figure 5.8, increasing the number of reported
reputation observations can improve performance, even when the number of direct ob-
servations is 0. This can be attributed to TRAVOS-C learning the sum of the trustee
behaviour and reputation noise parameters. That is, although reputation cannot, on its
own, be used to determine the noise associated with a reputation source, we can use it
to learn the value of the sums µatr,ate + µarep and σ2
atr,ate + σ2
arep. These, along with
any prior information, can provide some indication of the parameter values, particularly
in the case of the variances, because we know that, individually, these must be less than
their sum and greater than 0. Moreover, when direct observations are available they il-
luminate not only a trustee’s behaviour, but also the proportion of a reputation source’sChapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 115
opinion that is due to noise.
5.6.3 Learning from Reputation
Although the experiments described in the previous section demonstrate key properties
of how TRAVOS-C learns agent behaviour, they do not show how a truster can use
reputation to signiﬁcantly improve estimates of the behaviour of a trustee with whom it
has little or no direct experience. To achieve this, a truster should learn from opinions
about trustees it has direct experience with, to distinguish reputation sources with low
noise, from those with high noise. Using this information, it should then rely signiﬁcantly
on opinions with low noise, while not being misled by inaccurate opinions.
To test for this ability in TRAVOS-C, we placed a truster, atr, in an environment with
two trustees, ate(1) and ate(2), and one reputation source, arep. During each experiment
the number of direct observations was kept constant at 0 for ate(1) and 200 for ate(2), while
the number observations reported by arep for each agent was varied between experiments.
The hypothesis here is that, as the number of observations arep reports about ate(2) in-
creases, atr’s estimation accuracy for ate(1)’s behaviour parameters also increases when
reputation is reliable, or at least stays the same when reputation is relatively noisy. Thus,
if this hypothesis is correct, atr learns about arep’s reliability from its reported observa-
tions of ate(2) (referred to as training observations) and then uses this to determine how
to apply arep’s observations of ate(1) (referred to as test observations).
Similar to conditions described in the previous section, we kept the behaviour variance
constant during each experiment (both trustees sharing the same variance), while sam-
pling the behaviour means, independent of each other, from the conditional prior during
each episode. With regard to arep’s noise distribution, two sets of experiments were
performed: in one set, µarep = 0 and σ2
arep = 0.00001 (representing near perfect rep-
utation) were used, while in the other set, σ2
arep = 1000000 and µarep was normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance 10000 (representing highly unreliable reputation).
Selected results for experiments with near perfect reputation are illustrated in Figure 5.9,
in which the mean estimate errors for ate(1)’s behaviour mean are plotted in the top set of
graphs, and for the corresponding behaviour variances in the bottom set of graphs. From
left to right, the graphs show results for increasing numbers of training observations,
with test observations increasing along the horizontal axis. For comparison, the prior
estimates are also plotted, as are estimates based on direct observations, equivalent in
number to the test observations, with no reputation. The trustee behaviour variance
used in this case was σ2
atr,ate(1) = σ2
atr,ate(2) = 81.
The ﬁgure shows that, in general, as atr learns that arep’s reputation is essentially
noise free, the ability to assess ate(1) based on reputation approaches that based on an116 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
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Figure 5.9: Behaviour parameter estimates, based on reliable reputation.
equivalent number of direct observations. Moreover, analogous to the results described
in the previous section, this convergence takes place more rapidly for the mean than it
does for the variance, and even when there are no training observations, some beneﬁt
can still be extracted from reputation by using a combination of prior information and
parameter sum learning.
In contrast, results for cases in which reputation has signiﬁcant noise are shown in
Figure 5.10, in which the graphs show the estimation errors for ate(1)’s behaviour pa-
rameters (left) and arep’s noise parameters (right), plotted against their corresponding
prior estimates. As shown in the top set of graphs, there is a spike in estimation error
for the behaviour parameters when only one training observation is available with less
than ﬁve test observations.14 However, with four or more training observations, this
eﬀect disappears, and performance matches that of the prior. This is a positive result
because it suggests that, with small amounts of evidence, a truster can learn to ignore
the opinion of a reputation source with a signiﬁcant level of noise.
This eﬀect occurs despite the relatively large estimation errors for the reputation noise
parameters, as shown in the ﬁgure. These errors can be attributed to the low Fisher
14This eﬀect is also present when there are no training observations.Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 117
−100 0 100 200 300
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Trustee Mean, 1 Trn Obs
test observations
r
o
r
r
e
 
e
t
u
l
o
s
b
a
TRAVOS−C
prior
−100 0 100 200 300
−4000
−2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Trustee Variance, 1 Trn Obs
test observations
r
o
r
r
e
 
e
t
u
l
o
s
b
a
TRAVOS−C
prior
−100 0 100 200 300
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Reputation Mean, 1 Trn Obs
test observations
r
o
r
r
e
 
e
t
u
l
o
s
b
a
TRAVOS−C
prior
−100 0 100 200 300
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
x 10
5 Rep Variance, 1 Trn Obs
test observations
r
o
r
r
e
 
e
t
u
l
o
s
b
a
TRAVOS−C
prior
−100 0 100 200 300
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
Trustee Mean, 4 Trn Obs
test observations
r
o
r
r
e
 
e
t
u
l
o
s
b
a
TRAVOS−C
prior
−100 0 100 200 300
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
Trustee Variance, 4 Trn Obs
test observations
r
o
r
r
e
 
e
t
u
l
o
s
b
a
TRAVOS−C
prior
−100 0 100 200 300
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Reputation Mean, 4 Trn Obs
test observations
r
o
r
r
e
 
e
t
u
l
o
s
b
a
TRAVOS−C
prior
−100 0 100 200 300
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
x 10
5 Rep Variance, 4 Trn Obs
test observations
r
o
r
r
e
 
e
t
u
l
o
s
b
a
TRAVOS−C
prior
Figure 5.10: Behaviour parameter estimates, based on unreliable reputation.
information associated with the reputation, due to the large variance of the noise distri-
bution. However, for a truster to learn to ignore such reputation, it is suﬃcient to know
that the noise variance is high, without necessarily knowing its precise value.
5.6.4 Learning Reputation Source Correlations
So far, the eﬀects on a truster’s ability to determine the reliability of a reputation source
can mainly be attributed to opinions received from that reputation source, along with
direct observations of the trustees those opinions concern. However, at the beginning
of the chapter, we claimed that TRAVOS-C can improve its assessment of a reputation
source if evidence suggests a correlation between its noise distribution and that of any
other reputation source.
For this reason, we evaluated TRAVOS-C in an environment consisting of two reputation
sources arep(1) and arep(2), and two trustees ate(1) and ate(2). As before, ate(2) was made
well known to atr, with 200 direct observations, while ate(1) had 0 direct observations.
However, this time, both reputation sources reported an equal number of observations
for ate(1), while only arep(1) reported any observations for ate(2). In line with previous
experiments, the sum of the behaviour and noise parameters was controlled, while the118 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
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Figure 5.11: Reputation noise parameter estimates with evidence for correlation.
proportion of the sum attribute to each variance parameter was allowed to vary, and the
mean parameters were drawn from their conditional prior distributions.
Under these conditions, atr can only directly learn arep(1)’s noise distribution using its
direct observations of ate(2). However, even though arep(2) only reports on ate(1) for which
the truster as no direct experience, atr can still compare the reports of both reputation
sources for this trustee. According to the model, any diﬀerence between the distributions
of these reports must be due to the diﬀerence between the noise distributions of each
reputation source (since the trustee behaviour distribution is the same). Thus, if a
truster were to know this diﬀerence, along with the noise distribution of one of the
sources, it should be able to infer the distribution of the other.
To validate this claim, we ran experiments in which arep(1) and arep(2) had identical
noise distributions, varied the number of observations arep(1) reported for ate(2), and
varied the number of observations reported by both sources for ate(1). With respect
to these experiments, Figure 5.11 shows the mean estimation errors obtained for the
noise distribution parameters of each reputation source, when the total variance shared
between noise and behaviour distributions was 162.15 In each graph, the number of
observations reported by arep(1) for ate(2) varies along the horizontal axis, while the
15Similar results were obtained using a number of other values for the variance sum.Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 119
graphs from left to right plot results for increasing observation numbers reported by
both sources for ate(1).
These results show that, as the number of observations arep(1) and arep(2) reported for
ate(1) increases, atr’s ability to estimate arep(2)’s parameters, based on knowledge of ate(2),
approaches that for arep(1). In particular, when there are no reported observations for
ate(2), there is no evidence to compare arep(2)’s opinions to those of arep(1). Thus, in
this case, direct observations of ate(2) only provide information about arep(1), and the
estimation errors for arep(2) remain equal to that for the prior.
On the other hand, when there is a signiﬁcant number of observations from both reputa-
tion sources for ate(1), evidence linking the noise distributions of the reputation sources is
strong, allowing information about ate(2) to be used to inform predictions about arep(2).
5.6.5 Performance under Assumption Violations
The results described so far all demonstrate how TRAVOS-C performs when the as-
sumptions of the model are upheld in the environment. However, for TRAVOS-C to
have more general applicability, it needs to be robust against at least some types of
violation of these assumptions. To evaluate TRAVOS-C under such conditions, we ran
three sets of experiments, each representing a diﬀerent type of violation.
1. We investigated performance when both trustee behaviour and reputation noise
distributions are no longer Gaussian, but instead are skewed in one direction.
To achieve this, we simulated behaviour and noise using gamma distributions that
were transformed such that their mean, variance and skew could be speciﬁed as de-
sired. As illustrated in Figure 5.12, the extent to which these distributions violated
the Gaussian assumption could be controlled by specifying the skew. In particular,
as the skew approaches 0, the resulting distributions have approximately normal
morphology.
2. We performed a similar set of experiments using bimodal rather than skewed dis-
tributions (Figure 5.13). As with the skewed distributions, these were generated
in such a way that the overall mean and variance of the distribution could be
controlled, along with the distance between the distributions’ modalities. Each
distribution was constructed by combining two Gaussian probability density func-
tions, with one Gaussian density per model. The resulting combined p.d.f. is given
by Equation 5.105, in which d is a parameter controlling the distance between the
modes, and s is chosen to ensure a desired variance for the overall distribution. In
the special case where d = 0, the resulting distribution is Gaussian with variance120 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
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Figure 5.12: Example skewed distributions, generated using transformed gamma den-
sities.
s, thus breaking none of the model assumptions.
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2 − µ)2
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(5.105)
3. We ran experiments to represent one way in which a reputation source could lie
to a truster, in pursuit of its own goals. In this case, rather than adding noise
to observations of trustee behaviour, a reputation source’s opinion was generated
by drawing samples solely from its noise distribution, independent of any true
observations of a trustee. This was done to represent cases in which a reputation
source simply invents a random opinion, without regard for the trustee’s true
behaviour.
In the ﬁrst two sets of experiments, we exposed TRAVOS-C to conditions similar to
those described in Section 5.6.2, with 1 trustee and 1 reputation source, and varying
numbers of direct and reported observations. However, on these occasions, all behaviour
and noise parameters (including the variances) were selected randomly from their prior
distributions at the start of each episode, and the way in which these parameters were
used in the simulation was changed in line with the particular type of violation being
tested. That is, the generated parameters were used to specify the mean and varianceChapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 121
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Figure 5.13: Example bimodal distributions, generated using a mixture of two Gaus-
sian densities.
of noise and behaviour distributions, which either had a speciﬁed skew, or were bimodal
with a speciﬁed distance between modalities. However, despite using such distribu-
tions, we found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the results obtained for the modiﬁed
distributions and those obtained under the model’s assumptions.
This suggests that, with regard to estimates of the mean and variance, TRAVOS-C is
not sensitive to other properties with respect to the shape of the behaviour and noise
distributions. This may be due to the general property that the mean and variance of a
sum of random variables is always equal to the sum of the variable means, and the sum
of the variable variances, respectively. As stated previously, however, this does not imply
that estimates of other distribution properties are just as robust. Thus, the robustness
of expected utility calculations may depend on those aspects of a distribution to which
a particular utility function is sensitive.
In the ﬁnal set of experiments, Gaussian distributions were once again used to simulate
trustee behaviour and reputation noise, with parameters drawn from their prior distri-
butions between each episode. However, rather than reputation being based on trustee
behaviour observations with added noise, opinions from a reputation source were based
solely on samples generated from its noise distribution, independent of actual trustee
behaviour.122 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
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Figure 5.14: Behaviour parameter estimates, based on reports from a lying reputation
source.
In addition, we varied the number of trustees that the truster was exposed to, each
with identical numbers of direct observations, and reported observations from a single
reputation source. The reason for this is that, when the reputation source reports for
more than one trustee, it provides conﬂicting evidence about its noise distribution: as
the reputation source’s reports are generated solely on its noise distribution, reports for
diﬀerent trustees will generally be relatively similar, suggesting that the sum of noise and
behaviour parameters should be similar for all agents. Thus, if trustees have dissimilar
behaviours, direct observations of each trustee will suggest diﬀerent values for the noise
distribution.
The eﬀect of these experiments on estimates of behaviour distributions is illustrated in
Figure 5.14. Here, the number of trustees in the environment is 5, but similar results
were obtained from experiments with other numbers of trustees, although the eﬀect was
not as bad with just 1 trustee compared to cases with multiple trustees.16
These results show that, as the number of reported opinions increases relative to the
number of direct observations, a truster can be misled by a reputation source with
respect to the true behaviour of a trustee. Given enough direct observations, the truster’s
direct experience can eventually overcome the reputation source’s negative impact on
16In the conditions tested, the number of trustees ranged between 1 and 10.Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces 123
performance. However, since the reputation source is not tied to report any particular
number of observations, it could report having an arbitrarily large observation set to
overwhelm any reliable information that a truster may have.
Although this exposes a limitation of TRAVOS-C, one possible solution would be to
explicitly build into the model the possibility that reputation is independent of trustee
behaviour. However, further investigation would be required to determine how such an
approach could deal with a range of possible lying strategies, while maintaining the good
performance observed when reputation is reasonably consistent with the current model.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced an extension to TRAVOS, known as TRAVOS-C,
which, like its predecessor, fulﬁlls our aim of facilitating an agent in making decisions
with regard to its peers. More speciﬁcally, TRAVOS-C meets each of the objectives
outlined in Section 1.4 by:
• providing a clearly deﬁned mechanism for facilitating rational decision making,
through the application of decision theory as described in Chapter 3;
• enabling decisions based on both a truster’s direct experience and reputation;
• including mechanisms for eﬃcient communication of reputation, and ﬁltering of
inaccurate reputation; and
• enabling reasonable decision making both when a truster is very certain about a
trustee’s behaviour, and when it has little information about a trustee’s behaviour.
In addition, TRAVOS-C has the following three main advantages over its predecessor:
1. TRAVOS-C can assess a trustee based on continuous representations of trustee
behaviour, rather than the binary representations used in TRAVOS. Although
binary representations may be appropriate in some cases, for example when it
only matters that an agent fulﬁlls its obligations and not how it does so, allowing
for continuous representations extends the applicability of our work.
2. TRAVOS-C improves on the heuristic reputation ﬁltering mechanism used in
TRAVOS by including a new method based on Bayesian analysis. As well as
providing a more theoretically sound foundation, this allows a truster to account
for more aspects of a reputation source’s opinion. In particular, if a group of
reputation sources tend to give similar opinions, then information concerning the
reliability of one source can be used to assess the reliability of another. Also, even
if a reputation source provides signiﬁcantly biased opinions, these can still count124 Chapter 5 TRAVOS-C: A Trust Model for Continuous Action Spaces
toward a trustee’s assessment, provided the bias is predictable. This is not possi-
ble under TRAVOS, because its heuristic method cannot distinguish a predictable
bias from one that is unpredictable, providing no information.
3. TRAVOS-C can improve its assessment of a trustee, by considering the behaviour
of other similar agents in the system. This is particularly useful when little or no
information is available that is speciﬁc to the trustee, and this method can adapt
its impact on assessment in line with the amount of correlation that exists between
agents’ behaviour.
To back up these claims, we ﬁrst deﬁned the model in terms of its assumptions and
Bayesian analysis, and showed how it could be applied using decision theory and Monte
Carlo methods. We then demonstrated the properties of the system by an empirical
analysis. In particular, we showed that TRAVOS-C not only performs well when the
model’s assumptions are upheld in an agent’s environment, but that it is also robust
against certain types of violations of those assumptions.Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
Having described a number of mechanisms for assessing trust and reputation, the purpose
of this chapter is to take stock of our work, by outlining both what we have achieved,
and what questions remain unanswered. In doing so, the chapter comprises four main
sections: Section 6.1 gives an overview of what we have discussed so far, by summarising
the main points from each of the previous chapters; Section 6.2 then gives a more detailed
view of the contributions we have made to the state-of-the-art; Section 6.3 discusses the
main limitations of our work; Section 6.4 discusses the main avenues by which our
methods could be extended in future work; and ﬁnally, Section 6.5 draws the main
conclusions from the thesis.
6.1 Thesis Summary
Trust is a prevalent concept in human society, which is particularly associated with
situations in which one entity, a truster, needs to rely on the actions of another entity,
known as a trustee. Despite the lack of a single accepted deﬁnition, trust can be viewed
as the subjective probability with which a trustee will act in a certain way, from the
point of view of a truster. This notion of trust is not only important in society at
large, but it is also becoming increasingly important in the ﬁeld of computer science.
In particular, we are interested in the role that trust plays in service-oriented systems,
such as the Semantic Web and the Grid.
A key objective of these systems is to allow computer resources from diﬀerent geograph-
ical locations, or belonging to diﬀerent organisations, to be used together seamlessly
in support of a common goal. The nature of these systems means that resources from
organisations that have competing incentives may be used together, and some resource
failure should be expected at anytime. As a result, some researchers have suggested that
autonomous software agents, which make decisions without human intervention, could
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play an important role in managing resources in such environments. However, if this is
to be achieved, these agents must be capable of assessing the trustworthiness of their
peers.
In response, our aim was to develop trust assessment mechanisms that could be em-
ployed by agents in a service-oriented environment. In particular, we identiﬁed two
major sources of information that these mechanisms should make use of: (1) the direct
experiences of a truster with its peers; and (2) third party experience with a trustee, oth-
erwise known as reputation. However, the amount of information each of these sources
provide may vary depending on the situation; in particular, reputation may not always
be reliable, due to the view point and incentives of a truster’s reputation sources. Thus,
even though a truster should make use of these sources, it should be able to deal with
inaccurate reputation, and give reasonable results regardless of the amount of reputation
available.
Before addressing these aims directly, in Chapter 2 we reviewed existing methods in the
literature for solving these and similar problems. Here, we saw that previous models
diﬀer both in how they represent trust, and in how they reason about it. In terms of
representation, some of the prevailing approaches include the application of Dempster-
Shafer theory, probability theory, or more improvised methods. Although each of these
may have their place, we believe probability is particularly suited in our context for two
main reasons. First, assessing the properties of a system based on past behaviour is one
of the fundamental questions that probability theory attempts to answer, and which it
achieves through a set of well-established techniques with strong theoretical rationales.
Second, probability has a natural interpretation in decision theory, which itself is well
suited to facilitating decision making by autonomous agents.
There are three main ways by which existing trust models deal with the inherent lack
of reliability in reputation. First, a truster may assume that, out of a group of opinions
provided about a trustee, only a minority are likely to be inaccurate. The problem with
this approach is that, in many situations, this assumption may be inappropriate. For
instance, if no agent has any experience of a trustee, any agent that reports having such
experience must by lying, and so is not likely to provide useful information. Second,
we may try to discourage lying behaviour by designing systems in which it is always
in the best interest of an agent to tell the truth. However, this approach may not
always be possible, and in any event, cannot deal with inaccuracies due to reasons other
than lying. Finally, we may assess the reliability of a particular reputation source by
comparing its opinions to subsequent trustee behaviour: the more correlation we observe
between such opinions and behaviour, the more reliable the reputation source can be
judged to be. However, among existing probabilistic trust models, this approach has
not been addressed in a satisfactory manner.Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Work 127
To begin to address these limitations, Chapter 3 set out a framework by which decision
theory and Bayesian analysis can be applied to problems involving trust. In particular, it
set out a general approach for making decisions based on a truster’s own experiences, and
how best to communicate reputation between agents, such that all relevant information is
maintained with minimum transmission overhead. Furthermore, to help guide solutions
for inaccurate reputation, the chapter categorised the main causes of inaccuracies, along
with their eﬀects.
Building on this, Chapter 4 introduced TRAVOS, which instantiates the framework for
binary representations of trustee behaviour. TRAVOS includes a mechanism for dealing
with inaccurate reputation based on a reputation source’s past performance, and has
been applied as part of a larger system for managing resources in a service-oriented
environment. Finally, Chapter 5 presented TRAVOS-C, which extends the capabilities
of TRAVOS in three ways: (1) by using a continuous representation of trustee behaviour,
(2) by including an improved Bayesian mechanism for dealing with inaccurate reputation,
and (3) by allowing trustees to be assessed based on the behaviour of similar agents in
the system.
6.2 Research Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis stem from the speciﬁcation of the general frame-
work of modelling trust and reputation, and the development of TRAVOS and TRAVOS-
C. Together, these show how, by applying standard techniques from statistics and deci-
sion theory, an agent can assess the expected beneﬁts of interacting with another agent
in a given situation, and so decide which of its peers to interact with, in pursuit of its
goals. For example, if an agent has to choose between two providers of a multimedia
service, it can use trust to assess how likely each agent is to fulﬁll its promises, and use
trust along with other factors, when making its decisions.
In addition, by applying probability to trust assessment, our methods inherit three key
beneﬁts that they share with other probabilistic models of trust. First, by being based
on the axioms of probability, these models provide a way of representing beliefs about
uncertainty that is consistent and well founded.
Second, by applying well known results, we can derive optimality properties for these
mechanisms, under the model assumptions. For instance, decision theory tells us that if
an agent has to choose between possible actions, the best choice is always to maximise
its expected utility — something which can be directly derived using probability theory.
Third, by applying decision theory along with Bayesian analysis, we can meet our ob-
jective of making reasonable decisions regardless of the amount of information available.
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for a trustee’s actions, which accounts for the amount of evidence available in the most
appropriate way, given the model assumptions. Then, by applying this in decision the-
ory, a truster can make choices that account for both the risks and potential gains of
each choice, given the available evidence.
More signiﬁcantly, we contribute to the state-of-the-art in three main areas: reputation
communication, reputation inaccuracy ﬁltering, and trust assessment based on group
behaviour. We elaborate on each of these in the subsections that follow.
6.2.1 Communicating Reputation
As part of our general framework (Chapter 3), we specify a set of guidelines for commu-
nicating opinions between agents based on direct experience. These act as a benchmark
for transmitting reputation between agents, such that if these are met, all relevant in-
formation about an agent’s observations are conserved, and this is done with minimum
communication overhead. In addition, if these guidelines are adhered to, and an agent’s
reputation can be assumed to be accurate, then trust models, based on reputation, can
be built to reach conclusions that are consistent and as reliable as conclusions based on
direct experience.
These guidelines are fulﬁlled by a number of models, including TRAVOS, which represent
trustee behaviour as a binary event, and are based on the Beta Reputation System
(BRS). However, TRAVOS-C is the ﬁrst trust model to address these guidelines for
continuous representations of trustee behaviour.
6.2.2 Addressing Inaccurate Reputation
In cases where reputation cannot be considered as reliable as direct experience, both
TRAVOS and TRAVOS-C implement methods for minimising the impact of inaccu-
rate reputation, each of which has its own separate advantages. The method used in
TRAVOS works by comparing the past reports of a reputation source about a trustee,
with subsequent direct experience with that trustee. Based on this, it calculates the
probability that a trustee’s behaviour, on average, lies within a certain margin of error
around the reputation source’s best estimate. This is then used as part of a heuristic to
mediate each source’s opinions, such that sources whose opinion accuracy lies outside a
margin of error will tend to be ignored completely.
This approach has been shown empirically to outperform the only previous method of
its kind (Whitby et al., 2004), which operates on the same BRS derived representation
of trust. This is especially important when a signiﬁcant number of a truster’s reputation
sources provide inaccurate information, because the method presented by Whitby et al
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TRAVOS has formed the basis of later work, presented by Zhang and Cohen (2006),
which extends the technique to include some of the advantages featured by other existing
trust models.
Also building on this, TRAVOS-C presents an improved method of reputation ﬁltering
that is derived completely from the assumptions of the model, using Bayesian analysis.
In this case, interaction outcomes are represented as real numbers that may, for example,
be based on quality of service attributes pertaining to a trustee’s performance. Out-
comes of interactions between a particular truster and trustee are then assumed to be
drawn from a Gaussian distribution with unknown mean and variance. In particular, a
truster’s direct observations of a trustee are assumed to be drawn from this distribution,
while third party observations are assumed to be drawn from the same distribution,
but with added Gaussian noise. Each reputation source is associated with a diﬀerent
noise distribution, which the truster may learn through repeated interactions with both
trustees and reputation sources.
This approach has several advantages over both TRAVOS and other ﬁltering methods
in the literature. First, by applying Bayesian analysis to the model assumptions, we
obtain probability distributions for the model parameters, which are provably correct.
As such, the model accounts for all evidence and dependencies between parameters that
are correct for the model, and can be used to facilitate choices using decision theory in
a manner that is theoretically sound, without the need for heuristics. Of course, this
does not imply that the assumptions made are correct for every application, but we
have shown empirically that TRAVOS-C is robust against many types of violation in its
assumptions, and by making its assumptions explicit, it is clear under what conditions
the model operates best.
6.2.3 Assessing Trust based on Group Behaviour
To further improve the assessment of a trustee, TRAVOS-C can judge an agent, based on
the behaviour of other similar agents in the system. This method is particularly useful
for two reasons. First, if neither a truster or its reputation sources have signiﬁcant
experience with a trustee, then assessment based on group behaviour may still provide
a signiﬁcant improvement over assuming no information at all.
Second, it provides a pragmatic solution to the problem of whitewashing, in which agents
with a poor reputation attempt to improve their standing, by assuming a new identity.
In doing so, an agent eﬀectively wipes out any negative information that its peers have
about its behaviour, and so is treated just as any other unknown entity in the system.
To deal with this, Zacharia et al. (1999) suggest that newcomers to a system should
always be assigned the lowest possible rating. However, this may inhibit good market
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As an alternative approach, Sun et al. (2005) suggest that newcomers should be judged
according to the general behaviour of other newcomers to the system. In doing so, we
can adapt our assessments according to the proportion of reliable and unreliable agents
that enter the system at any one time.
These advantages can also be claimed for existing models that account for group be-
haviour, including REGRET (Chapter 2) and Sun et al’s approach. However, these
solutions are not directly applicable to probabilistic representations of trust, and require
the speciﬁcation of weights to decide how much impact group behaviour should have.
Our approach is signiﬁcant in that it automatically adapts to the amount of correlation
that exists between the behaviour of a group of agents. That is, only if there is evidence
that group behaviour is a strong indicator of an individual agent’s behaviour will it have
a signiﬁcant impact on assessment. Conversely, if there a great deal of diversity in the
behaviour, then group behaviour will have little or no impact on a truster’s assessment.
6.3 Limitations
Although we have a number of methods for assessing the trust that an agent should
place in its peers, there are still some open issues for which we do not provide a solution.
In particular, we have identiﬁed the following three limitations.
Reputation independence assumption In both TRAVOS and TRAVOS-C, we as-
sume that the experiences reported by each reputation source are independent of
each other; that is, their observation sets do not intersect. In some cases, it may
be desirable to relax this assumption, but this would require some method for
either communicating the intersections, or estimating them. Without this, obser-
vations that occur in the intersections would have a greater impact on the resulting
distribution, leading to an unwanted bias in the results.
Alternative action spaces Through TRAVOS and TRAVOS-C, we provide methods
for assessing a trustee when it is appropriate to represent its actions either as
binary events, or as real-valued scalars. What we have not oﬀered is a solution
to other representations, for example when a truster’s preferences depend on mul-
tiple dependent attributes, or non-binary discrete action-spaces. To deal with
these cases, would require further instantiation of the basic concepts presented in
Chapters 3 to 5, but this we consider to be outside the scope of our work.
Overlapping groups With regard to the group behaviour model in TRAVOS-C, we
make the assumption that each group that we use for assessment does not intersect.
This means, for example, that if we wanted to assess the behaviour of an unknown
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on other blue agents from Brazil. That is, we could not employ knowledge about
agents that are blue and not from Brazil, or from Brazil but not blue. To account
for this extra information would require an extra level of complexity, which is not
currently present in the model.
6.4 Future Work
In addition to the limitations mentioned above, there are a number of ways in which our
mechanisms and their application could be improved, to better aid decision making in a
multi-agent system. In particular, we identify the following three areas in which further
signiﬁcant research is warranted.
6.4.1 Dynamic Behaviour
One assumption that we have made in both TRAVOS and TRAVOS-C is that the
behaviour of both trustees and reputation sources does not change over time. For many
practical applications, this is an unsafe supposition, which we may deal with in one of
two ways: either we could assume that agent behaviour does not change signiﬁcantly
over a speciﬁed window of time, or we could attempt to model dynamism explicitly in
our assessments.
To apply the ﬁrst of these requires little or no change to our current methods. The
only diﬀerence would be that, rather than assessing a trustee based on all available
observations, we would only base our assessments on observations that have occurred in
a certain window of time. The problem with this approach, however, is that it does not
specify the duration of the window, nor take account of the precise time in which each
observation was made.
A more sophisticated approach would be to model the dynamism in agent behaviour
explicitly, by introducing new parameters into our models of trust. This would require
a detailed examination of, not only how an agent’s behaviour should be modelled under
such conditions, but also how reputation is communicated and assessed.
6.4.2 Correlation Between Tasks
Another assumption that we make in our model is that all interactions occur in a similar
context. That is, if we wish to know how trustworthy an agent is at providing movie
services, we need only consider our past experiences of movie services, and not any other
type of service. This is justiﬁed because the ability to perform one type of action does
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an agent’s performance for diﬀerent tasks may exist, and may provide a useful source of
evidence. Thus, it may be useful to investigate extensions to our current techniques to
take advantage of this knowledge.
6.4.3 Implications of Reputation in Group Learning
An important implication of trust assessment is that a truster will generally choose to
interact with agents that, according to the knowledge of the truster, provide better than
average performance. Although this seems reasonable, it raises the possibility that a
small number of service providers could quickly gain a monopoly position for certain
types of service: new agents entering a system may never get a foothold in the market,
because no clients will be willing to take a chance on unknown entities.
In human society, this problem is solved by exploration. Although people may generally
stick with suppliers that they know, they may occasionally take a risk with a new supplier
to judge its performance. In machine learning, such exploration usually falls under the
domain of reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998), which traditionally considers
the problem of individual learners exploring their environment.
Recently, however, research in reinforcement learning has progressed to consider groups
of learning entities. Generally, this type of work considers one of two types of prob-
lem: (1) agents are self-interested entities, which attempt to learn about each other’s
behaviour in a competitive environment (e.g. Tran and Cohen (2004)); (2) agents are
co-operative members of a team, which attempt to increase group knowledge eﬃciently
by coordinating their actions (e.g. Dutta et al. (2004)). In the former case, agents do
not generally share the knowledge that they learn, while in the latter case, agents do
share knowledge, but assume that all such knowledge is expressed truthfully.
In our view, agents that share reputation information eﬀectively bridge the gap between
these two types of problem. To some extent, trusters are self-interested agents which
attempt to learn about the behaviour of other agents to choose the best interaction
partners. To achieve this, however, trusters may share information they have about
their peers in the form of reputation. This is therefore a cooperative learning problem,
with the complication that reputation cannot be assumed to be accurate. Investigation
of the use of our current work in combination with reinforcement techniques is therefore
warranted.
6.5 Conclusions
Issues of trust are becoming increasingly important in computer science because of the
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case of service-oriented environments, in which resources from diﬀerent organisations or
locations may be used together for a common purpose. Managing such environments can
be a challenging problem, because the complement of available resources and the require-
ments posed upon them may change rapidly over time. As a result, many researchers
have suggested that the techniques developed within multi-agent systems should be used
to introduce a certain amount of autonomy into the management of such systems.
For such an approach to be eﬀective, however, autonomous agents must be able to assess
the trustworthiness of their peers, and make decisions based on these assessments in a
clearly justiﬁed way. One way to do this is to draw upon the existing techniques of
decision theory and statistics, which are already well established approaches for solving
these types of problems, and are based on well-founded axioms and reasoning.
However, there are two main factors that make trust assessment problems particularly
challenging. First, the amount and type of information a truster has available about a
trustee may vary greatly depending on the situation. For example, a truster may have
interacted with a trustee many times before, and so have extensive knowledge about the
dynamics of the trustee’s behaviour. On the other hand, there may be many instances
in a large system where a truster comes across a trustee that neither it nor its peers
have interacted with before. In both cases, a truster must be able to make reasonable
decisions based on the information it has available.
Second, if a truster needs to rely on the third party experiences of its peers, there are
two main diﬃculties that arise that do not arise with a truster’s own experience. First,
a third party’s view of trustee’s behaviour may be diﬀerent from that of the trustee,
either because the trustee behaves diﬀerently toward diﬀerent agents, or because the
third party does not assess behaviour in precisely the same way as the truster. Second,
a truster’s reputation sources may have incentives to misrepresent their experiences with
a trustee, so as to achieve their own malicious goals. Nevertheless, reputation can be a
useful source of information, provided a truster can ward against such possibilities.
To this end, we have developed two models of trust, known as TRAVOS and TRAVOS-
C, which can facilitate agent decision making under such conditions. In particular,
TRAVOS includes a heuristic mechanism for dealing with inaccurate reputation, and
is applicable when an agent’s behaviour can be appropriately represented as a binary
event. Building on this, TRAVOS-C oﬀers three main advantages over TRAVOS:
1. It reasons about continuous aspects of trustee behaviour.
2. It includes an improved Bayesian mechanism for handling inaccurate reputation.
3. It can assess an agent based on the behaviour of other similar agents in the system.134 Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Work
Both models contribute to the state-of-the-art in computational models of trust, and
constitute a signiﬁcant step toward practical autonomous management of large and
open service-oriented environments.Appendix A
Techniques for Numerical
Integration
Often, we need to deal with deﬁnite integrals that do not have closed form analytical
solutions. Prime examples of this can be found in Bayesian analysis, often occurring
when we need to perform expected value calculations, or ﬁnd the normalising constant
for a probability density function. Thus, when analytical solutions are not feasible, we
are forced to rely on numerical integration techniques, which can largely by separated
into deterministic and non-deterministic methods. Together, these classes cover a large
number of methods, including some well established techniques and others that are still
the subject of active research. In this appendix, however, we will focus our attention
on those techniques that have been employed, or are otherwise appropriate to, the work
discussed in this thesis, and in particular a group of non-deterministic techniques known
as Monte-Carlo methods. However, to put these in context, we shall begin by giving an
overview of some of the main deterministic methods available.
A.1 Deterministic Methods
Many of the most classical deterministic techniques, for example Newton-Cotes rules
(Evans and Swartz, 1999), take their inspiration from the deﬁnition of deﬁnite integration
as the limit of a Riemann sum. For example, suppose that a function f : R → R is
continuous on the interval [a,b], and that x1,...,xn is a sequence of numbers such that:
a = x1 < x2 < ... < xn−1 < xn = b
In this case, the deﬁnite integral of f from a to b can be deﬁned as:
Z b
a
f(x) dx = lim
n→∞
n−1 X
k=1
f(wk)∆xk (A.1)
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Figure A.1: An example of an integrand, approximated with diﬀerent numbers of
rectangles.
where ∆xk = xk+1−xk and wk is any number in [xk,xk+1]. Essentially, this means that
the integral can be approximated by summing the areas of a collection of rectangles that
approximate the integrand, as illustrated in Figure A.1. By dividing the domain of inte-
gration into an increasing the number of such rectangles, we can arbitrarily increase the
accuracy of such approximations at the expense of increasing the size and computational
cost of the summation.
More generally, we can partition the domain of integration into one or more regions,
and approximate each region by an elementary function which does have an analytical
solution to its integral. By increasing the complexity of these approximating functions,
we can increase the accuracy of the approximation without increasing the size of sum-
mation. However, there is a trade oﬀ here, as more complex approximations carry their
own computational overhead.
Although such techniques can provide highly accurate results eﬃciently in low dimen-
sions, in higher dimensions the size of summation required for a given level of accuracy
can increase exponentially. Thus, when dimensionality is high, or computational eﬃ-
ciency is paramount, we may need to turn to other methods that do not rely on splitting
the integrand into regions.
A simple method for achieving this is Laplace’s method (Evans and Swartz, 1999). In
terms of the types of functions it can approximate eﬀectively, this has perhaps narrower
applicability than some alternatives, such as variational methods. However, it does
provide a simple and eﬀective alternative for certain types of problem. The technique
works by approximating a function by an unnormalised Gaussian p.d.f. Based on this,
we can integrate the function using the known results for the normal distribution, but
the technique also has wider applications; for example, during rejection sampling, which
is described below. In one dimension, the method works by basing the variance of the
Gaussian approximate on the 2nd log derivative of the integrand in the neighbourhood ofAppendix A Techniques for Numerical Integration 137
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its maximum. More precisely, if we have an integrand f(x) with an estimated maximum
at x0, then we approximate f(x) by an unnormalised Gaussian as follows:
f(x) ≈ f(x0)exp

−
c(x − x0)2
2

where, (A.2)
c =
∂2
∂x2 lnf(x)
 
 x = x0 (A.3)
For this it can be seen that the approximate is proportional to a Gaussian p.d.f. with
variance 1
c. As such, we know from the normalising constant of this Gaussian that:
Z ∞
−∞
f(x) dx ≈ f(x0)
r
2π
c
(A.4)
Beyond this, the technique can be generalised to higher dimensions by calculating the
Hessian matrix1 of the integrand’s natural logarithm. This can then by used to approxi-
mate the integrand by a multidimensional Gaussian with appropriate covariance matrix.
However, as is clear from this description, the Laplace method is only applicable if the
integrand can by approximated eﬀectively by a Gaussian density function. Sometimes
this can be achieved by applying some transformation to the integrand, but, in any
event, the function should have one predominant maximum, with relatively symmetric
sloping sides that decreases monotonically toward zero. To illustrate this, Figure A.2
shows some example functions with corresponding Laplacian approximates.
A.2 Monte Carlo Methods
So far, the numerical integration techniques that we have described suﬀer from one of
two problems: either they place a hard limit on the level of accuracy they can achieve for
certain types of functions, or they quickly become intractable as dimensionality grows.
1The Hessian matrix is the multidimensional equivalent of the 2nd derivate in one dimension. It
contains entries of all the partial 2nd derivatives of a function (Khuri, 2003).138 Appendix A Techniques for Numerical Integration
In contrast, Monte Carlo techniques occupy the middle ground for two main reasons:
(1) they are anytime algorithms, in that greater accuracy can always be achieved by
spending more compute time on estimation; and (2) they are less sensitive (though
not always immune) to the eﬀects of dimensionality, compared to many deterministic
techniques.
The deﬁning property from which Monte Carlo techniques derive their strength is that
they simulate a stochastic process. They are in fact sampling methods, which can be
used to draw samples from almost any probability distribution of choice. Integration
problems are solved as a by product of this, by reformalising a deﬁnite integral as
an expected value calculation. This makes expected utility calculations a particularly
natural application of Monte Carlo techniques, but other integration problems can also
be solved in this way, even if an expected value is not their aim.
To give an example of how these work, suppose we wish to perform deﬁnite integration
of a vector x over domain X, and we can express this integral as the expected value
of some function f(x) with p.d.f. p(x) (Equation A.5). Then, according to probability
theory, we can approximate this integral by averaging the value of f(x) over n i.i.d
samples, {x1,...,xn} drawn from p(x) (Equation A.6).
E[f(x)] =
Z
X
f(x)p(x) dx (A.5)
E[f(x)] ≈
n X
i=1
f(xi) (A.6)
This results in an anytime algorithm because we can perform the calculation with any
reasonable value of n. However, the larger we allow n to be, the larger the expected
accuracy will be. Furthermore, the accuracy of this technique is not directly depen-
dent on the dimensionality of the domain, but only on the variance of the distribution
speciﬁed by p(x). However, as we shall see, dimensionality can cause other problems,
because it can increase the diﬃcultly associated with drawing independent (or eﬀectively
independent) samples.
With this mind, we shall now explore some of the mainstream techniques for sampling
from a distribution. In the main, there are two ways to do this: either we attempt
to draw independent samples from the distribution, or we can draw dependent samples
using a Markov chain. Independent samples are always preferred, because generally they
provide a higher level of accuracy with a lower number of samples. However, generating
independent samples is not always easy, in some cases carrying a higher computational
overhead than they are worth. On the other hand, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
techniques work by generating a sequence of samples in which each sample depends on
the sample that directly precedes it in the chain. Provided the marginal distribution
of each sample (with all other samples unknown) is the distribution we wish to sample
from, then the approximation will still converge on the desired result. However, theAppendix A Techniques for Numerical Integration 139
larger the correlation between each sample and its predecessors, the more samples it will
take to achieve a desired level of accuracy.
A.3 Independent Samples and Rejection Sampling
To generate truly independent samples from a given distribution, we have two main
possibilities: inversion methods, or rejection sampling (Mackay, 2003). Both of these
techniques assume that we can generate samples from some elementary distribution,
such as a uniform distribution, for which there are many existing algorithms (Gentle,
1998). The samples are then manipulated in some way, so that the distribution of the
modiﬁed samples is as desired.
In the case of inversion methods, this is achieved by generating uniform samples on the
interval [0,1] and then transforming these using the inverse distribution function of the
target distribution. However, in many cases, calculating the inverse distribution function
is not a tractable proposition. Therefore, unless the peculiarities of the problem allow
for some other sampling regime, we must turn to rejection sampling.
The main diﬀerence between rejection sampling and sample transformation, is that
rejection sampling does not keep all of the samples it actually generates. Instead, samples
are ﬁrst proposed, and then selectively thrown away, such that the remaining samples
have the desired distribution. To see how this is achieved, suppose that we have two
distributions: (1) a target distribution with p.d.f., P(x), which we wish to sample from;
and (2) a proposal distribution with p.d.f., Q(x), which we actually can sample from.
We then need to be able to evaluate functions P∗(x) and Q∗(x) that are proportional
to P(x) and Q(x) respectively. That is, it must be the case that:
[∀x ∈ X, P(x) = aP∗(x)] ∧ [∀x ∈ X, Q(x) = bQ∗(x)]
where a and b are two (possibly unknown) constants and X is the domain of x. In
addition, it must also be the case that:
∀x ∈ X, Q∗(x) > P∗(x)
Although the last of these constraints may not always by easy to fulﬁll, that we only need
of evaluating functions proportional to the two densities gives us signiﬁcant freedom. In
particular, it releases us from the necessity to evaluate the normalising constant for the
target distribution, if this is not of direct interest. For example, in Section ??, the
expected value calculations given in Equations 3.3 and 3.4, both involve the posterior
density p(θ|X) from Equation 3.6. In this case, we could use P∗(x) = p(θ)p(X|θ), so
avoiding the need to evaluate p(X), which we have already stated can be problematic.140 Appendix A Techniques for Numerical Integration
Algorithm 4 The rejection sampling algorithm.
for s = 1 to n do
accepted ← false
while accepted is false do
s ← sample from Q
u ← uniform sample from interval [0,Q∗(s)]
if u ≤ P∗(s) then
xi ← s
accepted ← true
end if
end while
end for
￿
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Figure A.3: Example rejection sampling regime.
With this in mind, the method proceeds according to Algorithm 4. Here, the ﬁrst step
is to draw a sample s from the proposal distribution, following by a second sample u,
drawn uniformly from the interval [0,Q∗(s)]. Based on this, s is rejected if u > P∗(s) and
kept otherwise. The reason this works is illustrated in Figure A.3. In eﬀect, the vector
< s,u > is uniformly drawn from the area under the curve of Q∗(x). Since any samples
that are drawn in the shaded area between Q∗(x) and P∗(x) are rejected, the remaining
vectors are uniform samples from the area under P∗(x). As a direct consequence of this,
the s components are distributed according to the P(x) which is the desired result.
Although this is true for any proposal density that satisﬁes the stated constraints, not
all such densities are equal. The distinguishing factor is the rejection probability, which
marginalised over x, is given as:
Z
X
P∗(x)
Q∗(x)
Q(x) dx (A.7)
Normally, generating samples from the proposal density is relatively inexpensive. How-
ever, the number of proposal samples required per accepted sample, grows proportionallyAppendix A Techniques for Numerical Integration 141
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Figure A.4: Examples of poor rejection regimes.
with the rejection probability. Thus, although it may be acceptable to reject 50%, or
even 95% of samples, rejecting 99.99% of samples may prove to be inhibitingly expen-
sive, depending on the application. A certain amount of optimisation on the part of
the proposal density may thus be desirable, although achieving near zero rejections is
unlikely to be necessary. However, to achieve even a 1% acceptance rate, the proposal
density needs to strike a balance between adequately covering the full support of the
target distribution, and expending too much density in areas where the target has little
or no density.
These two extremes are exempliﬁed in Figure A.4. Here, part (a) illustrates a very
narrow target distribution with a uniform proposal distribution covering a much wider
domain. The rejection probability in this case will be high because there will be a
relatively low probability of generating samples in the region of the target. On the other
hand, part (b) shows a standard normal distribution being used to propose samples for
a Cauchy distribution of similar scale. This case is actually a misnomer, because it is
impossible to use a Gaussian to adequately propose samples for a Cauchy, due to the
Cauchy distribution’s wider tails. In eﬀect, the area shaded black in the ﬁgure would
be clipped from the target distribution, and so any accepted samples would actually be
distributed according to the remaining area of the Cauchy, shaded white.
The search for viable proposal densities is also hindered by dimensionality. This is be-
cause, as dimensionality grows, it becomes more and more diﬃcult to ﬁnd Q∗(x) always
greater than P∗(x), without resulting in impractical rejection probabilities. Moreover,
it is generally the case that the acceptance rate becomes exponentially small as dimen-
sionality increases. To some extent, this can be overcome if the distribution can be142 Appendix A Techniques for Numerical Integration
Algorithm 5 The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
x0 ← initial state
for s = 1 to n do
x0 ← sample from Q(x|xi−1)
a = (P∗(x0)Q(xi−1|x0))/(P∗(xi−1)Q(x0|xi−1))
if a ≥ 1 then
xi = x0
else
xi = xi−1
end if
end for
broken into its low dimensional conditionals. For example, suppose we wish to sample
the joint distribution of three scalars, with p.d.f. P(x1,x2,x3). This can be achieved by
sampling ﬁrst from P(x1) followed by P(x2|x1) and then P(x3|x1,x2). In each case, the
samples from the current distribution supply the conditionals for each subsequent dis-
tribution. This, however, is not always feasible, so rejection sampling is not considered
an appropriate technique for much more than one dimensional problems.
A.4 The Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm
When truly independent sampling can not be eﬃciently achieved, then turning to de-
pendent sampling may oﬀer a viable alternative. One of the simplest of such approaches
is the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Mackay, 2003). This works in a similar way to
rejection sampling, accept that the proposal density need not be similar to the target
density for the technique to be eﬀective. Instead, samples are proposed from a density
Q(x|x0), which is dependent on the current state x0. That is, instead of generating a set
of independent samples, we now generate a sequence of samples, x1,...,xn, in which
each xi is directly dependent on its predecessor, xi−1, starting from some initial state
x0. Such a sequence is known as a Markov chain, which is why Metropolis-Hastings
and other sampling regimes that use this technique are known as Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods.
Although in using a Markov chain, we lose the ability to generate independent samples,
the advantage over rejection sampling is that Q(x|x0) no longer needs to be similar in
form to P(x), something which can be diﬃcult to achieve for complex distributions.
Instead, the method proceeds according to Algorithm 5, in which each sample xi is
proposed from Q(xi|xi−1) and accepted if:
P∗(x0)Q(xi−1|x0)
P∗(xi−1)Q(x0|xi−1)
≥ 1 (A.8)Appendix A Techniques for Numerical Integration 143
Algorithm 6 The Gibbs sampling algorithm.
x(0) =< x
(0)
1 ,...,x
(0)
m > is initial state
for i = 1 to n do
for j = 1 to m do
x
(i)
j ← sample from P(xj|{x
(i−1)
l }l6=j)
end for
end for
If this is not the case, the proposed sample is rejected. However, rather than leaving the
sequence untouched, rejecting a sample causes the previous sample state to be written
again to the sequence.
The key property of this process is that the distribution of xi tends to P(x) as i → ∞
and, as a result, it can be shown that samples generated by Metropolis-Hastings can
be used to estimate expected values through Equation A.10, where D is the domain of
x. However, how fast this convergence takes place is another matter, which determines
how many samples are required to achieve a given level of accuracy, relative to a given
number of independent samples.
E[f(x)] =
Z
D
f(x)P(x) dx (A.9)
≈
1
n
n X
i=1
xiP(xi) (A.10)
As with the acceptance rate in rejection sampling, this convergence rate is determined
by the size and shape of the proposal distribution, relative to the target distribution.
If the proposal density is too large compared to the target, then many samples will be
proposed that have low probability according to the target, and so will be unlikely to
be accepted. On the otherhand, if the proposal density is too small, then the sample
sequence will exhibit a random walk behaviour, which will take a long time to adequately
explore the target density. As well as this, it can be diﬃcult to assess how many samples
are required to achieve a certain level of accuracy, although many techniques have been
proposed to tackle this problem to some extent (Evans and Swartz, 1999).
Once again, dimensionality plays a role in how diﬃcult it is to achieve an eﬃcient
sampling mechanism. This time, however, the relationship between the number of di-
mensions and the size of simulation required for a given level of accuracy is essentially
quadratic, rather than exponential. Thus solutions involving a reasonably high number
of dimensions are at least possible, though we may still need to run long simulations to
achieve them.144 Appendix A Techniques for Numerical Integration
A.5 Gibbs Sampling
Gibbs Sampling (Mackay, 2003) is another example of a MCMC technique, which can be
applied to high dimensions. In fact, Gibbs sampling can be shown to be a specialise case
of Metropolis-Hastings, so any statement that is true for Metropolis-Hastings methods
is also true of Gibbs Sampling. What disguises it from the general case is that it does
not involve any adjustable parameters in the form of a proposal density, so it can be an
attractive proposition to get a Monte Carlo mechanism up and running quickly.
The process behind it is again very simple (Algorithm 6). Essentially, a sequence of
dependent samples for a random vector x =< x1,...,xm > are generated by sampling
individually from the set of conditional distributions P(xi|{xj}j6=i); that is, we use the
distributions of each element of x conditioned on all other elements of x. Furthermore,
the conditional values used to generate the next state, xi+1, are supplied from the values
of the current state, xi. This is done under that assumption that, individually, these
distributions are easier to sample from than the joint distribution P(x) as a whole.
A.6 Slice Sampling
Slice sampling (Mackay, 2003) is a MCMC approach that can be applied whenever the
Metropolis-Hastings method can be applied, but it is more robust against choices in
its parameters. The advantage is that it is self tuning: whereas Metropolis-Hastings is
sensitive to the shape of its proposal density relative to the target, slice sampling adapts
its parameters in response to the target distribution. This does not necessarily mean
that increasing dimensionality does not decrease the eﬃciency of the algorithm, nor
does the algorithm prevent random walking behaviour. However, it does mean that slice
sampling will generally out perform basic Metropolis-Hastings techniques on a variety
of problems.
Although the details of the algorithm are slightly more involved than those we have
described so far, a full deﬁnition is not necessary to understand its main properties. In
one dimension it can be considered similar to rejection sampling, in that it ﬁrst generates
2 dimensional vectors sampled uniformly from under the curve of P∗(x). However, no
ﬁxed proposal density is used. Instead, each subsequent sample < x0,u0 > is drawn
based on < x,u > as illustrated in Figure A.5. First, P∗(x) is evaluated, and then
u0 is drawn uniformly from the interval [0,P∗(x)]. Second, an interval [xl,xu] that
includes x is randomly selected, and from this x0 is chosen. During this process, any
proposed samples for which u0 > P∗(x0) are rejected, and the interval [xl,xu] is changed
dynamically so that it does not extend too far beyond or within the probable region
of P(x). In this way, random walk behaviour is controlled, while at the same time theAppendix A Techniques for Numerical Integration 145
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Figure A.5: Illustration of the slice sampling algorithm.
rejection rate is kept low, ensuring samples are unlikely to be proposed in areas of low
density.
This basic algorithm for one-dimensional problems can also be modiﬁed to deal with
multi-dimensional problems. However, perhaps more usefully, there is a computer-
friendly version of the algorithm due to Skilling and Mackay (2003) that can be applied
to problems of any number of dimensions without modiﬁcation. To achieve this, Skilling
and MacKay account for the fact that, no matter what the distribution’s domain, real
variables will always be represented using a ﬁnite number of bits. Therefore, all the
operations in the algorithm are applied directly to a set of bits of given length, rather
than to the real values that they conceptualise.Appendix B
Parameter Mapping for the Beta
Distribution
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In this appendix, we provide two theorems, which show how the α and β parameters
of a beta distribution can be calculated, if we know the variance and mean of the
distribution. Speciﬁcally, Theorem B.1 shows how α can be derived in terms of the
distribution mean (denoted µ) and the variance (denoted σ2), and then how, given this,
β can be determined from α and µ. Following this, Theorem B.2, gives an alternative
expression for β, in terms of σ2 and µ only.
Theorem B.1. Given Equations B.1 & B.2, the parameters of the beta distribution, α
& β can be derived from the distribution variance (denoted σ2) and the mean (denoted
µ).
µ =
α
α + β
(B.1)
σ2 =
α · β
(α + β)2(α + β + 1)
(B.2)
Proof: First of all, we express β in terms of µ and α:
µ =
α
α + β
(from deﬁnition) (B.3)
(α + β) · µ = α (B.4)
α + β = α/µ (B.5)
β = α/µ − α (B.6)
Now substitute for β in equation B.2 and simplify:
σ2 =
α(α/µ − α)
(α + (α/µ − α))2(α + (α/µ − α) + 1)
(B.7)
σ2 =
α2/µ − α2
(α/µ)2(α/µ + 1)
(B.8)
σ2 =
α2/µ − α2
(α/µ)3 + (α/µ)2 (B.9)
σ2 =
α2/µ − α2
α3/µ3 + α2/µ2 (B.10)
σ2 =
1/µ − 1
α/µ3 + 1/µ2 (B.11)
σ2 =
µ2 − µ3
α + µ
(B.12)
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σ2(α + µ) = µ2 − µ3 (B.13)
σ2 · α + σ2 · µ = µ2 − µ3 (B.14)
σ2 · α = µ2 − µ3 − σ2 · µ (B.15)
α = (µ2 − µ3 − σ2 · µ)/σ2 (B.16)
α =
µ2 − µ3
σ2 − µ (B.17)
From Equations B.6 and B.17, α and β can be expressed as follows, thus proving the
theorem.
α =
µ2 − µ3
σ2 − µ, β =
α
µ
− α
Theorem B.2. The β parameter of the beta distribution can be expressed only in terms
of µ and σ2 as shown in Equation B.18. We prove this in two ways: ﬁrst, by considering
the properties of the beta distribution; and second, by substitution.
β =
(1 − µ)2 − (1 − µ)3
σ2 − (1 − µ) (B.18)
Proof through the properties of the Beta Distribution: Imagine that we have
two beta distributions: distribution d with parameters α and β, and distribution ˆ d with
parameters ˆ α and ˆ β. Similarly, we denote the mean of ˆ d as ˆ µ and the variance of ˆ d as
ˆ σ2.
Now assume that ˆ α = β and ˆ β = α. From this we know that ˆ σ2 = σ2 since:
α · β
(α + β)2(α + β + 1)
=
β · α
(β + α)2(β + α + 1)
=
ˆ α · ˆ β
(ˆ α + ˆ β)2(ˆ α + ˆ β + 1)
(B.19)
and ˆ µ = (1 − µ) since:
ˆ µ + µ =
α
α + β
+
ˆ α
ˆ α + ˆ β
(B.20)
ˆ µ + µ =
α
α + β
+
β
β + α
(B.21)
ˆ µ + µ = 1 (B.22)
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We can now prove Equation B.18 as follows:
β = ˆ α =
ˆ µ2 − ˆ µ3
ˆ σ2 − ˆ µ, (from Equation B.17) (B.24)
β =
(1 − µ)2 − (1 − µ)3
σ2 − (1 − µ), (by substitution) (B.25)
Proof by Substitution: We now show that Equation B.18 is true by substituting
Equation B.17 into Equation B.6 as follows:
β =
α
µ
− α (B.26)
β =

µ2 − µ3
σ2 − µ

/µ −

µ2 − µ3
σ2 − µ

(B.27)
β =

µ − µ2
σ2 − 1

−

µ2 − µ3
σ2 − µ

(B.28)
β =
(µ − µ2) − (µ2 − µ3)
σ2 − (1 − µ) (B.29)
β =
µ − 2µ2 + µ3
σ2 − (1 − µ) (B.30)
To show that Equations B.18 and B.30 are equivalent, we expand (1 − µ)2 − (1 − µ)3.
(1 − µ)2 = 1 − 2µ + µ2 (B.31)
(1 − µ)3 = (1 − 2µ + µ2)(1 − µ) (B.32)
(1 − µ)3 = (1 − 2µ + µ2) − (µ − 2µ2 + µ3) (B.33)
(1 − µ)3 = 1 − 2µ + µ2 − µ + 2µ2 − µ3 (B.34)
(1 − µ)3 = 1 − 3µ + 3µ2 − µ3 (B.35)
(1 − µ)2 − (1 − µ)3 = (1 − 2µ + µ2) − (1 − 3µ + 3µ2 − µ3) (B.36)
(1 − µ)2 − (1 − µ)3 = 1 − 2µ + µ2 − 1 + 3µ − 3µ2 + µ3 (B.37)
(1 − µ)2 − (1 − µ)3 = µ − 2µ2 + µ3 (B.38)
β =
(1 − µ)2 − (1 − µ)3
σ2 − (1 − µ) =
µ − 2µ2 + µ3
σ2 − (1 − µ) (B.39)
Hence Equations B.18 and B.30 are equivalent and therefore Equation B.18 is true.Bibliography
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